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 Emotional Intelligence (EI) is a nebulous concept that permeates daily 
interpersonal communication.  Despite prolific research into its benefits, EI 
subjective measurement is difficult, contributing to an enigmatic definition of its 
core constructs. However, neuroimaging research probing socioaffective brain 
mechanisms underlying putative EI constructs can add an objective perspective 
to existing models, thereby illuminating the nature of EI. Therefore, the primary 
aim of this dissertation is to identify brain networks underlying EI and examine 
how EI arises from the brain’s functional and structural neuroarchitecture. EI is 
first defined according to behavioral data, which suggests EI is made up of two 
core constructs: Empathy and Emotion Regulation (ER). The interaction of brain 
networks underlying Empathy and ER is then investigated using a novel 
neuroimaging analysis method: dynamic functional connectivity (dynFC). The 
results suggest efficient communication and (re)configuration between the CEN, 
DMN, SN underlie both ER and RME task dynamics, and that these temporal 
patterns relate to trait empathy and ER tendency. Given the demonstrated 





second aim is to examine each of these constructs individually through detailed 
experiments using a variety of neuroimaging methodologies. The dissertation 
concludes by proposing EI is an ability that arises from the effective, yet flexible 
communication between brain networks underlying Empathy and ER.  
 The dissertation is divided into five chapters. Chapter I describes the 
foundational concept of EI as originally described by a variety of psychological 
figures and the lacuna that exists in terms of its neural correlates. Chapter II 
presents behavioral data that proposes EI is best predicted by Empathy and ER. 
Chapter III explores the dynamic relationship between brain networks underlying 
Empathy and ER, with the aim of elucidating their neurobiological associations, 
and investigate how such associations may combine to create EI. Chapter IV 
examines Empathy closely, by probing its neurobiological relationship to 
interoception and anxiety. Chapter V examines ER closely, by investigating 
whether gender plays a role in ER, and its neurobiological relationship to 
hormones. Chapter VI links the general findings from Chapters III, IV and V, and 
proposes an integrative neurocognitive EI model.  The dissertation concludes by 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
“When we speak of emotional intelligence, we are alluding to whether someone 
understands key components of emotional functioning” 
 
Alain de Botton 
 
Background 
In recent years, an increased interest in the neurobiological basis of 
emotion perception and regulation in humans has led to the acknowledgement 
that emotions play a critical role in cognitive processes such as judgment, 
decision-making, problem solving and interpersonal perception (Damasio, 2005; 
Grewal et al., 2006). The novel concept of Emotional Intelligence (EI) proposes a 
useful framework for integrating aspects of emotion processing, emotion 
regulation and subsequent effective behavioral responses to emotional stimuli. 
This framework has its early roots in Thorndike's 1920 concept of social 
intelligence, which involved the ability to understand, manage, and interact wisely 
with others. It is also related to Gardner's 1986 discussion of intra- and inter- 
personal intelligence, which involved the capacity to understand the intentions, 
motivations and desires of the self and other, respectively. However, it was 
Mayer and Salovey that in 1990 built upon this work and formally defined EI as: 







others’ feelings and emotions, to discriminate among them, and to use this 
information to guide one’s thinking and action”. This definition was later refined 
and broken down into four proposed abilities, or branches, that are distinct yet 
related: perceiving, using, understanding, and managing emotions (Mayer, 
2004), and updated in 2016 by the same authors. The following is a description 
of the latest reformulation of their EI model (Mayer et al., 2016).  
The first branch, perceiving emotions, is the ability to detect and decipher 
emotions in own’s own physical state, as well as others’ faces, pictures and 
voices through their facial expressions, language and behavior. The perception 
of emotion is considered the most basic, as it provides the basis for all other 
emotional processing. The second branch, using emotions, is the ability to 
harness emotions and facilitate various cognitive activities, such as thinking and 
problem solving. For example, research suggests completing careful methodical 
tasks is best facilitated by a sad mood, while a good mood can stimulate creative 
and innovative thinking (Isen et al., 1991). An emotionally intelligent person could 
successfully gauge their mood and choose the task appropriately. The third 
branch, understanding emotions, is the ability to comprehend emotion language 
and appreciate complicated relationships among emotions. This ability 
encompasses the ability to correctly label emotions, be sensitive to variations in 
the same emotions (emotional granularity (Barrett, 2004)), and understand how a 
person might feel under certain conditions, or affective forecasting. The fourth 







ourselves and others. This branch includes the ability to evaluate strategies to 
maintain, reduce, or intensify an emotional response, and effectively manage 
one’s own or others’ emotions to achieve a desired outcome. For example, a 
shrewd politician may tap into feelings of anger in order to rouse feelings of 
anger in his political base. Other researchers have expanded on the Mayer & 
Salovey EI model, introducing the expression of emotions in a productive manner 
(Goleman, 1995), empathy (Leiberg & Anders, 2006; Petrides & Furnham, 2000), 
and even zeal to motivate others (Davies et al., 1998) as crucial social skills that 
can contribute to effectively managing relationships with others.  
Despite its amorphous definition, skills linked to EI have been directly 
associated with positive social interaction and well-being, while emotion 
dysregulation is considered a key mechanism underlying various 
psychopathologies (Davidson, 1998; M. L. Phillips et al., 2008). For example, 
research suggests high EI measurements are inversely related to social anxiety 
and depression (Mayer et al., 1999), are associated with more positive 
interactions with other people (Lopes et al., 2005), less violent behavior (Brackett 
et al., 2004), improved relationship satisfaction, leadership ability, career 
success, physical/emotional health, and many others (Brackett et al., 2012; 
Hagelskamp et al., 2013; Keidar, 2015).  Conversely, low EI has been associated 
with anxiety, depression, posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (G. J. Taylor, 







Together, these findings suggest that EI skills play an important role in 
helping people to manage conflict and experience positive emotions in their 
relationships with others, while a lack thereof may lead to emotion dysregulation 
and possibly mental disorders. Importantly, research shows that EI comprises 
skills that can be modified. This idea gains support from previous studies 
suggesting that scores on EI-related measures tend to improve with age 
(Derksen et al., 2002; Hemmati et al., 2004; Kafetsios, 2004), as well as with 
training in other domains (e.g., music lessons; see (Thompson et al., 2004)). 
That is, these results reinforce the idea EI is set of psychological skills for which 
expertise can be gained through sufficient practice/experience. 
 
Challenges of Current EI Research 
A major challenge faced by psychology researchers studying EI is 
inconsistent measurement, and therefore definition, of EI’s constituent 
constructs. The major limitation of self-report inventories that ask people to 
evaluate their own EI abilities (i.e., recognizing, thinking about, and modifying the 
emotions of self and others) is what they report may not match their true abilities 
(Austin et al., 2004). For example, some people who rate their own social 
sensitivity highly receive much lower ratings from third-party observers (Carney & 
Harrigan, 2003). Another approach to measuring EI involves performance-based 
assessments, but these too, have issues. The performance of the participant is 







be reliably identified. There are also valid concerns regarding the age, gender, 
ethnicity of a chosen group of experts and how that may interact with the 
demographic characteristics of a given test-taker. In addition, the observed 
relationship between self-reported trait EI and actual performance ability (e.g. 
recognizing emotion in faces tends to be weak (r=0.20 to 0.30) (Austin et al., 
2004; Brannick et al., 2009). A third, and more widely used approach, is 
consensus scoring, whereby correct answers are chosen by emotion researchers 
(Kafetsios, 2004). A well-recognized limitation, however, is that since the correct 
answer is defined by what most people choose, it can’t be used for difficult 
questions that most people would get incorrect. Additionally, they do not correlate 
with other established measures of the ability to recognize emotions from facial 
images or voice tones (Roberts et al., 2001) or predict differences in the first 
impressions people make on others while working together (Day & Carroll, 2004), 
as might be expected of an EI test. Also, their ability to predict measures of well-
being and life satisfaction are either greatly reduced or completely removed after 
controlling for other measures, such as general intelligence (IQ) tests and 
personality inventories (Gannon & Ranzijn, 2005). 
Since the processes that comprise EI remain inconsistently defined and 
make its investigation problematic, a potential solution is combining subjective EI 
measurements with objective neuroimaging tasks, therefore testing which 
sociocognitive processes underlie EI. Unlike the self-report methods or 







of EI offers the possibility of a more objective means of scoring/evaluating EI – 
potentially allowing for a (currently lacking) performance-based neurobiological 
cognitive test of EI.  
 
Linking EI to Neuroarchitecture 
Despite its importance in navigating complex socioemotional situations in 
daily life, EI’s neurobiological mechanisms have not been uncovered. Existing 
neuroimaging studies of healthy individuals suggest that several brain regions 
may be of particular importance for the interconnected set of sociocognitive skills 
underlying EI, such as the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex (dlPFC), amygdala, insular cortex, anterior cingulate cortex, superior 
temporal gyrus (STG), and visual association cortex – regions underlying 
emotion perception, understanding and regulation (Bar-On et al., 2003; Hornak et 
al., 2003; Killgore & Yurgelun-Todd, 2007; Tarasuik et al., 2009; Xiang et al., 
2017). However, leading models of large-scale brain architecture suggest that 
there is not a 1-to-1 mapping between brain regions and psychological functions. 
That is, most brain regions appear to be involved in a myriad of psychological 
processes, the success of which depend on the correct temporal and regional 
recruitment facilitating their interaction (Anderson, 2014).   
Present influential models define EI as an ‘array of non-cognitive abilities’, 
a problematic assertion since research suggests emotional abilities largely 







understand how EI’s interconnected facets may arise from the brain’s functional 
architecture, common “emotional” and “cognitive” mental processes related to EI 
derived from a broad psychological literature will be discussed in the context of 
canonical intrinsic connectivity networks (ICNs). ICNs are a set of established 
cortical networks presumed to underlie sensory, emotional and cognitive 
functions (Seeley et al., 2007). For the purposes of this illustration, the salience 
(SN), default mode (DMN) and central executive networks (CEN) will serve as a 
relevant demonstration (Figure 1).  
Figure 1: The Salience, Default Mode and Central Executive brain networks. 
Abbreviations: ACC – Anterior Cingulate Cortex, mPFC – Medial Prefrontal 
Cortex, PCC – Posterior Cingulate Cortex, dlPFC – dorsolateral Prefrontal 
Cortex, IPL – Intraparietal Lobule. 
 
The SN includes the anterior insula (AI), anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) 
and in addition the dorsal cingulate and sensorimotor cortex, and features 
extensive connectivity with limbic structures involved in reward and motivation 







al., 2017; Owens et al., 2018; Seth, 2013; Yeo et al., 2011). The SN is thought to 
integrate information regarding bodily changes and direct attention to 
homeostatically/emotionally relevant stimuli (Menon, 2015; Seeley et al., 2007; K. 
S. Taylor et al., 2009).  The DMN comprises the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) 
and posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) regions, and is thought to underlie 
autobiographical, self-monitoring and sociocognitive functions (Raichle, 2015; 
Raichle et al., 2001; van den Heuvel & Hulshoff Pol, 2010). The CEN is a fronto-
parietal network with subcortical coupling distinct from the SEN and is engaged 
in higher-order cognitive and attentional control. The CEN is anchored in the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) and inferior parietal lobule (IPL) (Chan et 
al., 2008; Seeley et al., 2007).  
 
Neural Correlates of Emotional EI Processes 
Regarding emotional processes related to EI, empathy - the tendency to 
share and understand others’ inner lives has been characterized to involve 
regions anchored in the SN (Zaki, 2014). A further delineation has been made 
between a basic emotional contagion system, affective empathy – the sharing an 
emotional experience with another (I feel what you are feeling); and cognitive 
empathy – imagining the situation from another’s perspective (I understand why 
you feel that way) (Shamay-tsoory, 2015). Because affective empathy has been 
linked to automaticity relative to its cognitive component, it primarily elicits 







emotion signals (insula, ACC, sensorimotor cortex), coupled with limbic regions 
(amygdala and hypothalamus) (Decety et al., 2013). By comparison, cognitive 
empathy additionally involves the DMN regions coupled with the superior 
temporal sulcus (STS), temporoparietal junction (TPJ), and fusiform face area 
(FFA) (Saxe & Powell, 2006), regions underlying conscious determination of 
intent. Thus, brain regions involved in empathy are associated with 
receiving/monitoring sensory data, subjective emotional experience and 
understanding complex social interactions.  
Closely related to empathy, the ability to accurately identify emotions in 
the self and others requires self-awareness and understanding of another’s 
perspective. Although behaviorally distinct, neurobiologically the two processes 
rely on similar neural mechanisms. Studies have demonstrated that regions that 
anchor the DMN (plus the insula and amygdala (Vogeley et al., 2001)), respond 
during the recognition/awareness of one’s own emotional states (interoception) 
(Gavazzi et al., 2017). Research on emotional recognition/awareness in others 
reveals involvement of the DMN and SN through two important neural 
mechanisms: the construction of a simulation of the observed emotion in the 
perceiver via amygdala, STS, TPJ and FFA, followed by the top-down 
modulation of sensory cortices, involving the vmPFC and insula (Adolphs et al., 
2000). The involvement of STS and TPJ, which are posited to contain mirror 
neurons (sensitive to biological motion) (Iriki, 2006), suggest these areas are 







emotion recognition/awareness in the self relies on regions involved in 
interoception, while emotional recognition/awareness in others involves regions 
associated with emotion perception and categorization.  
While identifying and understanding emotions in ourselves and others is 
necessary for EI, emotion regulation (ER) – how a person can effectively manage 
his/her emotions, is also critical. Research shows individuals high in EI regulate 
their emotions successfully when necessary but do so flexibly, thereby leaving 
room for emotions to emerge (Peña-Sarrionandia et al., 2015). Moreover, 
promising research suggests EI training can improve ER outcomes (Bagheri et 
al., 2017). Neurobiologically, ER is thought to be mediated by neural circuits 
involving regions anchored in the CEN: the dlPFC and vmPFC, which putatively 
down-regulate the amygdala (Davidson et al., 2000; Etkin et al., 2015). The 
dlPFC is recruited to maintain a higher-order goal representation online, while the 
vmPFC updates specific emotional outcome expectancies, subsequently 
influencing emotion regulation through direct projections to the amygdala. Thus, 







solve emotional conflict. A neural representation of the three “emotional” 
processes is illustrated below (Figure 2).  
    Figure 2: EI Emotional Processes 
 
Neural Correlates of Cognitive EI Processes 
In concert with “emotional” processes, processes underlying “cognition”, or 
executive functions (EF), have been widely interrogated. A breadth of research 
points to the generally accepted mechanisms of decision-making, response 
inhibition and directed attention. Decision-making permits short-term 
maintenance and manipulation of information while calculating reward 
contingencies. Neuroimaging studies probing decision-making which relies on 
working memory, observe robust activation of the CEN regions vmPFC and 
dlPFC during memory search and maintenance processes (Barbey et al., 2013; 







establishes a link between past decisions and affiliated emotions (Bechara et al., 
2000), thereby aiding future decision-making. Meanwhile, vmPFC activation is 
observed during processing of reward contingencies, increasing the likelihood 
that cognitive operations are maintained by the dlPFC, thus illustrating the 
importance of communication between the vmPFC and dlPFC (Barbey et al., 
2011; Kringelbach, 2005; Schultz et al., 2000; Tremblay & Schultz, 1999). Thus, 
decision-making relies on neural circuits involving keeping goals in mind while 
assessing their reward expectancy. 
Response inhibition, the ability to suppress inappropriate or unwanted 
actions, recruits a right-lateralized CEN network formed by prefrontal-parietal 
(rIFG-rIPL) circuits, ACC and the pre-supplementary motor area (SMA) 
(Simmonds et al., 2008). Putatively, the rIFG elicits top down control to suppress 
basal ganglia output to the pre-SMA while the rIPL keeps the location of the 
attention task set in mind (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Rubia et al., 2001). Thus, 
response inhibition engages the right CEN network over planned motor actions. 
Directed attention employs regions within the SEN and CN: the superior 
parietal lobule (SPL), IPL, dlPFC/vlPFC, and frontal eye fields (FEF). Research 
suggests when focusing attention selectively, communication from the dlPFC and 
SPL up-regulates activation in visual cortex for increased processing of 
contextual information related to goal attainment (Barbey et al., 2013). The vlPFC 
and IPL are recruited to source-monitor the general context for salient 







order to ensure goal attainment (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Kastner et al., 1998; 
Mesulam, 1981).  A neural representation of the three “cognitive” processes is 
illustrated below (Figure 3).  
Figure 3: EI Cognitive Processes 
Critically, research suggests a connection exists between various 
“emotional” and “cognitive” EI processes. For example, emotional information 
can have a positive and negative effect on decision-making and working memory 
maintenance (Lindström & Bohlin, 2011; Osaka et al., 2013) and can either 
enhance or impair response inhibition depending on saliency of the stimulus 
(Pessoa et al., 2012). Increased attention is shown to be connected to the 
emotional attributes of a stimuli (Schuett, 2016), and interoception has been 
previously tied to important EI cognitive processes such as problem solving and 
flexibility of thought (Mahler K, 2015). The involvement of the ACC in both 
executive control and emotional processing suggests this structure contributes 







2011). While many studies have either investigated emotional and cognitive EI 
processes separately, how the two interact with each other to create unified 
emotionally intelligent behavior is uncertain.  
 
Project Motivation 
 The extent to which the aforementioned EI processes are related, both 
behaviorally and neurobiologically, is presently unknown, despite the established 
role EI plays in harmonious socioemotional communication. Due to the 
inconsistent EI measurement, a clear EI definition of its processes is lacking. 
Furthermore, neuroimaging studies thus far have only investigated sociocognitive 
processes underlying EI separately, without exploring their interaction. 
Understanding their interaction may explain how different ICNs work in tandem to 
give rise to EI ability.  Thus far, no study has aimed to amend this disparity by 
constructing and testing a cognitive-emotional EI framework based on its putative 
neurobiological mechanisms. Therefore, the primary goals of these dissertation 
studies are a) to define common EI processes based on their consistency in 
current models in order to build a cognitive-emotional EI framework for testing 
the neural mechanisms underlying EI (Chapter II), b) to test the cognitive-
emotional EI framework by investigating how brain networks underlying resultant 
EI processes interact dynamically (Chapter III), c) and to explore the relationship 
of resultant EI processes with physiological and psychological variables using a 







To comprehensively investigate common EI processes, we assessed how 
resultant EI processes interact, and how this interaction is reflected to functional 
neuroarchitecture. This was achieved by implementing a novel neuroimaging 
methodology called dynamic functional connectivity (dynFC). Similar to 
continuous shooting mode on a camera, dynFC captures several snapshots of 
network interactions over the course of the scan, thereby revealing reoccurring 
patterns of dynFC between networks. Comparing dynFC measurements can 
clearly delineate how brain networks underlying EI processes communicate not 
only spatially but also temporally. Then, each resultant EI process was examined 
individually, to understand how they relate to other physiological variables 
(hormones, interoception), psychological traits (anxiety, worry, rumination) and 
whether any gender differences emerge, through a combination of neuroimaging 
methodologies (structural measurements, functional activation, static functional 
connectivity). Thus, this dissertation aims to answer 1) How do EI processes 
interact on a temporal scale? 2) Are there physiological variables and 
psychological traits related to EI processes? 3) Do men and women differ in their 
practice of EI processes? In this way, this work will improve the understanding, 
cognitive/behavioral measurement, and use of the concept of EI in two ways. 
First, it divides up the processes/abilities contributing to EI in ways that are 
informed by the neural sciences. This holds the promise of reducing confounds 
as well of designing assessments that are potentially capable of offering specific 







can also guide in the interpretation of neuroimaging results, potentially allowing 
such methodologies to also be of some use in identifying particular EI processing 

































CHAPTER II: BUILDING A COGNITIVE-EMOTION EI FRAMEWORK 
 




In order to address the first aim of redefining common EI processes and 
build a behavioral framework for testing the neural mechanisms underlying EI, 
existing trait and ability EI questionnaires were correlated with measurements 
and tasks interrogating EI “emotion” and “cognitive” processes: Decision 
Making/Working Memory, Response Inhibition, Directed Attention and Empathy, 








Figure 4: EI processes investigated 






























We anticipate that the correlational analysis will reveal relationships 
between EI measurements and Response Inhibition and Emotion Regulation, 
since both constructs require a level of control: one over movement, and one 
over emotion, respectively. In addition, we anticipate Empathy will be related to 
Directed Attention, since understanding another’s emotional state requires 
successfully shifting the attention to another.  
Methods 
Participants 
Participants were recruited through on-campus flyers and an online 
research participation system (SONA Systems) and were paid for their 
participation. Every effort was made to recruit an equal number of male and 
female subjects in each study, and to ensure that minorities were represented in 
proportion to the composition of the local community.  30 healthy young adults 
without a reported history of neurological or psychiatric disorders were recruited 
for this study Written informed consent was obtained prior to experimental 
sessions, and experimental protocols were approved by University of Louisville’s 







from the analyses due to incomplete data, leaving a total of 27 participants (m = 
21.85 years old/16 females). 
Procedure 
The collection of data was divided into two consecutive days. The first day, 
participants visited the laboratory to sign consent forms, read through task 
instructions and complete self-report questionnaires and tasks in a quiet room by 
themselves. On the second day, the participants continued completing the 
remainder of self-report questionnaires and tasks. A mix of “emotion” and 
“cognitive” tasks/questionnaires was presented each day, and the order of the 
tasks was optimized to manage participant fatigue (Table 1).  
Day 1 Day 2 
Go-No-Go Task (Response 
Inhibition) 
ER Task (Emotion Regulation) 
RME Task (Empathy) eLEAS Questionnaire (Self/Other 
Awareness) 
Iowa Gambling Task (Decision-
Making) 
STROOP Task (Directed Attention) 
IRI Questionnaire (Empathy) MSCEIT Questionnaire (Ability EI) 









The stimuli for the Emotion Regulation Task consist of neutral and negatively 
valenced pictures taken from the International Affective Picture Series (Lang et 
al., 2005). The stimuli for the Reading the Mind in the Eyes (RME) consist of 
black and white pictures of eye pairs taken from revised RME pen-and-paper test 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). 
“Emotional” EI Tasks and Questionnaires 
Empathy 
The RME task requires participants to view black and white pictures of pairs of 
eyes, then choose the emotion of the individual’s eyes from four choices.  
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI)  
The IRI  measures affective, cognitive and total empathy and consists of 28 items 
rated on a 5-point scale with the anchors: “does not describe me well” to 
“describes me very well” (Davis, 1983). 
Electronic Levels of Emotional Awareness Scale (eLEAS) 
The eLEAS is a performance measure that assesses an individual’s ability to be 
aware his or her emotions, as well as other’s emotions. The scale poses 
evocative interpersonal situations and elicits open-ended descriptions of the 
emotional responses of self and others which are scored using specific structural 









(1) Baseline ER Task – Participants rate neutral and negative IAPS pictures 
on a 1-4 Likert scale for how negative it makes them feel, providing a 
baseline measurement of ER.  
(2) ER task– The task requires participants to view negative IAPS pictures 
within two conditions: 1) Suppress condition – participants view negatively 
valenced pictures and are instructed to “passively view the picture and remove 
yourself from any attached feeling” or 2) Feel condition- participants view 
negative pictures and are instructed to “Feel the emotion associated with the 
picture”. Fifteen different IAPS pictures appear in each condition. The color of a 
border around the pictures indicates the condition: blue for feel trials and red for 
suppress trials.  
(3) ER rating – Participants are asked to rate the pictures that were presented 
in the ER task on negative emotional feeling using a 1-4 Likert scale, which 
provides a behavioral measure of ER. 
(4) Strategy Questionnaire – At the end of each scanning session, the 
participants see the ER task pictures again and write whether they used any 
emotion regulation strategy during the “suppress” trials. 
Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ) 
To measure differences in habitual emotion regulation, participants 
completed the emotion regulation questionnaire (ERQ) (Gross and John 2003). 
The test measures the tendency to use cognitive reappraisal or expressive 







“Cognitive” EI Tasks and Questionnaires 
Decision-Making/Working Memory 
During the virtual Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), participants are given four decks of 
cards and an endowment of fake money ($2000). Participants are presented with 
four virtual decks of cards on a computer screen. They are told that each deck 
holds cards that will either reward or penalize them, using game money. The goal 
of the game is to win as much money as possible. The decks differ from each 
other in the balance of reward versus penalty cards. Thus, some decks are “bad 
decks”, and other decks are “good decks”, because some decks will tend to 
reward the player more often than other decks (Bechara et al., 1994). 
Response Inhibition 
During the Go/NoGo Task, series of letters are presented in a continuous stream 
and participants perform a binary decision on each stimulus. One of the 
outcomes requires participants to make a motor response (go), whereas the 
other requires participants to withhold a response (no-go) (Donders, 1969).  
Directed Attention 
During the STROOP task, participants are required to select the written color 
names of the words independently of the color of the ink (for example, they would 
have to select “purple” no matter what the color of the font). The Stroop effect is 
the delay in reaction time between congruent and incongruent stimuli (Stroop, 
1935).  







Trait Emotional Intelligence Questionnaire (TEIQue) 
This is a 30-item questionnaire designed to measure global trait emotional 
intelligence (Cooper & Petrides, 2010).  
Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT)  
The MSCEIT is an ability-based test designed to measure the four branches of 
the EI model of Mayer and Salovey. MSCEIT consists of 141 items and takes 30-
45 minutes to complete. MSCEIT provides 15 main scores: Total EI score, two 
Area scores, four Branch scores, and eight Task scores. In addition to these 15 
scores, there are three Supplemental scores (Mayer et al., 2003).  
Data was correlated using the corr.test function in the psych package of R 
(Core R Team, 2019; Revelle, 2010), and corrected for age, gender and multiple 
comparisons using False Discover Rate (FDR) (Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995). 




Relationships between measurements of interest are represented in the 








Figure 5: Correlational Network Results. Correlations corrected for age, gender 
and multiple comparisons (FDR). Red lines denote positive correlations, blue 




We observed that ability to control emotions during a task (ER ability) was 
positively related to self-reported cognitive reappraisal tendency (ERQ 
Reappraisal), r(23)=.50, p=.01, but negatively related to self-reported expressive 
suppression tendency r(23)=-.45, p=.02. In addition, increased tendency to 
cognitively reappraise was related to less ability to share emotion with another 
(IRI Affective Empathy), r(23)=-.45, p=.02, but more ability to understand 
another’s emotions (IRI Cognitive Empathy), r(23)=.43, p=.03. Lastly, increased 
trait EI (TEIQue) was related to more ability to understand another’s emotions, 



























p<.01), but inversely associated with tendency to expressively suppress 
emotions r(23)=-.53, p=.01.  
Taken together, these behavioral findings suggest that in our sample, the 
constructs that best predict emotional intelligence are empathy and ER.  
Although traditionally thought of as “emotional” processes, brain imaging 
research suggests they both rely on brain regions subserving “cognitive” 
processes. For example, effective ER relies on the elegant orchestration of the 
dlPFC and vmPFC to downregulate the amygdala, yet utilization of these 
prefrontal regions is also exhibited in working memory and directed attention 
tasks (Barbey et al., 2013; Depue et al., 2016). Furthermore, empathy involves 
activation of the ACC and sensorimotor cortex, as does effective response 
inhibition (Decety et al., 2013; Rubia et al., 2001). Therefore, it is reasonable to 
posit that a cognitive-emotional EI framework involves a combination of brain 
networks involving both “emotional” and “cognitive” processes. 
Using these behavioral findings as a scaffold, we constructed a 
neuroimaging study whereby participants completed the questionnaires and fMRI 
tasks that showed significant relationships within our model. Resultant 
relationships between questionnaire scores, behavioral performance on the fMRI 
tasks and a variety of functional brain measurements thus serve as the 














CHAPTER III: EMPATHY AND EMOTION REGULATION 
 
“It seems the essence of our lives sometimes comes down to the feeling of 




Experiment 1: Empathy and Emotion Regulation Task Dynamics 
 
Empathy lies at the core of harmonious socioemotional communication. 
This multifaceted construct plays a critical interpersonal and societal role, 
enabling sharing of experiences, needs and desires between individuals, and 
establishes an emotional bridge that promotes prosocial behavior (Riess, 2017). 
Relatedly, the ability to regulate emotion is equally important during empathic 
socioemotional encounters to facilitate communication. Current research 
suggests empathy involves two distinct facets: affective empathy, or sharing an 
emotional experience with another (I feel what you are feeling); and cognitive 
empathy, or imagining the situation from another’s perspective (I understand why 
you feel that way) (Shamay-tsoory, 2015). However, these facets have been 
shown to be dissociably disrupted in psychiatric illness (Cox et al., 2012). For 
instance, psychopathy is characterized by deficits in affective but not cognitive 







cognitive but not affective empathy (Cox et al., 2012). Additionally, it’s common 
that individuals afflicted with either disorder exhibit deficits in emotion regulation 
(ER) ability.  
      The ability control one’s own emotional state (James J. Gross, 1998) or ER, 
is posited to interact with empathy. For instance, when a parent is trying to 
comfort an upset child, empathy allows an understanding of the child’s emotional 
state. However, if the parent lacks regulation over their emotions, it may result in 
added distress and impede the parent from appropriately responding to their 
child’s needs. Therefore, ER ability has a critical role in empathy, the core 
assertion being that individuals with a lower ability for ER experience higher 
levels of personal distress and lower levels of empathy when observing another’s 
negative emotional state (Decety & Moriguchi, 2007; Zaki & Ochsner, 2012). Yet 
despite their theorized interaction, no substantial evidence exists linking empathy 
(nor its facets) and ER ability. Clues from clinical populations suggest that in 
addition to being characterized by empathy deficits (Baron-Cohen & 
Wheelwright, 2004; Decety & Moriguchi, 2007; Mullins-Nelson et al., 2006), 
individuals with psychopathy and autism also exhibit decreased ability to regulate 
emotion, leading to dysregulated mood (Kim et al., 2000; Konstantareas & 
Stewart, 2006; Samson et al., 2012). Unraveling how affective and cognitive 
empathy relate to ER ability neurobiologically may illuminate the nature of these 







Previous research suggests brain regions underlying empathy and ER are 
anchored in ICNs that interact together to facilitate interpersonal communication. 
To illustrate using the example above, to show affective empathy, the parent 
must be able to recognize the child’s emotional experience and reflect that 
inward (Simone G. Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2009). This process should influence 
one’s internal physical states, which in turn should correlate with activity in the 
neural structures that make up SN (Craig, 2009; Wiens, 2005), the ICN thought 
to be involved in sensitivity to external stimuli and the integration of sensory 
information (Menon, 2015; Seeley et al., 2007). A parent’s increased recruitment 
of the SN is exhibited in order to observe external signals from the child, 
subsequently influencing the parent’s physiological state, which should elicit 
neural activity within their DMN (Craig, 2009; Wiens, 2005), the ICN which is 
associated with autobiographical, self-monitoring and sociocognitive functions 
(Raichle, 2015; Raichle et al., 2001; van den Heuvel & Hulshoff Pol, 2010), 
behaviors necessary for both affective and cognitive empathy (De Waal & 
Preston, 2017). In order for an effective parent-child interaction, the negative 
emotion the parent recognizes and feels through the aforementioned processes 
must be efficiently regulated. In order for this to occur, the parent’s CEN 
becomes more active to ameliorate unwanted negative emotional reactivity 
(Ochsner et al., 2002), an ICN engaged in higher-order cognitive and attentional 







various ICNs underlying the facets of empathy and ER ability interact dynamically 
to create harmonious socioemotional communication.  
     To date, nascent research has only examined the link between empathy or 
ER ability and static network expression (Bilevicius et al., 2018; Pan et al., 2018) 
that is: people’s subjective empathic response or ER ability and their brain 
communication at a single time point. Although investigating which ICNs are 
related to empathy and ER ability is useful, it is insufficient for understanding 
their flexible temporal network (re) configurations. Elucidating how 
communication between brain networks underlying empathy and ER unravels 
across multiple points in time would illustrate how EI behavior arises from their 
dynamic interaction.  
     The dynamic interactions between ICNs have been revealed by recent 
advances in fMRI analytical methods and are referred to as dynamic functional 
connectivity (dynFC) (Allen et al., 2014; Hutchison et al., 2013). Similar to 







network interactions over the course of the scan, thereby revealing reoccurring 
patterns of dynFC between networks, called brain states (Figure 6).  
Figure 6: Example of a Brain State 
 
Importantly, dynFC brain states have been suggested to correspond to 
mental states (Gonzalez-Castillo et al., 2015). Comparing differences in brain 
state measurements related to affective and cognitive empathy, and their relation 
to ER ability, for example in mean dwell time (how long subjects spent in a given 
brain state), can clearly delineate how these processes vary not only spatially but 
also temporally.  
Aim 
Therefore, using dynFC, we aim to explore how each empathy facet 
(affective/cognitive) contributes to ER ability, and in a complementary 




We anticipate increased affective empathy will relate to higher mean dwell 
time in brain states expressing SN and DMN network positive connectivity, and 
that increased cognitive empathy will relate to higher mean dwell time in brain 
states expressing CEN positive connectivity and DMN negative connectivity. We 
also expect increased ER ability and affective empathy will relate to higher mean 
dwell time in brain states expressing CEN and DMN positive connectivity, as well 







time in brain states expressing SN positive connectivity and CEN negative 
connectivity.  
Methods 
All participants were required to answer an MRI screening questionnaire 
to ensure their safety in an MR environment. In addition, participants were at 
least 18 years of age, right-handed, native English speakers, with normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision and hearing and had no disclosed history of 
neurological or psychiatric disorders. These exclusion criteria are standard in 
neuroimaging research to reduce potential confounds due to handedness, 
differences in perceptual abilities, or effects of psychiatric drugs. Participants 
were screened for being a native English speaker as there may be difficulty in 
interpreting task instructions as a result of language. Every effort was made to 
recruit an equal number of male and female subjects in each study, and to 
ensure that minorities were represented in proportion to the composition of the 
local community. Recruited participants were fully informed and made as 
comfortable as possible in order to maximize retention rates. Candidate subjects 
responding to these notices received a brief description of the research and 
completed prescreening questions over the phone. When arriving to participate in 
a study, participants were familiarized with the protocol by the experimenter, 
including risks and benefits of the research. In the case of fMRI sessions, 
participants also completed a detailed screening form to indicate any 







Medicine standardized MRI screening protocol (absolute exclusions for ferrous 
metal in any part of body, such as pacemakers, cochlear implants, surgical clips 
or metal fragments, serious medical conditions, claustrophobia). To protect 
against potential risks of boredom, fatigue, or frustration, participants were 
allowed rest breaks as needed. Participants’ comfort levels were monitored 
throughout the session. Participants could communicate with the experimenter at 
all times. It was made clear that participation is voluntary and that participants 
could withdraw from the study at any time without penalty or prejudice. Any 
questions that the subjects had were answered by the experimenter. After 
testing, participants were debriefed as to the purpose and predictions of the 
experiments. Written informed consent was obtained prior to all experimental 
sessions, and experimental protocols were approved by University of Louisville’s 
Institutional Review Board prior to data collection. 
fMRI Tasks 
(1) Reading the Mind in the Eyes (RME) 
 
The Reading the Mind in the Eyes task is a measure of “mentalizing,” or reading 
the mind state of another. The participant is presented with a series of 30 B&W 
photographs of the eye-region of the face of different Caucasian actors and 







thinking or feeling from the list of adjectives. Each photograph and choice are 
displayed for 6 seconds (Figure 7). 
Figure 7: Example trial from RME task. 
(2) Emotion Regulation Task (ERT)  
The ERT was divided into three parts: (A) ER Baseline (B) Emotion Regulation 
(ER) (C) ER Rating. Only parts A & B were BOLD scans, part C was structural.  
(A) ER Baseline:  
The ER Baseline task employed a hybrid event-related design that contained 
mini-blocks presented in pseudorandom order. 20 negative International Affective 
Picture System (IAPS) pictures and 10 neutral pictures were displayed  (Lang et 
al., 2005). The pictures were displayed for 4 seconds. This design was chosen to 
balance considerations for the psychological state of the participant with 
statistical power. Following presentation of each stimulus, participants rated the 
image for how negative it made them feel, using a 4-point Likert scale (1 = None 
to 4 = Extremely negative; 2 seconds to rate; Figure 8). This allowed acquisition 







variable jittered ITI was incorporated to increase design efficiency for 
hemodynamic response estimation (0-10 sec). Resultant behavioral ratings from 
the task were further used to calculate ER Suppression Score (see part C).  
Figure 8: Example of a single trial from ER Baseline Task (Image displayed not 
part of actual stimuli set) 
 
(B) Emotion Regulation (ER): 
The ER task also employed a hybrid event-related design with mini blocks 
presented in pseudorandom order, whereby a different set of negative and 
neutral pictures selected from the IAPS database  were displayed (Lang et al., 
2005). First, the words ‘SUPPRESS’ in the color red or ‘VIEW’ in the color blue 
appeared as cues for 500 ms to prepare the participant for the upcoming picture. 
Next, negative pictures surrounded by a red border (Suppress trials) and neutral 
Please rate how negative the emotional 
pictures make you feel. You should answer 
according to the following scale.













pictures surrounded by a blue border (View trials) were presented for 3.5 
seconds (Suppress trials n = 30, View trials n = 12) (Figure 9). The participant 
was instructed to “‘decrease or detach’ from the emotion when the border was 
red, and ‘simply view’ the picture when the border was blue”. The “Suppress” 
instructions were worded simply in order to encourage the participant to use their 
default ER method. A pseudorandom variable jittered ITI was incorporated to 
increase design efficiency for hemodynamic response estimation (0-4 sec). The 
pictures repeated once, with a 60 second break in-between.  
Figure 9: Example of a single trial of each condition from Emotion Regulation 
(ER) (Image displayed not part of actual stimuli set).  
 
(C) ER Rating  
During a structural scan, the same images used in part B were then displayed 
without any border for 4 seconds. Following presentation of each image, 
participants rated how negative the image made them feel, using a four-point 
Likert scale (1 = None to 4 = Extremely negative, displayed in the same way as 
ER Baseline). The negative ER ratings from this part were subtracted from the 























Suppression Score. The Suppression Score was derived from negative ratings 
only (rather than ratings on “View” trials) to ensure an accurate measurement of 
negative affect down-regulation success (i.e. comparing a response to negative 
stimuli before and after ER). The Suppression Score was used as an 
independent variable in subsequent FC analyses which served as the dependent 
variable.  
Imaging Data Acquisition  
All structural MRI images were acquired using a Siemens 3-T Skyra MR 
scanner. A 20-channel head coil was used for radiofrequency reception. 
Participants were given earplugs to reduce scanner noise and were additionally 
given headphones to receive instructions. Foam padding was added to limit 
motion if additional room remained within the head coil, and a piece of folded 
tape was placed over the participant’s forehead as a reminder to remain still 
throughout the scan. Structural images were obtained via a T1-weighted 
magnetization-prepared rapid gradient-echo sequence (MPRAGE) in 208 sagittal 
slices. Imaging parameters were as follows: echo time (TE) = 2.26 ms, repetition 
time (TR) = 1,700 ms, flip angle = 9.0°, field of view (FoV) = 204 mm, and voxel 
size = 0.8 × 0.8 × 0.8 mm. Functional blood oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD) 
images were collected using gradient-echo T2*-weighted echoplanar imaging 
(TE = 28 ms; TR = 2000 ms; flip angle = 79°; FoV = 204 mm; voxel size = 3.2 
mm3, 38 interleaved slices). Slices were oriented obliquely along the AC–PC line. 







Preprocessing of fMRI data was performed using the CONN Functional 
Connectivity Toolbox 20.b (Whitfield-Gabrieli & Nieto-Castanon, 2012) based on 
SPM12 (Penny et al., 2007) in the 2020b version of MATLAB. All preprocessing 
steps were conducted using the default preprocessing pipeline for volume-based 
analysis (to MNI-space). First, each subject’s functional images were realigned to 
the first volume and unwarped (which implements the removal of dynamic EPI 
distortions, movement-by-susceptibility interactions as described in 
http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/toolbox/unwarp/), slice-timing corrected 
(interleaved bottom-up), co-registered with structural data, spatially normalized 
into the standard MNI (Montreal Neurological Institute) space, and finally images 
were smoothed using a Gaussian kernel of 6 mm FWMH. Moreover, noise was 
reduced via the anatomical CompCor approach (Behzadi et al., 2007), which 
extracts principal components from white matter and cerebrospinal fluid time 
series.  The six head motion parameters from the ART toolbox were also included 
as a confound regressors. Next, a [0.008 to ∞] temporal band-pass filter standard 
for task-based connectivity analyses was applied to the time series (Nieto-
Castanon, 2015). Linear detrending was additionally performed. In sum, 
detrending, outlier censoring, motion regression, and CompCor correction were 
performed simultaneously in a single first-level regression model, followed by 
band-pass filtering. These corrections yielded a residual BOLD time course at each 








After preprocessing the data, Group ICA of fMRI Toolbox (GIFT) was used to 
decompose the data into functional networks using group spatial independent 
component analysis (ICA) (Calhoun et al., 2001). First, subject-specific data was 
reduced to 29 independent components (ICs) (as estimated by the minimum 
description length (MDL) algorithm) with the principal component reduction as 
previously done (Allen et al., 2014; Damaraju et al., 2014). To ensure stability and 
validity, we repeated the Infomax ICA algorithm in ICASSO 20 times (Himberg et 
al., 2004). Aggregated spatial maps were estimated. The back reconstruction 
approach (GICA) was used to obtain subject-specific maps and time courses as 
implemented in the GIFT toolbox  (Calhoun et al., 2001). After visual inspection by 
independent reviewers, spatial correlation values between the 19 ICs and the 
consensual atlas of resting-state networks (CAREN) based on 4 freely available 
brain functional Atlases (Doucet et al., 2011, 2018; Gordon et al., 2016; Yeo et al., 
2011) were used for ICs selection, according to these 5 categories: Visual (VIS) 
Salience (SN), Sensorimotor-Auditory (SMN), Default Mode (DMN) and Central 
Executive Networks (CEN) (Doucet, 2019). Components were classified as 
intrinsic connectivity networks (ICNs) if they exhibited peak activations in grey 
matter,  had moderate correlation values with time courses of the “Suppress” 
(ERT) and “Rate” (RME) task conditions (above 0.3) and strong correlation values 
with the CAREN network template (above 0.50) (Cordes et al., 2001). After ICs 
selection, subject-specific spatial maps and time courses were post-processed, 







Dynamic Functional Connectivity Analysis (DynFC) 
Dynamic FC (dynFC) analysis was performed with the GIFT toolbox. The 
22 TR sliding window method for each subject was applied following (Allen et al., 
2014), whereby overlapping time windows of 30 s were taken from the scanning 
time in steps of 2 s (1 TR) and convolved with a Gaussian of sigma = 3 TRs in 
order to de-weigh volumes at the beginning and end of the windows, resulting in 
240 consecutive windows for the ERT and 157 consecutive windows for the 
RME.  The length of the window (22 TRs = 44s) was based on previous studies 
in the field because it provides a good trade-off between the ability to capture 
dynamic changes and the accuracy of correlation estimation (Biundo et al., 2015; 
Cilia et al., 2011; Hutchison et al., 2013). For each window, dynFC was 
estimated in the form of a regularized inverse covariance matrix using the GIFT 
toolbox using graphical LASSO method with an additional L1 norm constraint, 
repeated 10 times. Finally, covariance estimates were Fisher-Z-transformed. 
In order to identify dynFC states that reoccurred across time and across 
subjects, the windowed dynFC matrices were subjected to the GIFT k-means 
clustering procedure, repeated 100 times to reduce any bias to initial random 
selection of cluster centroids (Rashid et al., 2014). K-means clustering applies 
Euclidean distance to regroup similar dynFC matrices of the different windows. 
The number of clusters (k), or states, can be calculated in several ways. In this 
study we used the elbow criterion, defined as the ratio of within-cluster distances 







2014; Damaraju et al., 2014) and the cluster number was set to 5 for the ERT 
and 4 for the RME. Next, we used the Pearson correlation coefficient for the 
clustering analysis. To sum up, a subset of windows was selected for each 
subject, representing those dynFC matrices with maximal variability in dynFC. 
From those windows, the optimal number of clusters (k) was determined by the 
GIFT toolbox using the elbow criterion. The resulting k cluster centroids were 
used as templates for clustering all the dynFC windows of matrices of all 
subjects. Using the resultant four cluster centroids, all FC matrices of each 
subject were then categorized as belonging to one of the four states based on 
their similarity to the cluster centroids. From these data, we obtained a state 
transition vector representing their state status across time. Final cluster 
centroids were obtained as the median of all state-assigned FC matrices across 
time. The subject-specific centroid of each state was computed by calculating the 
median value of each FC matrix for that state. 
Finally, indexes from dynFC were extracted. They were: 1) Mean dwell 
time, which represents how long participants stayed in a certain state, which was 
calculated by averaging the number of consecutive windows belonging to one 
state before changing to the other state and 2) Number of transitions, which 
represents how many times either state changed from one to the other, counting 
the number of times a switch occurred, with more transitions representing less 
stability over time. To investigate how empathy trait is reflected in the dynFC of 







correlated with IRI scores.  Conversely, to assess how ER tendency is reflected 
in the dynFC of brain networks underlying empathy, RME dynFC indexes were 
correlated with ERQ scores. Correlations between the extracted dynFC 
measurements and questionnaires were assessed in the Statistical Package for 
Social Science (SPSS) (IBM SPSS Statistics 24), controlling for age, gender 
multiple comparisons using FDR (Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995). 
 
Results 
ERT Dynamics Regressed with IRI Empathy Questionnaire 
Following the elbow criterion, the sample showed 5 different dynFC states 
during the ERT. Indexes from 2 dynFC states had significant relationships with 
behavioral measurements and will be described in detail below. 







State 1 (13% of the windows) was characterized primarily by positive 
connectivity between the CEN, DMN and SN (Figure 10).  
 
Figure 10: Dynamic Functional State 1 of the ERT 
Amount of time spent in this state (mean dwell time) exhibited a positive 
relationship with IRI Affective Empathy r(22)=.51, p=.01. No other behavioral 
measurements exhibited significant relationships with this state’s dynFC indexes.  
















State 2 (19% of the windows) was characterized by positive connectivity 
between the CEN and the SN and SMN, and negative connectivity between the 
VIS network and the CEN, SMN, DMN, SN (Figure 11).  
Figure 11: Dynamic Functional State 2 of the ERT 
Amount of time spent in this state (mean dwell time) exhibited a negative 
relationship with IRI Cognitive Empathy r(22)=-.48, p=.02. No other behavioral 
measurements exhibited significant relationships with this state’s dynFC indexes.  
RME Dynamics Regressed with ERQ Questionnaire  
Following the elbow criterion, the sample showed 4 different dynFC states 
during the ERT. Indexes from 1 dynFC state had significant relationships with 
behavioral measurements and will be described in detail below. 
















 State 1 (22% of the windows) was characterized by positive connectivity 
between the CEN/VIS and hypoconnectivity between DMN and 
CEN/SMN/SN/VIS (Figure 12).  
Figure 12: RME Dynamic State 1 
Amount of time spent in this state (mean dwell time) exhibited a negative 
relationship with ERQ Cognitive Reappraisal r(23)=-.43, p=.02. No other 
behavioral measurements exhibited significant relationships with this state’s 
dynFC indexes.  
 
Discussion 
The aim of this study was to evaluate whether dynFC during an ER task 
related to trait empathy, and conversely, whether dynFC during an RME task 














CEN, DMN and SN gives rise to these brain dynamics, and that these fluid 
network patterns relate to trait empathy and ER tendency. 
Review of Behavioral Findings 
As previously discussed in Chapter II, our behavioral findings showed 
inverse relationships between cognitive reappraisal and empathy, depending on 
the type of empathy interrogated. ERQ Cognitive Reappraisal showed a negative 
relationship with the affective empathy facet of the IRI, but a positive relationship 
with the cognitive empathy facet. The findings suggest the increased tendency to 
employ cognitive reappraisal to down regulate negative emotion is associated 
with decreased ability to share, but increased ability to understand another’s 
emotion. Affective empathy has previously been associated with increased 
reactivity to others’ emotions, greater spontaneous facial mimicry (T. W. Lee et 
al., 2008; Sonnby-Borgström, 2002), and increased self-reported resonance with 
the mimicked emotion  (Hatfield et al., 1993; Laird et al., 1994; Strayer, 1993; 
Wild et al., 2001). Therefore, the heightened arousal tendency in affective 
empathy may result in greater interference on cognitive control, thereby reducing 
the individual’s capacity to engage in adaptive regulation strategies such as 
cognitive reappraisal. In contrast to affective empathy, cognitive empathy is 
reliant upon higher-order cognitive control processes in order to inhibit one’s 
default self-perspective and take another’s perspective (Carlson et al., 2004; 
Hansen, 2011; Joseph & Tager-Flusberg, 2004; Sabbagh et al., 2006). Given the 







empathy may also be associated with the efficacious use of cognitive processes 
that support cognitive reappraisal. Indeed, we replicate findings of a recent study 
that showed people with higher cognitive empathy stated they were more likely to 
reappraise (Powell, 2018).  
Relationship between Emotion Regulation Task Brain Dynamics and Trait 
Empathy 
We observed that increased dwell time in first ERT dynFC brain state, 
characterized by positive connectivity between the CEN, DMN and SN, related to 
increased affective empathy. The results suggest that while down-regulating 
negative emotion, time spent in a state defined by synchrony between networks 
subserving cognitive control, autobiographical thought and sensory perception 
relates to increased ability to share another’s emotions. Although previous 
research examining brain mechanisms underlying ER suggest reliance primarily 
on the CEN (Davidson et al., 2000; Etkin et al., 2015), we extend these findings 
by demonstrating ER may involve the interaction of the CEN with the SN and 
DMN, networks underlying feeling and understanding one’s own emotions 
(Gavazzi et al., 2017; Saxe & Powell, 2006; Vogeley et al., 2001). Indeed, these 
findings are in line with research suggesting effective emotion regulation may be 
preceded by understanding one’s own feelings (C. D. Frith & Frith, 2006), 
thereby possibly implicating the SN and DMN. Furthermore, our results suggest 
increased reliance on this combination of networks facilitates affective empathy.  







overreliance on these networks may prove useful in understanding how 
excessive affective empathy poses a risk for developing internalizing disorders, 
including depression and anxiety (Blair, 2005; Gambin & Sharp, 2016, 2018; 
Gawronski & Privette, 1997; Schreiter et al., 2013; Shu et al., 2017; Silton & 
Fogel, 2010; Thoma et al., 2011; Tone & Tully, 2014; Zahn-Waxler et al., 2010). 
We speculate that if the empathizer’s emotional reaction is overwhelming, it may 
tax the DMN and SN to such an extent that it may lead to inappropriately 
modulating the shared emotional reaction (reliant on the CEN). Indeed, 
inappropriate modulation of emotion due to heightened arousal has been 
associated with internalizing symptoms (Kaźmierczak et al., 2013). Hence, the 
first ERT dynFC brain state may be a network configuration prominent during the 
downregulation of emotion, but that also underlies affective empathy ability.  
Increased dwell time in the second ERT dynFC brain state, characterized 
by positive CEN/SN connectivity and negative connectivity between CEN/VIS 
related to decreased cognitive empathy. Research indicates the SN and CEN 
may interact with each other in supporting attention and working memory (Cocchi 
et al., 2013; Elton & Gao, 2014). Specifically, the SN receives and provides 
selective amplification of salient information and then generates a top-down 
control signal that initiates CEN to respond to salient information for attentional 
shift and control execution (Menon, 2015). In combination with negative 
connectivity between networks subserving external visual attention (CEN/VIS), 







directed state.  Therefore, this network configuration may arise to enable 
attention deployment toward goal‐relevant behavior, in this case, the 
downregulation of negative emotion during the ERT. Our results further suggest 
that more time spent in this brain state was associated with decreased ability to 
take another’s perspective. We postulate that an internally focused attention 
state is ineffective for successful mentalizing, since the attention should be 
primarily shifted outwardly, towards another person.  Therefore, during a 
demanding (internally focused) cognitive task such as ER, there may not be 
enough cognitive resources to also support attention shifting towards salient 
external stimuli.  
The present findings enrich prior ER research by demonstrating that trait 
empathy shares a double dissociation with brain dynamics underlying ER, 
depending on the type of empathy interrogated: increased dwell time in an ER 
dynFC brain state related to increased affective empathy, but increased dwell 
time in another ER dynFC brain state related to decreased cognitive empathy.  
This may be explained by one perspective of brain states, described as “the 
repertoire of more or less flexible brain network configurations that emerge 
dynamically to enable context‐appropriate behavior based on the skillful 
interchange between external and internal needs” (Denkova et al., 2019). 
Therefore, the double dissociation observed between empathy’s facets with ER 







internally driven (affective empathy) or externally driven (cognitive empathy) 
mental activities. 
Relationship between Empathy Task Brain Dynamics and Emotion Regulation 
Tendency 
During the RME task, we observed that increased dwell time in a dynFC 
brain state dominated by positive connectivity between CEN/VIS, and negative 
connectivity between DMN and all other networks was associated with a 
decreased tendency to cognitively reappraise negative emotion.  Given the 
nature of the RME task (visual processing and decision-making), positive 
CEN/VIS dynFC was not surprising, given these networks support these 
functions (Seeley et al., 2007). Similarly, the DMN has been consistently shown 
to be deactivated when subjects engage in goal-directed tasks (Greicius et al., 
2003; Raichle et al., 2001). Together, this pattern of connectivity is interpreted as 
reflecting an externally driven goal-directed state. The converse of the 
connectivity pattern of the internally driven state during the ER task, which 
showed a negative association with cognitive empathy; increased time spent in 
this RME dynFC state relates to a decreased tendency to use cognitive 
reappraisal. Cognitive reappraisal is defined as the attempt to reinterpret an 
emotion-eliciting situation in a way that alters its meaning and changes its 
emotional impact (James J. Gross & John, 2003; Lazarus & Alfert, 1964); and 
has been shown to activate regions anchored in the CEN, namely the medial and 







structures as amygdala and insula (Ochsner & Gross, 2005; Zaki et al., 2012). 
We postulate that an externally driven goal state is ineffective for successful 
cognitive reappraisal, since reappraisal is an internally driven mechanism.  In line 
with our behavioral findings that show a positive relationship between cognitive 
reappraisal and cognitive empathy, during a demanding (externally focused) 
cognitive task such as the RME, there may not be enough cognitive resources 
allocate attention towards a taxing (internally focused) task such as reappraisal.  
Summary 
In conclusion, our investigation using dynFC to probe the relationship 
between empathy and ER revealed increased dwell times during the ER task 
brain states related bi-directionally to affective and cognitive empathy, and 
increased dwell time during an RME task brain state related to decreased 
tendency to use cognitive reappraisal.  Specifically, the present findings suggest 
that efficient communication and (re)configuration between the CEN, DMN, SN 
underlie both ER and RME task dynamics, and that these temporal patterns 
relate to trait empathy and ER tendency. Thus, we propose EI may arise from the 
efficient interplay between brain networks subserving cognitive control, 
autobiographical thought and sensory perception. Taken together, these findings 
contribute a neurobiological basis for the hypothesized relationship between ER 









Limitations and Future Directions 
Several limitations of this study should be acknowledged. First, we recognize we 
had a small sample size, which could contribute to low power in detecting desired 
outcomes. Future studies with larger samples may be necessary to clarify how 
dynFC indexes relate to behavioral measurements. Additionally, our sample 
consisted primarily of Caucasian participants, and additional research should 
examine these questions with more ethnically and racially diverse samples. It 
would be interesting to study possible cultural differences relating to cognitive 
and affective empathy, emotion regulation, and the ways in which these 
constructs may interface with internalizing symptoms in other cultures. The field 
would benefit from longitudinal research examining these questions over time in 
a diverse sample of male and female individuals, especially for the RME task. In 
addition, performance on the RME task may differ according to sex (Baron-
Cohen et al., 1997; Dorris et al., 2004; Losh et al., 2009). Previous studies have 
reported sex differences in typical individuals for neural activation associated with 
the RME task (Baron-Cohen et al., 2006), specifically, activation differences have 
been identified in the dlPFC and the medial temporal gyrus. To understand how 
empathy and emotion regulation differ in men and women, potential sex-














CHAPTER IV: A CLOSER LOOK AT EMPATHY 
 
“Human morality is unthinkable without empathy” 
Frans de Waal 
 
EXPERIMENT 2:  
Shared Characteristics of Intrinsic Connectivity Networks Underlying 
Interoceptive Awareness and Empathy 
 
Internal body signals relative to emotion processing has been a topic of 
long-standing interest (Gurney, 1884; Strack et al., 1988), with more recent 
evidence highlighting an intriguing bidirectional relationship between sensations 
that arise internally and emotional phenomena (Cameron, 2001; Craig, 2009; 
Damasio, 2005; Lane, 2008). A proposed biological basis that may clarify this 
interplay is interoception, namely – the afferent processing of internal bodily 
signals that arise from visceral organs (Cacioppo et al., 2000; Cameron, 2001; 
Craig, 2009; Johnson, 2001; Wiens, 2005). For example, an increased heart rate 
signals an emotional modulation, indicating that the assessment of one’s own 
emotions requires interoceptive processes (K. H. Lee & Siegle, 2012). Indeed, 







interoception (Critchley et al., 2004; Pollatos et al., 2007; Werner et al., 2009). In 
addition, neuroimaging findings corroborate a substantial overlap between the 
neural substrates of one’s own emotional and interoceptive processing. This 
highlights the proposed idea that interoception plays an important role in 
emotional self-assessment (Adolfi et al., 2017; Critchley & Garfinkel, 2017; 
Damasio et al., 2000; Terasawa et al., 2013). However, the relationship between 
signals arising from one’s own body and the emotions of another individual is a 
topic that remains relatively unexplored. 
A harmonious social interaction putatively hinges on whether the observer 
can vicariously feel and understand the mental state of the listener, a 
socioemotional ability known as empathy (Davis, 1980). Empathy can be further 
fractioned into two interrelated facets: Affective and Cognitive empathy. Affective 
empathy is conceptualized as the automatic process of vicariously experiencing 
the emotional state of another (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004; Davis, 1980), 
while Cognitive empathy describes the individual’s ability to accurately imagine 
another person’s perspective (Davis, 1980; Decety & Jackson, 2004; Lawrence 
et al., 2006). The two facets of empathy exist on a continuum. While Affective 
empathy requires the empathizer to represent both ‘self’ and ‘other’, Cognitive 
empathy requires a marked ‘self’ and ‘other’ distinction in order to successfully 
imagine a different perspective from one’s own (Steinbeis, 2016).  
One popular interpretation of such a ‘shared representation’ (Decety and 







experience, which may explain why interoceptive awareness (IA; processed 
internal sensations part of conscious awareness), plays such a crucial role in 
social encounters (Cameron, 2001; Khalsa et al., 2018).  Indeed, a substantial 
amount of evidence points to IA influencing the degree to which an individual 
experiences their emotions (Barrett et al., 2004; Wiens, 2005). For instance, 
those with high IA report heightened emotional arousal (Dunn et al., 2010; 
Pollatos & Schandry, 2008; Wiens, 2005), which suggests better IA could lead to 
greater Affective empathy due to the fact the shared emotion is more intense. In 
addition, increased IA has also been tied to decreased susceptibility to body 
ownership illusions (Tajadura-Jiménez & Tsakiris, 2014; Tsakiris et al., 2011), 
suggesting a clearer divergence between ‘self’ and ‘other’ which may positively 
relate to Cognitive Empathy.  
Current neuroimaging evidence indeed suggests that the neural 
substrates of empathy overlap with those involved in self-experience (Iacoboni, 
2005; Jackson et al., 2005; Keysers et al., 2004; Wicker et al., 2003), supporting 
the theory that the brain represents others’ experiences in terms of the 
experiences of the self (Decety & Sommerville, 2003). For instance, in the Jabbi, 
Swart, and Keysers 2007 study, activation of the anterior insula (AI) and inferior 
frontal operculum (IFO) was observed in both the observer and experiencer 
during aversive taste stimuli. Similarly, observing others’ pain has been found to 







with one’s own pain (Jackson et al., 2005; Lieberman & Eisenberger, 2009; 
Singer et al., 2004).  
However, in the ‘shared representation’ context, it is unclear which brain 
regions underlying a specific aspect of empathy contribute to IA. This may be 
due to empathy’s facets activating interacting, but only partially overlapping, 
neural bases (Y. Fan et al., 2011). Affective empathy primarily elicits activations 
from regions implicated in rapid and prioritized processing of emotion signals, 
including: the amygdala, hypothalamus, orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and AI 
(Decety et al., 2013). By comparison, Cognitive Empathy, which shares similar 
neural networks with mentalizing and Theory of Mind (TOM) (Pardini & Nichelli, 
2009) additionally involves the superior temporal sulcus (STS), temporoparietal 
junction (TPJ), fusiform gyrus (FG), and medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) (Saxe & 
Powell, 2006). Thus, it is plausible to theorize that IA may share neural bases 
with Affective empathy within the AI and amygdala, and with Cognitive empathy 
within the PFC. A better understanding whether there is a disassociation 
between these constructs in relation to IA could therefore refine and extend the 
‘shared representation’ hypothesis.  
     Although no studies have explored the neural intersection of IA and 
empathy’s two facets, one recent meta-analysis did investigate convergent areas 
of activation between IA, emotion and social cognition (Adolfi et al., 2017). The 
results for the three domains converged in the AI, amygdala, right inferior frontal 







particular importance to the fronto-temporo-insular nodes (Adolfi et al., 2017). 
The authors conclude co-activation of these regions may result in an evaluative 
association of the internal milieu, and in combination with external cues, leads to 
complex social cognition (Adolfi et al., 2017). However, only partial insight can be 
gleaned from these results in connection to the present study. The authors of the 
Adolfi et. al 2017 study describe the complex domain of “social cognition” simply 
in terms TOM (the attribution of mental states to oneself and others) (Baron-
Cohen et al., 2001). TOM only takes into account the Cognitive and not Affective 
facet of empathy, and according to the Shamay-Tsoory et al. 2010 model, both 
are required for intact empathic processing. Therefore, within the framework of 
the ‘shared representation’ hypothesis, this meta-analysis only offers a limited 
glimpse into how IA and empathy’s facets are neurologically related. 
     Nevertheless, this activation-based meta-analysis revealed a number 
of key brain regions known to play a role within a distributed socioemotional 
network. Scant functional connectivity (FC) data exists directly addressing how 
these regions communicate and how their communication could result in 
representing others’ experiences in terms of the experiences of the self (Decety 
& Sommerville, 2003). Thus far, one study investigating deficits in a patient with 
depersonalization disorder (body self-awareness disruption) employed graph-
theory analyses during an empathic task and demonstrated impaired Affective 
empathy and IA related to changes in a interoceptive-emotional network, 







Although germane, the study only supports an association between these 
domains during active, task-relevant network configurations. However, if the 
brain uses the ‘self’ as a blueprint for understanding others’ emotional 
experiences as proposed by Decety and Sommerville 2003, it stands to reason 
that the brain’s intrinsic connectivity networks (ICNs) during resting-state (rsfMRI) 
already contain the information necessary for task-based expression.  
In fact, several studies corroborate this assumption. Recently Tavor et al. 
2016 applied computational models showing that resting state functional 
connectivity (rsFC) alone is sufficient to predict individual variability in task maps, 
and that this pattern of intrinsic connectivity can be predictive of a subject’s 
identity, similar to a fingerprint (Finn et al., 2015). Importantly, Bilevicius et al. 
2018 illustrated that empathy scores were correlated with different patterns of 
rsFC in the default mode network (DMN), salience network (SN), and left and 
right central executive networks (CEN). Similarly, Cox et al. 2012 showed that 
relative empathic ability (REA) is reflected in the brain's rsFC. Lastly, Christov-
Moore et al. 2020 utilized machine learning to demonstrate rsFC patterns within 
resonance and CEN networks can predict trait empathic concern. No evidence 
regarding trait IA within rsfMRI exists thus far, but studies point to a large-scale 
brain system supporting interoception comprising the DMN and SN (Kleckner et 
al., 2017). Therefore, it is possible to hypothesize that empathy and IA could 
share rsFC within the DMN or SN, supporting the ‘shared representation’ 







In addition to rsFC, BOLD variability is an often discounted neuroimaging 
measurement that may offer complementary information regarding network 
function and organization. What BOLD variability represents has been unclear, 
but recent neuroimaging advances suggests it may reflect network coherence 
throughout the cortex, and therefore a complementary reflection of functional 
connectivity (Fox, 2005; Mišíc et al., 2011; Vakorin, Lippe, et al., 2011). Although 
BOLD variability is often ignored because it has been attributed to various 
confounds that are deliberately minimized (in the name of improving signal-to-
noise ratios) (Garrett, Samanez-Larkin, et al., 2013), several areas of 
neuroscience research have examined the properties and unique functionality of 
variance, and suggest that by considering rather than ignoring variance, our 
ability to understand and predict neural phenomena can improve dramatically 
(Faisal et al., 2008; MacDonald et al., 2006; R. B. Stein et al., 2005). In fact, 
recent theories consider high BOLD variability necessary for the neural system’s 
adaptability, efficiency and cognitive performance (Dai et al., 2016; Garrett et al., 
2010; Garrett, Kovacevic, et al., 2013; McIntosh et al., 2008; Vakorin, Lippe, et 
al., 2011; Vakorin, Mišić, et al., 2011). Specifically, according to the coordination 
dynamics theory, networks demonstrating increased BOLD variability can flexibly 
shift through integrative and segregative configurations, maintaining the neural 
system in balance (Tognoli & Kelso, 2014). In  the same way rsFC is used to 
predict task performance in individual subjects (Finn et al., 2015), resting state 







BOLD variability signature is stable and persistent across time (Gaut et al., 
2018). rsBOLD variability has been in clinical populations to investigate alteration 
in the organization of brain networks (Good et al., 2020; Kumral et al., 2020; 
Scarapicchia et al., 2018; Zhang et al., 2020) and in healthy populations to 
investigate brain maturation trajectories (Nomi et al., 2017) and degree of 
cognitive flexibility (Armbruster-Genç et al., 2016). Although no studies in a 
healthy sample have yet explored rsBOLD variability in relation to trait empathy 
or IA, this inquiry could shed light on how networks underlying these constructs 
communicate. For instance, increased rsBOLD variability in SN and/or DMN in 
relation to empathy and IA could putatively be related to effective switching 
between ‘self’ and ‘other’, leading to successful empathizing.   
 
Aims 
Therefore, the present study employs a data-driven approach to explore 
rsFC and rsBOLD variability related to brain networks underlying Cognitive, 
Affective empathy and IA. Specifically, we aim to understand whether Cognitive 
and/or Affective empathy as measured by self-report questionnaires share rsFC 
and/or rsBOLD variability with IA self-report measures during resting state in 









We hypothesize based on previous literature that 1) Affective empathy will 
share rsFC and/or rsBOLD with IA within a SN network, specifically amygdala, 
AI, and IFO, given their involvement in the processing of emotion experienced in 
oneself and vicariously for others (Singer et al., 2004), while 2) Cognitive 
empathy will share rsFC/ rsBOLD variability with IA within a mentalizing network, 
specifically in the rTPJ and precuneus, as these regions are posited to underlie 
explicit mentalizing (Bardi et al., 2017; Hyde et al., 2015; Kovács et al., 2014; 
Naughtin et al., 2017).  
Participants and Procedure 
26 healthy young adults (m=21.85 y.o./16 female) without a reported 
history of neurological or psychiatric disorders were recruited for this study. All 
participants were right-handed and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and 
hearing. The study took part on two separate days. On the first day, participants 
visited the lab to be briefed on the MRI protocol, fill out consent forms and 
behavioral assessments. On the second day, participants completed the rsfMRI 
scan at the University of Louisville, School of Medicine.  
The participants watched a 7 min abstract, nonsocial movie titled Inscapes 
previously demonstrated to evoke strong connectivity in networks that resemble 
rest more than those exhibited during conventional movies (Vanderwal et al., 
2015). The movie features a series of technological-looking abstract shapes. 
Participants were told to keep their eyes open and relax while watching and 







Esys LCD TV monitor at the back of the scanner bore, which was viewed by 
participants through a mirror on the head-coil. The video is freely available for 
download from HeadSpace Studios.  
Empathy Questionnaire – Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) 
Affective and Cognitive empathy was assessed using the Interpersonal 
Reactivity Index (IRI) (Davis, 1983). The IRI consists of 28 items rated on a 5-
point scale with the anchors: “does not describe me well” to “describes me very 
well”. The items are arranged into four subscales with seven items. Each 
subscale measures a distinct component of empathy: empathic concern (EC) 
(feelings of compassion and concern for others); personal distress (PD) (feelings 
of anxiety and discomfort that result from observing another person’s negative 
experience); perspective taking (PT) (the ability to adopt the perspectives of 
other people and see things from their point of view); and fantasy subscale (FS) 
(the tendency to identify with characters in movies, books, or other fictional 
situations) (Davis, 1983). Affective empathy, the ability to infer an agent’s 
feelings or emotions, was derived from summing the EC and PD subscales.  
Cognitive empathy, the ability to infer an agent’s beliefs or thoughts, was derived 
from summing the FS and PT subscales. Total empathy was derived from 
aggregating Affective and Cognitive empathy scores. All scores were 
standardized by applying a z-score transformation, and later compared with the 
MAIA assessment and its subscales (see below) in subsequent analyses.  







The Multidimensional Assessment of Interoceptive Awareness (MAIA) is a 
32-item instrument assessing IA: “the conscious perception of sensations from 
inside the body that create the sense of the physiological condition of the body, 
such as heart beat, respiration, satiety, and the autonomic nervous system 
sensations related to emotions” (Mehling et al., 2012). Each statement is rated 
from 0 (never) to 5 (always) in terms of how often it applies to the participant 
generally in daily life. The statements are then separated into 8 subscales: 
Noticing, Non-Distracting, Not-Worrying, Attention-Regulation, Emotional 
Awareness, Self-Regulation, Body Listening and Trusting, which are in turn 
aggregated into 5 overall scales used in the present study: Awareness of Body 
Sensations (Noticing); Emotional Reaction and Attentional Response to 
Sensations (Not-Distracting, Not-Worrying); Capacity to Regulate Attention 
(Attention Regulation), Awareness of Mind-Body Integration (Emotional 
Awareness, Self-Regulation, Body Listening) and Trusting Body Sensations 
(Trusting). A total Interoceptive Score (MAIA Total) was derived by summing all 
the aggregate scales. All scores were standardized by applying a z-score 
transformation, and later compared with the IRI and its subscales (see above) in 
subsequent analyses. Correlations between behavioral measurements were 
conducted with the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (Version 25.0.0; 
SPSS, INC.), and corrected for age, gender and multiple comparisons using false 









All analyses were conducted using the CONN toolbox 19.c (Whitfield-
Gabrieli & Nieto-Castanon, 2012) based on SPM12 (Penny et al., 2007) in the 
2017 version of MATLAB. Spatial preprocessing in the CONN toolbox included 
realignment, normalization and smoothing (6 mm FWHM Gaussian filter) using 
SPM12 default parameter settings. Anatomical volumes were segmented into 
gray matter, white matter and cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) areas, and the resulting 
masks were eroded to minimize partial volume effects. Physiological and other 
sources of noise were estimated and regressed out using CompCor (Behzadi et 
al., 2007), a method that performs principal component analysis to estimate the 
physiological noise from white matter and cerebrospinal fluid for each participant. 
Motion from the ART toolbox was also included as a confound regressor. Next, a 
0.01–0.10 Hz temporal band-pass filter standard for resting-state connectivity 
analyses was applied to the time series (Nieto-Castanon, 2015). In sum, 
detrending, outlier censoring, motion regression, and CompCor correction were 
performed simultaneously in a single first-level regression model, followed by 
band-pass filtering. These corrections yielded a residual BOLD time course at 
each voxel that was used for subsequent analyses. 
Neuroimaging Analysis 
Network Connectivity  
     Group-level independent component analysis (ICA) using the CONN 







regions during resting state that may be associated with the IRI and MAIA 
scores. This involved the application of the fastICA algorithm to volumes 
concatenated across subject and resting state condition in order to identify 
independent spatial components (ICs) and back-projection of these components 
to individual subjects, resulting in maps of regression coefficients representing 
connectivity between the network and every voxel in the brain (see Calhoun et al. 
2001 for details). Forty ICs were identified using spatial overlap of suprathreshold 
areas (Dice coefficient (Rombouts et al., 1998)), based on CONN’s default 
network atlas with ROIs characterizing an extended set of classical brain 
networks: Default Mode Network (4 ROIs), SensoriMotor (2 ROIs), Visual (4 
ROIs), Salience / Cingulo-Opercular (7 ROIs), DorsalAttention (4 ROIs), 
FrontoParietal / Central Executive (4 ROIs), Language (4 ROIs), Cerebellar (2 
ROIs) (all ROIs defined from CONN's ICA analyses of HCP dataset / 497 
subjects) (Nieto-Castanon, 2014). We chose 40 ICs due to research suggesting 
ICA results are only affected by the number of ICs when the number is smaller 
than the number of source signals (Ma et al. 2007), in addition to assuring 
coverage of a majority of signal variance. Noise components were further 
identified through visual inspection by authors (TS and BD) (e.g., components 
largely overlapping CSF), resulting in the exclusion of 4 out of 40 ICs from further 
consideration. Each of the remaining 36 ICs was subsequently entered in 
multiple regressions with the IRI and MAIA subscales, aggregate and Total 







at p≤0.05, voxel thresholded at p<0.001 (FDR-corrected) using Gaussian 
Random Field Theory , and corrected for age and gender. All coordinates 
reported below refer to peak activations in anatomical MNI space.  
Network Variability 
In order to assess network variability and its relationship to either empathy or IA, 
we regressed each IC’s network variability (calculated in CONN as SD of each 





In order to establish the relationship between empathy and IA, all IRI and 
MAIA subscales, aggregate and Total scores were correlated.  
Relationship between Affective Empathy and Interoceptive Awareness 
Excluding same-subscale correlations, negative relationships were 
observed between Affective empathy and the following MAIA subscales: 
Capacity to Regulate Attention (r(26) = -0.83, p<0.01), Trusting Body Sensations 
(r(26) = -0.55, p<0.01) and MAIA Total (r(26) = -0.64, p<0.01). Similarly, we 
observed a negative relationship between the Personal Distress (PD) subscale 
and Capacity to Regulate Attention (r(26) = -0.74, p<0.01), Awareness of Mind 
Body Integration (r(26) = -0.49, p<0.01), Trusting Body Sensations (r(26) = -0.53, 







relationship between Affective empathy and IA (most influenced by the PD scale, 
since EC exhibited no significant relationship). 
Relationship between Cognitive Empathy and Interoceptive Awareness 
We observed a positive relationship between Cognitive Empathy and the 
Awareness of Mind Body Integration subscale, r(26) = 0.35, p=0.06, although it 
did not survive multiple comparison correction. In addition, we observed a 
significant positive relationship between the IRI Perspective Taking (PT) 
subscale and the MAIA Awareness of Mind Body Integration subscale, r(26) = 
0.41, p<0.01. Therefore, we report a positive relationship between Cognitive 
empathy and IA (most influenced by the PT subscale, since Fantasy exhibited no 
significant relationship).  
Taken together, our behavioral results show a bidirectional relationship 
between empathy and IA, depending on the facet of empathy interrogated and 
mainly driven by the subscales of PD (Affective Empathy) and PT (Cognitive 
Empathy).  








We observed that within a network comprising right inferior frontal 
operculum (rIFO), bilateral superior parietal lobule (SPL) and bilateral middle 
temporal gyrus (MTG), greater connectivity in the rIFO was associated with 
greater overall empathy as measured by the IRI Total, and with greater IRI 
Affective empathy. Conversely, lower connectivity in the rIFO was associated 
with increased overall IA as measured by the MAIA Total and increased MAIA 
Capacity to Regulate Attention (Figure 13, Table 2). 
Figure 13. Greater connectivity in the right inferior frontal operculum (rIFO) is 
associated with lower total IA and greater Affective empathy. Statistical maps are 
FDR-corrected within the network at cluster-based p < 0.05, after voxel threshold 
at p < 0.001, and further corrected for age, gender, and multiple comparisons 
across components using FDR. 
 
Table 2         
         
Spatial Network Statistics      
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Subscale Region Laterality 
Peak 
Cluster 
(X, Y, Z) size p-FDR T stat 
Effect 
Size 90% CI 
MAIA Total IFG R 46, 48, 2 289 0.04 -6.84 2.7 2, 3.25 
Capacity to 
Regulate 
Attention IFG R 46, 48, 14 407 0.0003 -6.02 2.8 2, 3.25 
IRI Total IFG R 36, 56, 6 207 0.03 5.26 2.7 1.5, 3 
Affective 
Empathy IFG R 40, 48, -4 284 0.02 5.67 2.8 2, 3.5 
 
Network Variability  
      Network variability analyses revealed that within a network comprising left 
IFO (L IFO), Cerebellum, and rAI, IRI Personal Distress was negatively related to 







Awareness of Body Sensations was positively related (T(22) = 1.48, p=0.001)), 
(Figure 14).  
Figure 14: Shared network variability between Affective empathy and MAIA 
Awareness of Body Sensations. Statistical maps are FDR-corrected within the 
network at cluster-based p < 0.05, after voxel threshold at p < 0.001, and further 
corrected for age, gender, and multiple comparisons across components using 
FDR. Note: the red dots in the graph represent the observed correlation between 
the standard deviation of the individual network’s BOLD time-series (SDBOLD) and 
each subjects’ behavioral measure. The blue dots represent the predicted values 
of the statistical model. The R2 value represents the variance explained resulting 
from the regression between SDBOLD and behavioral variables of interest. 
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     Lastly, within a network comprising right Precuneus, rMTG, bilateral 
supramarginal gyrus (SMG) and rIFO, IRI Perspective Taking (T(22) = 1.45, 
p=0.001) and MAIA Mind Body Integration (T(22) = 2.52, p=0.01) were positively 
related to network variability (Figure 15).  
Figure 15: Shared network variability between Cognitive empathy and MAIA 
Mind-Body Integration statistical maps are FDR-corrected within the network at 
cluster-based p < 0.05, after the voxel threshold at p < 0.001, and further 
corrected for age, gender, and multiple comparisons across components using 
FDR. Note: the red dots in the graph represent the observed correlation between 
the standard deviation of the individual network’s BOLD time-series (SDBOLD) and 
each subjects’ behavioral measure. The blue dots represent the predicted values 
of the statistical model. The R2 value represents the variance explained resulting 
from the regression between SDBOLD and behavioral variables of interest. 
 
Discussion 
Empathy and IA are crucial to meaningful social exchanges. As these two 
constructs interact, a ‘shared representation’ is created as one's own internal 
state is utilized to understand the emotional experiences of others (Decety & 
Shared Negative Temporal Connectivity  between Perspective Taking and Mind Body Integration
Temporal Variability and 

















Sommerville, 2003). However, it is not yet clear whether a specific aspect of 
empathy (Affective or Cognitive) interfaces with IA. Our resting state fMRI study 
employed Independent Component Analysis (ICA) to investigate which empathy 
facet shares rsFC and/or rsBOLD with IA while healthy adults viewed naturalistic 
stimuli. We observed a bidirectional behavioral relationship between empathy 
and IA, whereby Affective empathy and IA were negatively related, and Cognitive 
empathy and IA were positively related. This bidirectional link is mirrored in the 
neuroimaging results, such that Affective empathy and IA were inversely related 
to increased rsFC within the rIFO, and also inversely related to rsBOLD; whereas 
Cognitive empathy and IA showed only a positive relationship with rsBOLD. 
Together, these results suggest a double disassociation between empathy and 
IA depending on the type of empathy interrogated, which is reflected in the brain 
network’s intrinsic connectivity and variability patterns.  
Behavioral Findings 
Behaviorally, we observed a negative relationship between the Personal 
Distress (PD) subscale of the Affective empathy aggregate IRI scale and the total 
MAIA score, Capacity to Regulate Attention and Trusting Body Sensations 
subscales. The Capacity to Regulate Attention subscale pertains to various ways 
of controlling one’s attention towards bodily sensations, as part of an active 
regulatory process; while Trusting Body Sensations reflects the extent to which 
one views awareness of bodily sensations as helpful for decision making 







empathy exhibited no significant relationship, implying that PD is the dominant 
subscale of the Affective empathy aggregate scale when relating to the MAIA 
within this sample. This distinction is important, considering that previous data 
suggests EC motivates individuals to pay attention to others’ emotions in order to 
try to comfort them, while conversely, PD drives attention away from others in 
order to reduce the aversive effects for oneself, perhaps as a form of emotion 
regulation (Zaki, 2014). Indeed, Decety & Jackson, 2004 proposed that PD may 
arise from the failure of applying sufficient self-regulatory control over the shared 
emotional state. In line with previous studies, we report an inverse relationship 
between PD and an attention regulation measure – MAIA’s Capacity to Regulate 
Attention subscale. Together with the Trusting Body Sensations subscale, our 
findings suggest the increased ability to regulate internal attention and rely on 
this discrete information may be linked to a decrease in the discomfort 
experienced while witnessing another’s distress.  
Furthermore, we found a positive relationship between the Perspective 
Taking (PT) subscale of the Cognitive empathy aggregate IRI scale and the 
Awareness of Mind Body Integration of the MAIA. This MAIA subscale represents 
the integration of several higher level cognitive processes necessary for socially 
relevant goal-directed behavior (i.e. executive functions (PRIBRAM, 1973)) 
including: emotional awareness, self-regulation of emotions, and the ability to feel 
a sense of an embodied self, that is – “a sense of the interconnectedness of 







of alienation from one's body” (Mehling et al., 2012). Thus, our results support 
previous findings suggesting Cognitive empathy, and in particular PT, is related 
to a wide array of executive function skills such as working memory, inhibitory 
control and cognitive flexibility (Aliakbari et al., 2013; Healey & Grossman, 2018; 
Yan et al., 2020). Taken together with the aforementioned negative relationship 
between PD and IA, these behavioral results suggest a bidirectional ‘shared 
representation’ between empathy and IA, contingent on the type of empathy 
interrogated. To wit, directing attention towards internal bodily sensations may 
relieve vicarious emotional pain but flexibly employing cognitive-control skills may 
increase the ability to take the perspective of another.  
Functional Connectivity Findings 
Our rsFC results provide further support for this inverse relationship. 
Within a network of brain regions previously shown to underlie attentional 
processing (superior parietal lobule (SPL), medial temporal gyrus (MTG) and 
right inferior frontal operculum (rIFO) (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Perrett et al., 
1992, 1982, 1985; Yan Wu, Wang, et al., 2016), we observed that increased 
rsFC in the rIFO was associated with increased overall empathy (total IRI score) 
and the Affective empathy aggregate scale on one hand, but reduced overall IA 
(total MAIA score) and Capacity to Regulate Attention on the other hand. 
Previous studies investigating both personal (Craig, 2009; Critchley, 2005; 
Damasio, 2005; Gray et al., 2007; Johnson, 2001) and vicarious emotional 







of the anterior insula (AI) and frontal operculum, and therefore the IFO is thought 
of as a continuum between these two structures (Jabbi et al., 2007; Wicker et al., 
2003). Because Affective empathy was driven by the PD subscale within this 
sample, increased rsFC within the rIFO in the present study may relate to 
intensified personal suffering from witnessing another’s distress, but decreased 
awareness of one’s own body sensations, perhaps due to allocating attention 
externally (for example, away from self and toward other’s distress). In line with 
previous activation-based results (Adolfi et al., 2017; Ernst et al., 2013), our 
findings refine the ‘shared representation’ hypothesis (Decety & Sommerville, 
2003) by showing rsFC overlap of IA and Affective empathy in this region, and 
extend previous results by providing rsFC evidence of a double dissociation 
between empathy and IA.  
Network Variability Findings 
Our rsBOLD results offer a complementary perspective that further 
supports this bidirectional relationship. We observed increased scores on the 
MAIA Awareness of Body Sensations subscale and decreased scores on the 
Affective empathy scale was associated with increased rsBOLD of brain regions 
previously shown to underlie processing and integration of visceral information 
(i.e., Cerebellum, L IFO, L AI) (Adamaszek et al., 2017; Baumann & Mattingley, 
2012; Bogg & Lasecki, 2015; Schienle & Scharmüller, 2013; J. D. Schmahmann, 
2001; Terasawa et al., 2013). Despite the prevailing focus on the AI as a hub for 







al., 2009; Terasawa et al., 2013), additional brain regions are also commonly 
implicated in interoceptive experience. For example, fMRI studies identify the 
involvement of the IFO and cerebellum, reinforcing the notion that interoceptive 
processing (and perhaps especially nociceptive information) may occur through 
multiple neural pathways (Garcia-Larrea, 2012; Peiffer et al., 2008; Rapps et al., 
2008). In the same vein, observing distress in others without actually 
experiencing it may rely on high-order cognitive functions to access minor 
changes in physical state, as a tool to modulate negative stimulus input (Preckel 
et al., 2018). The implication of the cerebellum in a shared network underlying 
both Affective empathy and interoceptive processing is not surprising, since the 
cerebellum serves as an integral node in the distributed cortical–subcortical 
neural circuitry supporting an array of sociocognitive operations (Jeremy D. 
Schmahmann & Pandya, 1995). Thus, our rsBOLD findings offer a 
complementary perspective alongside our rsFC data, and suggest that increased 
communication between regions of this network relates to increased awareness 
of internal sensations and perhaps a sense of ‘self’, but decreased flexibility in 
integrating emotions arising from witnessing ‘others’’ distress. 
In addition, we observed a positive relationship between rsBOLD and the 
Cognitive empathy scale and the MAIA Awareness of Mind Body Integration 
subscale within a network of brain regions previously associated with the process 
of mentalizing – the precuneus, rIFO, SMG and MTG (Mar, 2011; Northoff et al., 







Mentalizing signifies the ability to attribute mental states to another individual, 
allowing the observer to predict intent and direct their behavior appropriately (U. 
Frith et al., 1991; Premack & Woodruff, 1978). Researchers agree that 
mentalizing differs from the vicarious sharing of emotion in its psychological 
complexity, combining observation, memory, knowledge, and reasoning to 
provide insight into the thoughts and feelings of others (Decety & Jackson, 2004; 
van der Heiden et al., 2013). Therefore, its connection with MAIA’s Awareness of 
Mind Body Integration scale is not surprising, since both concepts require not 
only affective experience, but also comprehension and integration of another’s 
particular state of mind within one’s own emotional schema. We therefore 
suggest that increased rsBOLD of brain regions underlying a mentalizing network 
may point to enhanced network flexibility subserving not only a better ability to 
take another’s perspective, but also an improved sense of interconnectedness 
between one’s own mind and body.  
Lastly, our data shows an interesting convergence of empathy and IA 
within the IFO. Research suggests the IFO serves as both a sensory-cognitive 
integration area and a control node of the ventral attention network (Corbetta & 
Shulman, 2002; Craig, 2009), conjectured to maintain goal-related information 
online until a decision is reached (Tops et al., 2011; Tops & De Jong, 2006). 
Moreover, recent evidence suggests a hemispheric specialization of the IFO 
related to reactive/proactive goal maintenance (Tops et al., 2011). On one hand, 







shifting whilst a response is ongoing (reactive) (Hampshire et al., 2009; Higo et 
al., 2011; Nelson et al., 2010; Tops et al., 2011), through its connections to 
rostral ACC, superior temporal gyrus (STG) and occipital cortex (Cauda et al., 
2011). On the other hand, the lIFO may exert top-down control whilst preparing a 
response (proactive) (Tops et al., 2011), through its connections to dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex and bilateral supplementary motor area (Cauda et al., 2011). 
Taking this evidence into consideration, we speculate the positive association 
between rsFC within the rIFO and Affective empathy indicates a propensity in the 
highly empathic individual to shift attention toward salient cues in their 
environment (for example, another individual in distress). In contrast, the 
negative relationship between rsFC within the rIFO and IA may indicate an 
inability to redirect attention toward external salient cues, and therefore may lead 
to increased awareness of one’s own internal sensations. Our rsBOLD findings 
offer complementary evidence regarding the role of the IFO in socioemotional 
processes. We show that increased network flexibility within an interoceptive 
experience network (comprised of lIFO, L AI, cerebellum) is linked to increased 
Awareness of Body Sensations as well as decreased Affective empathy. We 
suggest the lIFO plays a crucial part in this network’s ability to modulate attention 
from one’s own internal sensations (i.e. the ‘self’) to discomfort arising from 
witnessing the ‘others’’ distress, perhaps in an effort to plan an appropriate 
emotional response. In the same vein, we show enhanced network flexibility 







related to both better Cognitive empathy and increased Mind Body Integration. 
These relationships may illustrate that heightened ability to determine intent in 
others and integrate sensory information into one’s own emotional schema 
relates to flexibly shifting attention towards the target of interest (either ‘self’ or 
‘other’). In sum, our data suggests the IFO may serve as an internal/external 
attention modulator and thus may play a critical role in switching attention from 
one’s own body sensations (‘self’; IA) to the other’s (Affective and/or Cognitive 
empathy). 
Limitations and Future Directions 
Our study’s findings should be considered along with its limitations. The 
definition of rsBOLD has been inconsistent across previous studies, (e.g., 
amplitude, variance, standard deviation, mean squared successive difference; for 
a review, see (Garrett, Samanez-Larkin, et al., 2013) with considerable range in 
the methodology used to derive them. Therefore, implementation of rsBOLD as a 
consistently used neuroimaging measure will require increased efforts toward 
methodological standardization. It is also important to note that due to the nature 
of the analyses used, the findings of this study do not represent causal 
relationships. That is, the results represent a correlational relationship between a 
questionnaire-based measure of IA or empathy and rsFC and/or rsBOLD. Our 
sample was unfortunately not large enough for a gender-specific analysis, as 
evidence suggests there are differences in the capacity for empathy between 







conducted in this regard. Similarly, in using an undergraduate sample, the 
generalizability of these findings is limited. 
 
Summary 
In conclusion, the current research provides novel information about the 
relationship between interoceptive awareness and empathy. In contrast to 
previous studies which used task-based fMRI to assess the neurobiology of 
these two constructs separately, we used a data-driven resting state approach to 
test whether distinct empathy facets share network characteristics 
(rsFC/rsBOLD) with IA. We demonstrate a bidirectional relationship between 
empathy and IA, depending on the type of empathy investigated. Specifically, 
Affective empathy and IA share rsFC and rsBOLD, while Cognitive empathy and 
IA only share rsBOLD. In regard to Affective empathy, increased vicarious 
emotional experience and decreased IA were associated with increased rsFC 
within the rIFO of a larger attention network; while increased IA and reduced 
Affective Empathy were related to increased network flexibility within an internal 
sensation network. Concerning Cognitive empathy, perspective-taking ability and 
a sense of mind-body connectedness related to increased communication 
between brain regions subserving a mentalizing network. We also suggest the 
role of the IFO as an internal/external attention modulator that may play a critical 
role in switching attention from one’s own body sensations (IA) to another’s 







understand another’s emotional state is related to one’s own awareness of 
internal body changes, and that this relationship is reflected in the brain’s intrinsic 
neuroarchitecture. Methodologically, this work highlights the importance of 
utilizing rsBOLD alongside rsFC as an important complementary route into 
understanding neurological phenomena. Our results hold promise in aiding 
diagnosis of clinical disorders characterized by IA and empathy deficits such as 
the autism spectrum disorders (ASD), where participants may be unable to 
complete tasks or questionnaires due to the severity of their symptoms.  
 
 
EXPERIMENT 3:  
Convergent Neural Correlates of Empathy and Anxiety During Socioemotional 
Processing 
 
Empathy is characterized by the ability to understand and share an 
emotional experience with another person. This socioemotional response 
induced by perceiving another person's affective state is a fundamental 
component of social interactions and is thought to aid in both moral development 
and prosocial behavior (Decety et al., 2015). Most literature suggests that 
empathy encompasses two interrelated components: affective empathy and 
cognitive empathy (Davis, 1983). Affective empathy, also termed empathetic 







of another person (I feel what you feel). In comparison, cognitive empathy is 
related to perspective-taking, or the ability to adopt another's psychological point-
of-view, also referred to as mentalizing (I understand what you feel). While 
affective empathy is believed to be more innate, fostering care and concern for 
others, cognitive empathy involves a deliberate understanding of another 
person's viewpoint and is particularly important for social competence and 
reasoning (Decety et al., 2015) as the inability to understand another person's 
beliefs and actions may interfere with appropriate social responses (Ickes & 
Hodges, 2013; Simone G. Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2007).  
Given that empathy is closely tied to compassion and concern for 
others, the increased emotional awareness and social sensitivity in empathy may 
consequently be associated with anxiety, particularly when empathizing with 
individuals in distressing situations. Conversely, increased anxiety may translate 
into increased worry and concern for others, or concern for how one's actions 
might affect others, and therefore may be linked to increased empathy. Gaining 
insight from clinical anxiety, individuals with social anxiety disorder tend to be 
hyper self-aware and extremely attentive to social signals due to their intense 
fear of being negatively evaluated by peers (Perry et al., 2011). This 
understanding may help explain why anxious individuals have a propensity to 
over-interpret the implied threat in others' facial expressions (Horley et al., 2004), 
but moreover, these internal and external attentional biases found in anxiety may 







2011). Indeed, it has been suggested that increased sensitivity to subtle social 
cues is essential to make mentalizing judgments (Harkness et al., 2005).  
Beyond commonalities of enhanced emotional and social sensitivity, 
empathy and anxiety may additionally be related through increased internally 
generated thought. Research indicates that enhanced self-reflection is positively 
correlated with perspective-taking and empathic concern (Joireman et al., 2002) 
and may even enhance sensitivity leading to more accurate judgments about 
other's mental states (Dimaggio et al., 2008). Building on this notion, 
neuroimaging research provides additional evidence that when predicting 
emotional responses of another person, greater recruitment of emotion related 
and mentalizing regions positively correlates with self-report empathy (Hooker et 
al., 2008). Similarly, internally generated thought is believed to be a key 
constituent in anxiety. Meta-analyses show associations between rumination and 
anxiety, with the strongest links being attributed to brooding and emotion-driven 
rumination (Olatunji et al., 2013). In fact, rumination has been shown to mediate 
the longitudinal relationship between life stress and symptoms 
of anxiety in both adolescents and adults  (McLaughlin & Nolen-Hoeksema, 
2011). Neuroimaging investigations reveal that rumination reliably engages the 
cortical midline, especially the more anterior portion, such that increased 
engagement of the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) was found when healthy 
subjects were instructed to adopt a ruminative thinking style in an 







and sustained recruitment of the amygdala has also been implicated in 
rumination. During one self-referential processing task in depressed patients, the 
amygdala was found to exhibit more sustained responses to emotional relative to 
neutral stimuli, with degree of sustained amygdala activation being positively 
correlated with rumination scores (Siegle et al., 2002).Together, this suggests 
that empathy and anxiety may be linked not only through a sensitivity to social 
and emotional information, but also in a shared propensity to continue to process 
emotional information through reflection and rumination. 
Although the literature is scant, previous research provides some 
evidence for a direct relation between empathy and anxiety. Using film clips 
depicting victims facing threats, one recent study demonstrated that trait empathy 
is associated with greater self-reported vicarious anxiety when observing victims, 
and a follow-up study extended these findings by manipulating levels of state 
empathy to establish a causal relationship between empathy and vicarious 
anxiety (Shu et al., 2017). Furthermore, previous studies have documented that 
individuals who experience emotion mirroring intensely are more prone to 
personal distress (e.g., anxiety or discomfort; (Lamm et al., 2007)). Investigations 
in the clinical realm have reported similar relationships. A recent study on 
inpatient adolescents found that measures of affective empathy are positively 
related to all anxiety dimensions (Gambin & Sharp, 2018). Likewise, Perry et al., 







socio-cognitive abilities, such that measures of social anxiety and general anxiety 
positively associated with affective and cognitive empathy, respectively. 
To date, neuroimaging studies have only separately investigated 
empathy and anxiety. In regard to empathy, affective and cognitive empathy 
involve interacting and partially overlapping neural bases (Y. Fan et al., 2011).  
Because affective empathy has been linked to automaticity relative to its 
cognitive component, it primarily elicits activations from regions implicated in 
rapid and prioritized processing of emotion signals, including: the amygdala, 
hypothalamus, orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and anterior insula (Decety et al., 
2013). By comparison, cognitive empathy, which shares similar neural networks 
with perspective taking and mentalizing (Pardini & Nichelli, 2009), additionally 
involves the superior temporal sulcus (STS), temporoparietal junction (TPJ), 
fusiform gyms (FG), and (mPFC; (Saxe & Powell, 2006)). The involvement of 
STS and TPJ, areas posited to contain mirror neurons (Iriki, 2006), suggests 
these areas are specifically activated during the conscious determination of 
intent. Lesion studies and recent clinical work support the involvement of 
aforementioned regions in relation to empathic responses. In patients with 
frontotemporal dementia, reduction of gray matter in the amygdala, insula and 
TPJ were associated with deficits in attribution of mental states (i.e., mentalizing), 
specifically in the emotional realm (Cerami et al., 2014). Furthermore, lesions in 
the amygdala and insula have been found to specifically be associated with 







damage show consistent and selective deficits in cognitive empathy but intact 
emotion recognition and affective empathy (S G Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2003). 
For the purposes of this study, however, we did not aim to further disentangle the 
neural differences between cognitive and affective empathy, but instead applied 
this knowledge to more precisely investigate the links between empathy and 
anxiety. 
In regard to anxiety, neuroimaging investigations demonstrate that anxiety 
reliably elicits activations in the amygdala and insula, particularly in relation to 
negative emotional responses (Etkin & Wager, 2007). While the amygdala is 
central to threat detection, orchestrating behavioral and physiological responses, 
the insula has been implicated in interoceptive awareness and may be 
particularly important for sensing perturbations in social anxiety disorder, PTSD 
and specific phobia consistently show greater activations than matched control 
subjects in these structures, however, similar patterns have been observed 
during fear conditioning in healthy subjects (Etkin & Wager, 2007). Extensive 
work additionally highlights the role of the hippocampus in anxiety due to its 
importance in contextual processing, as well as the mPFC, which provides top-
down regulatory control to the amygdala, helping to modulate behavior in light of 
complex environmental information (Liberzon et al., 2015; Shin & Liberzon, 
2009). Interestingly, many of the regions involved in anxiety are also implicated in 
empathy, namely the amygdala, insula and mPFC. This evidence suggests 







networks, as both constructs are associated with regions involved in processing 
salient stimuli, subjective emotional experience, and understanding complex 
social interactions. 
Aims 
Therefore, given evidence of a relation between empathy and anxiety, the 
current study aimed to investigate the underlying convergent neural correlates 
using a socially relevant task shown to engage cognitive and emotion processes 
through face processing, introspection and self-report rating of emotional state. 
This task was then used as a backdrop to explore how differences in trait 
empathy and anxiety may modulate processing within a socioemotional 
processing network and to assess points of convergence between empathy and 
anxiety. 
Hypotheses 
The following hypotheses were posited: (1) behaviorally, higher empathy 
would be related to higher trait anxiety; (2) increased trait anxiety and empathy 
would share neural substrates in emotional processing structures (e.g., amygdala 
and insula); while empathy will additionally relate to regions supporting social 
cognition (e.g., TPJ); and (3) both empathy and anxiety would exhibit increased 
functional connectivity (FC) between regions supporting emotional processing 
and social cognition (e.g., amygdala to TPJ), thus demonstrating the two 









55 healthy young adults were recruited for the present study. All 
participants were right-handed, with normal or corrected-to-normal vision and 
hearing and had no disclosed history of neurological or psychiatric disorders.  A 
total of six participants were excluded from analyses due to incomplete 
behavioral data (N = 1), incomplete magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) data (N = 
4), and disclosed psychiatric diagnosis following consent (N = 1), leaving 49 
participants in the final sample (28 males, 21 females; Ages 18-33; M age = 
22.00, SD = 4.04) 
Procedure 
The present study consisted of multiple visits. On the first visit, participants 
completed the functional MRI (fMRI) portion of the study at the University of 
Louisville, School of Medicine. At this time, participants signed consent forms, 
were briefed on MRI protocol, read through task instructions and completed 
the Face Processing Task. Within the next 72 h, participants visited the 
laboratory on the main campus to complete a variety of self-report questionnaires 
measuring personality traits of empathy and anxiety, along with measurements 
assessing internally generated thought (i.e., worry and rumination): Toronto 
Empathy Questionnaire (TEQ;(Spreng, McKinnon, et al., 2009)), State-Trait 
Anxiety Inventory (STAI;(Spielberger et al., 1973)), Penn State Worry 
Questionnaire (PSWQ;(Meyer et al., 1990)), and Ruminative Responses Scale 







The TEQ was chosen as the measure for empathy because it possesses 
a robust single factor structure and is thought to measure empathy at the 
broadest level (i.e., capturing both affective and cognitive empathy), and has 
convergent validity with existing self-report scales and behavioral measures of 
affective and cognitive empathy (Spreng, Mar, et al., 2009). The RRS consists of 
22 items, comprising three subscales: (1) reflection-turning inward to engage in 
cognitive problem solving; (2) brooding-comparing one's current situation with 
some unachieved standard; and (3) depressive Rumination. Subscale totals of 
the RRS can be individually utilized, or all items can be summed together for a 
composite total rumination score, indicative of one's propensity to engage in 
repetitive and passive self-focused attention (Treynor, 2003). Since all 
questionnaires were administered one to 3 days following fMRI task scanning, 
only trait anxiety scores from the STAI were used in analyses. All questionnaires 
are known to be psychometrically sound, with high internal consistency and test-
retest reliability (Barnes et al., 2002; Meyer et al., 1990; Spreng, Mar, et al., 
2009; Treynor, 2003). 







A Face Processing Task constructed from Fearful and Neutral human 
faces (male and female) shown to reliably elicit activation from brain regions in a 
canonical socioemotional network was utilized. The Face Processing task 
consisted of two conditions: Fearful and Neutral. Images were acquired from the 
Eckman Face Database. During scanning, visual stimuli were displayed through 
ePrime onto an in vivo Esys LCD TV monitor at the back of the scanner bore, 
which was viewed by participants through a mirror on the head-coil. This task 
employed an event-related design, during which face stimuli were presented for 
4s in a pseudo-random order (Fear trials N = 30, Neutral trials N = 12). After 
presentation of each face, participants rated the image for how negative it made 
them feel, using a four-point Likert scale (1 = None, 4 = Extremely negative; 2 s 
to rate). Each trial was then followed by a variable inter-trial interval (ITI; 0-8 s). 
This rating period was included to ensure processing of the emotionality of each 








Figure 16: Example of a single trial from the Face Processing Task. 
 
Behavioral data were analyzed using SPSS (Version 25.0.0; SPSS, INC.), 
including the use of PROCESS for mediation analyses (Hayes, 2012). Here, we 
chose not to use a causal steps approach to mediation, as this method has been 
criticized as being unnecessarily restrictive and can lead to misleading or false 
conclusions (e.g., concealing a significant indirect effect due to the absence of a 
total or direct effect, i.e., suppression;(MacKinnon et al., 2000; Rucker et al., 
2011)). Furthermore, we did not seek to demonstrate causal effects, but rather 
describe relationships among traits. For these reasons, a bootstrapping method 
was undertaken to test for indirect effects (Preacher & Hayes, 2004).  
Neuroimaging Analysis 
Functional Analyses 
Image preprocessing and data analysis were implemented using the FSL 
package (version 5.0.9, Analysis group, FMRIB, Oxford, UK). Standard 
preprocessing was applied: MCFLIRT-linear slice-time correction/motion 
correction, optiBET-brain extraction (Lutkenhoff et al., 2014), time-series 
prewhitening, and high-pass filtering (0.01 Hz). Individual's functional images 
were first registered to their high-resolution MPRAGE scans via 6-parameter 
linear registration, and the MPRAGE images were in turn registered to the 
Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) 152 Tl-2 mm template via a 12-parameter 







combined to align the functional images to the standard template. Functional 
images were resampled into the standard space with 2 mm isotropic voxels and 
were smoothed with a Gaussian kernel of 6 mm full-width at half-maximum 
(FWHM). ICA-AROMA (i.e., Independent Component Analysis Automatic 
Removal of Motion Artifact), a data-driven method to identify and remove 
components representing motion-related noise in fMRI data, was additionally 
utilized (Pruim et al., 2015). Following preprocessing, Lower-level statistics were 
implemented in FEAT. Using multiple regression analysis, statistical maps 
representing the association between the observed time-series (e.g., BOLD 
signal) and one or a linear combination of regressors for each subject were 
constructed. Regressors for the main effects were constructed by modeling each 
of the conditions-Fearful and Neutral-versus low-level fMRI baseline (ITI fixation), 
in order to create contrasts of interest: Fearful > Neutral (F > N) and Neutral > 
Fearful (N > F). For each regressor, a double-gamma hemodynamic response 
function (HRF) was convolved with an event vector starting at the stimulus onset 
through rating response to capture both the stimulus processing and 
introspective time periods in each trial (duration of 6,000 ms). Higher-level 
analysis was conducted using FLAME 1+2 and outlier de-weighting to combine 
and spatially normalize all subjects. The higher-level models employed 
nonparametric permutation methods through FSL's randomize function (Nichols 
& Holmes, 2001). For each contrast of interest, cluster thresholding and 







Free Cluster Enhancement (TFCE) method, which detects clusters of contiguous 
voxels without first setting an arbitrary statistical cutoff (e.g., Z > 2.58), and 
controls the family-wise error (FWE) rate at p < 0.05 (Smith & Nichols, 2009). 
Each contrast underwent 5,000 permutations. Randomise produces corrected 1-
p maps, which were used for all figures. Figures of statistical brain maps were 
created using FSLview. 
The present analyses primarily focused on a region of interest (ROI) 
approach. For ROI analyses, regions comprising a canonical socioemotional 
processing network were analyzed (i.e., regions supporting emotion processing 
and social cognition). ROIs included: bilateral TPJ, bilateral insula, mPFC, and 
bilateral amygdala. Convergent findings from neuroimaging and lesion studies 
indicate that the amygdala and insula are critical for affective reactivity and 
interoceptive awareness, respectively (Craig, 2002; Etkin & Wager, 2007), while 
the TPJ and mPFC are essential to the perception of intentionality and mental 
states of others, as well as cognitive empathy (Amodio & Frith, 2006; Young et 
al., 2010). Bilateral anatomical masks were created from FSL's Harvard Oxford 
cortical atlas (insula and mPFC) and subcortical atlas (amygdala). Since this 
cortical atlas does not include anatomical TPJ masks, bilateral masks were 
manually created, using 10 mm radii surrounding the vertices at which the 
temporal and parietal lobes meet, at the posterior end of the Sylvian fissure for 
each hemisphere. The STS was additionally tested (-60, -46, 6) but yielded null 







Secondly, exploratory whole-brain analyses were carried out for the Face 
Processing Task.  
Functional Connectivity 
Seed regions for FC analyses were derived from peak z-stats of functional 
activation task results (peak z-stat within FWE-corrected cluster, when 
applicable, or peak z-stat within ROI mask in cases when no significant functional 
activation results were found). Seed masks were created using a 5 mm radius 
surrounding the peak z-stat. Seed-to-ROI FC was then performed by using the 
following steps. First, lower-level subject specific models (FSL's FEAT) were run 
by applying high-pass filtering (100 s, and subsequently the residuals and mean 
functional output were added together (FSL's res4d and mean_func). Following 
image preprocessing, lower-level subject specific models were run by regressing 
out average time courses over ventricles, white matter and subject-space whole-
brain masks (using FSL's means). The residuals (res4d) and mean functional 
output (mean_func) from the FEAT output were subsequently combined to create 
a subject-specific preprocessed time series that was globally normalized and 
controlled for white matter and ventricle signals. This data was then used in a 
third series of lower-level subject-specific models that incorporated regressors of 
demeaned timeseries extracted from each seed region for each condition of 
interest. Thus, for each subject, we determined regions of coactivation to the 
specified seed within each contrast of interest, which was then combined at the 







determined through paired-sample t-tests for each contrast of interest (F > N and 
N > F) using the TFCE method (FWE rate: p < 0.05, 5,000 permutations). 
Additionally, whole brain exploratory analyses were carried out. To test whether 
controlling for age or sex would alter any of the reported results, both age and 
sex were regressed into neuroimaging task data and were not found to 
significantly relate to any reported regions.  
Questionnaires 
Questionnaires were incorporated into all functional analyses. First, 
questionnaire scores were used as regressors in higher level ROI functional 
analyses in the F > N and N > F contrasts (FWE-corrected, p < 0.05). 
Additionally, regions displaying significant FC were masked using a 5 mm radius, 
and mean FC parameter estimates between regions were extracted for contrasts 
of interest and correlated with scores from each questionnaire. Finally, median 
splits of questionnaire scores were used for exploratory whole-brain group 
analyses, comparing Lower and Upper halves of each questionnaire for F > N 
and N > F contrasts. Areas of regional overlap between questionnaires following 
TFCE correction were masked using a 5 mm radius, and parameter estimated 
were extracted to calculate Cohen's d effect size between the Lower and Upper 









Correlations of self-report questionnaires revealed that empathy was 
positively associated with worry (r = 0.30, p = 0.04). Worry, rumination and 
anxiety were found to all be highly intercorrelated (worry and rumination: r = 0.64, 
p < 0.001; worry and anxiety: r = 0.60, p < 0.001; rumination and anxiety: r = 
0.70, p < 0.001). Contrary to hypotheses, empathy was not directly associated 
with anxiety (r = -0.04, p = 0.77). However, empathy positively correlated with 
worry (PSWQ), while worry, rumination (RRS) and anxiety (STAI) were all highly 
intercorrelated (Table 3). 
Table 3 
Correlations between Behavioral Questionnaires. 
 TEQ PSWQ RRS total  STAI trait 
TEQ 1.00    
PSWQ r = .30, p = 
.04 
1.00   
RRS total r = .15, p = 
.30 
r = .64, p < 
.001 
1.00  
STAI trait r = -.04, p = 
.77 
r = .60, p < 
.001 
r = .70, p < 
.001 
1.00 
Note. Significant correlations are shown in bold.  
TEQ = Toronto Empathy Questionnaire; PSWQ = Penn State Worry 
Questionnaire; RRS = Ruminative Responses Scale; STAI = State Trait Anxiety 
Inventory 
 
Given the lack of a direct effect between empathy anxiety, but a significant 
positive correlation between empathy and worry, an inconsistent mediational 
model was run to test for indirect effects. While classical mediation involves 
causal and directional relationships among variables, neither aspect is a 







inconsistent mediation arises when the addition of a third variable actually 
increases the predictive validity between a predictor and outcome variable. Thus, 
significant indirect effects may exist even in the absence of a significant c (X Y) 
pathway (MacKinnon et al., 2000; Zhao et al., 2010). Therefore, it was 
hypothesized that empathy and anxiety would be indirectly related through the 
process of worry.  
Results from this analysis demonstrated a significant positive indirect 
effect between empathy and anxiety through worry, suggesting that higher 
empathy relates to higher worry, which in turn increases anxiety (TEQ: p = .04, 
PSWQ: p < .001, Bootstrapped 95% CI: [.055 - .597]). These effects were 
observed bidirectionally (STAI  PSWQ  TEQ), revealing an overall positive 
indirect relationship between empathy and anxiety, but only with the inclusion of 
worry. Furthermore, worry and rumination were included in a single model, which 
additionally revealed significant positive indirect effects between empathy and 
anxiety through both worry and rumination (TEQ: p = .03, PSWQ: p = .01, RRS: 
p < .001, Bootstrapped 95% CI: [.020 - .325]). This relationship was observed 
bidirectionally as well (STAI  RRS  PSWQ  TEQ), however, the positions 
of worry and rumination could not be interchanged as empathy only shared a 







Figure 17: Behavioral results. Empathy demonstrated a significant positive 
indirect relationship with anxiety, through inconsistent mediation of worry. These 
effects were observed bidirectionally. Empathy also revealed a positive indirect 
relationship with anxiety through worry and rumination.  
TEQ = Toronto Empathy Questionnaire; PSWQ = Penn State Worry 





Task- Related Region of Interest Analysis 
Using an established socioemotional process network (TPJ, insula, 
mPFC, amygdala), we first evaluated regional activations when individuals were 
processing fearful and neutral human faces (F > N and N > F). Results revealed 
that greater left TPJ activation was related to F > N faces, indicating enhanced 
face processing and supporting mentalizing. Greater bilateral anterior insula 
activation frequently associated with interoceptive awareness, was also related to 
F > N faces. Finally, increased mPFC activation was related to N > F faces, 
suggesting internal mentation, reflection or rumination (Figure 18; Table 4). No 







significant increased amygdala activations were observed in both main effects, in 
line with many studies that have shown amygdala activations for all face 
processing (Decety & 
Sommerville, 2003; 
Todorov & Engell, 2008), 
and thus differences did 
not emerge in either 
contrast. Nevertheless, 
these results support that 
integral components of a 
canonical socioemotional 
networks were activated 
during this Face Processing Task.  
Figure 18: Neuroimaging Task Results. All results are FWE-corrected, p < .05. 
Red indicates Fearful>Neutral (F>N) faces and blue indicates Neutral>Fearful 
(N>F) faces. A) Greater left TPJ activation was related to F>N. B) Greater 
bilateral insula activations related to F>N. C) Increased mPFC activation was 
related to N>F. TPJ = temporoparietal junction; mPFC = medial prefrontal cortex 
 
 
Table 4: Neuroimaging Task Results, as shown in Figure 18. 
Region  Peak t-
statistic 
x y z 
Temporoparietal Junction (TPJ) L 3.98 -54 -44 32 







Insula L 3.99 -38 16 -8 
Medial Prefrontal Cortex (mPFC) R/L 4.42 2 30 -
22 
Coordinates in MNI Space. 
Questionnaire Regressions 
Next, questionnaires measuring empathy, anxiety and worry were 
regressed into task data to investigate how these individual traits modulate 
processing within this socioemotional network. Higher empathy (TEQ) was found 
to be related to greater activation in the left TPJ for F > N faces, suggesting that 
higher empathy is related to enhanced face processing and mentalizing, 
specifically for emotional faces. Regression of STAI revealed that higher trait 
anxiety was related to greater bilateral insula activations for N > F faces. 
Although on average, individuals showed increased insula activations for F > N 
faces, these results demonstrate an interacting effect of anxiety, suggesting 
either that people higher in anxiety process the neutral faces as more negative, 
or exhibit prolonged interoceptive processing and emotional carry-over from the 
fearful faces. Similarly, higher worry (PSWQ) was found to be related to greater 
mPFC activation for N > F, indicating more internal mentation, and supporting the 
latter idea of continued processing of emotional stimuli into the neutral condition. 
Finally, regression with the RRS revealed that higher total rumination was 
associated with increased activations of bilateral TPJ, bilateral insula and mPFC 
for N > F faces, an amalgamation of the three results from empathy, anxiety and 






















Figure 19: Neuroimaging results for questionnaire score regressions. All results 
are FWE-corrected, p < .05. Red/yellow indicates Fearful>Neutral (F>N) faces 
and blue indicates Neutral>Fearful (N>F) faces. TEQ: Higher empathy related to 
greater activation in the left TPJ (F>N). STAI: increased anxiety related to 
greater bilateral insula activations (N>F). PSWQ: More worry was related to 
greater activation in the mPFC (N>F). RRS total: Higher total rumination was 
related to grater activations in bilateral TPJ, bilateral insula, and mPFC (N>F) 
TEQ = Toronto Empathy Questionnaire; PSWQ = Penn State Worry 
Questionnaire; STAI = State Trait Anxiety Inventory; RRS = Ruminative 
Responses Scale; TPJ = temporoparietal junction; mPFC = medial prefrontal 
cortex 
 








Region  Peak t-
statistic 
x y z 
TEQ      
Temporoparietal Junction (TPJ) L 4.76 -58 -38 22 
STAI      
Insula R 3.34 46 0 2 
Insula L 3.13 -36 2 -6 
PSWQ      
Medial Prefrontal Cortex (mPFC) R/L 3.57 10 50 -8 
RRS      
Temporoparietal Junction (TPJ) R 3.92 54 -20 16 
Temporoparietal Junction (TPJ) L 4.32 -54 -38 34 
Insula R 4.04 32 16 -2 
Insula L 4.87 -34 12 10 
Medial Prefrontal Cortex (mPFC) R/L 3.88 12 52 -6 
Coordinates in MNI Space. 
Because rumination revealed overlapping neural correlates with empathy, 
anxiety and worry, the behavioral data was revisited to assess rumination as a 
connecting point. Median splits of TEQ, STAI, and PSWQ were performed, and 
independent samples t-tests were calculated on degree of rumination between 
the Lower and Upper half groups of each questionnaire. Results showed that 
individuals in the Upper halves of empathy, anxiety and worry also had higher 
total rumination on average (TEQ: t(47) = 1.98, p = 0.05; STAI: t(47) = 7.59, p < 







divided into the three subscales-Reflection, Brooding and Depressive 
Rumination. Within the Reflection subscale, individuals in the Upper halves of 
empathy, anxiety and worry all had higher Reflective Rumination (TEQ: t(47) = 
2.00, p = 0.05; STAI: t(47) = 2.54, p = 0.0 l ; PSWQ: t(47) = 2.56, p = 0.01). 
However, for the Brooding (TEQ: t(47) = 1.18, p = 0.25; STAI: t(47) = 5.34, p < 
0.001; PSWQ: t(41) = 4.93, p < 0.001) and Depression subscales (TEQ: t(47) = 
1.73 , p = 0.09; STAI: t(47) = 9.10, p < 0.001; PSWQ: t (47) = 4.75, p < 0.001), 
only individuals in the Upper halves of anxiety and worry had significantly higher 








Figure 20: Median splits of TEQ, STAI and PSWQ showed that the Upper halves 
of all three questionnaires were related to higher total rumination (RRS total). 
Analysis of the three RRS subscales revealed that empathy, anxiety and worry 
were all related to higher Reflective Rumination. However, only the Upper halves 
of anxiety and worry were associated with higher Brooding and Depressive 
rumination. TEQ, Toronto empathy questionnaire; STAI, State-Trait Anxiety 




Next, FC was performed between seeds and all regions comprising the 
socioemotional network. Significant increased FC was observed between the left 
amygdala and left insula (peak t-statistic = 4.72; -38, -6, -4), as well as the left 
amygdala and left TPJ (peak t-statistic = 4.37; -52, - 30, 28) for F > N faces. This 
demonstrates that on average, individuals displayed increased communication 
between these regions when viewing emotional faces compared to neutral ones. 
However, when relating these findings to questionnaire scores, higher empathy, 
worry and total rumination were all related to increased connectivity between the 
left amygdala and left insula in the N > F contrast (TEQ: r = 0.36, p = 0.0 l ; 
PSWQ: r = 0.39, p = 0.01 ; RRS: r = 0.39, p = 0.01), suggesting not only 
enhanced communication between these regions in response to emotional faces, 
but sustained connectivity into the neutral condition for people higher on these 
traits. Similarly, increased total rumination was related to greater connectivity 










Figure 21: On average, individuals displayed increased functional connectivity 
(FC) between the left amygdala and left insula, as well as left amygdala and left 
TPJ for F > N faces. Higher empathy, worry and rumination was found to be 
positively correlated with FC between the left amygdala and left insula for N > F 
faces. Additionally, higher total rumination was related to increased connectivity 
between the left amygdala and left TPJ for N > F faces. TEQ, Toronto Empathy 
Questionnaire; STAI, State-Trait Anxiety Inventory; PSWQ, Penn State Worry 





Finally, we wanted to explore whether increased bottom-up processing or 
decreased top-down control seemed to be driving his putative emotional carry-
over from Fearful to Neutral trials. In other words, could we find either: (1) 
evidence for increased bottom-up processing in individuals high on these 
measures, suggesting greater sensitivity to social and emotional information; 







measures, suggesting more difficulty in switching between emotional and non-
emotional states? To test this, we performed an exploratory whole-brain analysis 
using the median split groups (with the addition of median split RRS total), 
comparing the Lower and Upper half groups of each questionnaire in the F > N 
and N > F contrasts. Results showed that in F > N, the Lower half groups were 
all associated with increased activations in frontoparietal attentional networks, 
with strong similarities and regional overlap between anxiety, worry and 
rumination [average Cohen's d for Lower>Upper across questionnaires for left 
dorsolateral PFC (dlPFC) = 1.12, and for left intraparietal sulcus (IPS) = 0.98]. 
For empathy, one overlapping but non-significant cluster in the left dlPFC was 
observed (FWE-corrected, p = 0.10). No significant results were found for F > N, 
Upper > Lower. Therefore, individuals on the Upper end of any or all of these 
measures appear to exhibit decreased top-down attentional control during 
the F > N contrast, leading to both enhanced processing of emotional stimuli and 










Figure 22: Median splits of TEQ, STAI, PSWQ, and RRS total revealed that the 
Lower halves of these traits were associated with enhanced activations in the 
frontoparietal attention network, with TEO exhibiting one overlapping but non-
significant cluster in the left dlPFC. This increased top-down activation for 
individuals in the Lower halves of these traits may facilitate switching between 
emotional and non-emotional states. All results are FWE-corrected. TEQ, 
Toronto Empathy Questionnaire; STAI, State-Trait Anxiety Inventory; PSWQ, 
Penn State Worry Questionnaire; RRS, Ruminative Responses Scale; dlPFC, 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. 
 
Discussion 
The present study aimed to investigate the convergent neural correlates 
that may underlie a relationship between empathy and anxiety. We used an 
emotional Face Processing Task shown to reliably elicit activation from brain 
regions in a canonical socioemotional network, self-report questionnaires 







rumination), to examine how these traits were related to functional activation 
within, and communication between, regions comprising a socioemotional 
processing network. Our results show that empathy, anxiety and worry each 
engaged a different component of this socioemotional network, while rumination 
related to increased activations across all cortical regions in the network. 
Furthermore, higher empathy, worry and rumination were all associated with 
increased bottom-up connectivity, while anxiety was related to worry and 
rumination through decreased top-down attentional control. Taken together, our 
data demonstrate that in the context of socioemotional processing, empathy 
shares an indirect relationship with anxiety through the ruminative tendencies of 
worry. 
Behaviorally, our results showed a positive correlation between empathy 
and worry, as measured by the TEQ and PSWQ, respectively. Empathy is 
closely tied to perspective-taking and mentalizing, which requires using one's 
own mental state to gain insight into another's thoughts or feelings. 
Comparatively, worry tends to be a future-oriented state that focuses on potential 
threats, but also represents an attempt at mental problem solving  (Borkovec et 
al., 1983). Thus, this positive relationship between empathy and worry suggests 
that predispositions towards empathic arousal and perspective-taking may be 
natural to engage in problem-solving simulations on behalf of other individuals. 
Additionally, we observed a significant indirect relationship between empathy and 







While rumination shares many similarities to worry, it has been suggested that 
rumination is a process of "compulsively focusing attention on the symptoms of 
one's distress, and on its possible causes and consequences, as opposed to its 
solutions" (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998). This idea both supports the observation that 
rumination is most closely related to anxiety and provides a scaffold for how 
empathy relates to worry, which in turn relates to rumination, and thus anxiety. 
Relationships to Functional Activation  
Questionnaire regressions further revealed that each of these processes-
empathy, anxiety and worry-related to increased activations within different 
cortical regions comprising a socioemotional network. First, empathy was found 
to relate to increased activation in the left TPJ for F > N faces. The TPJ is known 
to be a multimodal association area that integrates input from visual, auditory, 
somatosensory and limbic areas, and has reciprocal connection to the PFC, 
making it a central locus for processing multisensory information and cognitive 
aspects related to the self (Decety & Lamm, 2006). In concert with the posterior 
STS, the TPJ is also thought to be specialized for processing faces and eye gaze 
(Blakemore, 2008), and thus aids in mentalizing (Bernhardt & Singer, 2012). 
While the right TPJ is more commonly implicated in empathetic responses, 
studies have shown involvement of bilateral TPJ when participants read stories 
about character's mental states or false beliefs (Young et al., 2010), and 
specifically the left TPJ when participants imitated others (Decety & Lamm, 







enhanced face processing and mentalizing during the current study, particularly 
for emotional faces. 
Regression of STAI trait revealed increased activations in bilateral anterior 
insula for Neutral trials, and similarly, higher worry was related to increased 
mPFC activation for Neutral trials, indicating that these traits are related to 
prolonged processing of emotional stimuli. Research suggests that the insula 
plays an important role in vicariously sharing emotions (Bernhardt & Singer, 
2012), as well as representing and integrating interoceptive and affective states 
(Craig, 2002, 2009). In fact, in one study looking at high and low degrees of 
alexithymia, the greater the individual's deficits in understanding their own 
emotions, the less insula activation they showed while empathizing with others in 
pain (Bird et al., 2010). Therefore, these increased activations in the anterior 
insula supports the notion that trait anxiety is related to increased emotional 
sensitivity and interoceptive awareness. 
Furthermore, the mPFC has been linked to many aspects of social 
cognition, including monitoring one's own emotional state (Dvash & Shamay-
Tsoory, 2014), understanding emotional states of others (Amodio & Frith, 2006), 
and internal mentation (Andrews-Hanna, 2011). Depressed participants show 
significantly greater activation in the mPFC than controls during experimentally 
induced rumination (Cooney et al., 2010) and individuals with generalized anxiety 
show sustained activation of the mPFC into resting epochs, which correlates with 







may promote continued interoceptive awareness into Neutral trials, while higher 
worry may play a role in cognitively processing those feelings (i.e., interoceptive 
processing and introspection). Finally, regression of RRS total showed that 
rumination was related to increased activations in bilateral TPJ, bilateral anterior 
insula, and mPFC for Neutral trials, suggesting that rumination is globally related 
to prolonged processing of emotional information, and moreover, alludes to 
relationships with empathy, anxiety and worry via overlapping neural correlates 
(summary in Figure 23). 
 
Figure 23: Summary figure of neuroimaging findings related to each trait. 
Behaviorally and neurally, empathy shared direct relationships with worry and 
rumination. Additionally, anxiety exhibited behavioral relationships and common 
neural correlates with worry and rumination. Empathy was found to only share a 
significant indirect behavioral relationship with anxiety through worry, and this is 
reflected in the convergent neural correlates of worry and rumination. Pink 
indicates increased regional activations for F > N. Blue indicates increased 
regional activations for N > F. Green with black arrows denotes increased FC for 







comparing the Upper > Lower halves of questionnaires. Top Left: empathy was 
positively related to increased activation in the left TPJ for F > N, and increased 
FC between the left amygdala and insula for N > F. Top Right: anxiety was 
related to increased activations in bilateral insula for N > F, and decreased 
activations in the frontoparietal attentional network for Upper > Lower. Bottom 
Left: worry was related to increased activation in the mPFC for N > F, increased 
FC between the left amygdala and insula for N > F, and decreased activations in 
the frontoparietal attentional network for Upper > Lower. Bottom Right: 
rumination was related to increased activation in the mPFC, bilateral insula and 
bilateral TPJ for N > F, increased FC between the left amygdala and insula as 
well as the left amygdala and T PJ for N > F, and decreased activations in the 
frontoparietal attentional network for Upper > Lower. 
 
Empathy Relates to Reflection, Worry to Depressive Brooding 
Upon revisiting the behavioral data to further assess rumination as a 
connecting point between empathy and anxiety, median splits revealed that 
higher empathy, anxiety and worry were all related to higher total rumination. 
However, when assessing the rumination subscales, individuals in the Lower and 
Upper halves of empathy showed no differences on Brooding and Depression, 
suggesting that empathy is most closely tied to Reflective Rumination. In line with 
this finding, research indicates that self-reflection is positively correlated with 
perspective-taking and empathic concern (Joireman et al., 2002). On the other 
hand, the Lower and Upper halves of anxiety and worry showed significant 
differences in levels of Brooding and Depressive Rumination. Evidence suggests 
that the Brooding subscale is more pathological than Reflection, and Depressive 
Rumination is known to consist of items that overlap with measures of 
depression symptomatology  (Treynor, 2003; Watkins & Moulds, 2009). 
Furthermore, one study showed that rumination (measured separately from self-







associated with personal distress (Joireman et al., 2002). Both worry and 
rumination have been described as unproductive and repetitive thought 
processes (Segerstrom et al., 2000) that exacerbate and prolong negative affect 
(McLaughlin & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2011), and it is believed that this repetitive 
negative thinking is what increases vulnerability to multiple anxiety and 
depressive disorders (McEvoy et al., 2013). Therefore, while empathy shares a 
similar style of repetitive thinking and continued processing of emotional 
information through reflection, only worry and anxiety demonstrated a 
relationship with ruminative subscales associated with repetitive negative 
thinking typical of many clinical mood disorders. Because the relationship 
between empathy and anxiety was only found indirectly through worry, or worry 
and total rumination, this suggests that the tendency towards negative affect in 
worry and rumination may be a critical component necessary to link empathy to 
anxiety. Thus, empathy may be directly tied to worry through mentalizing and 
simulations of situational outcomes, but the indirect relationship to anxiety seems 
to rely on persistent negative affect induced by repetitive negative thinking found 
in the ruminative tendencies of worry. 
Neuroimaging Findings 
We next evaluated region-to-region FC within this canonical 
socioemotional network for the Face Processing Task and assessed the 
modulatory role these individual differences play. Interestingly, although no 







FC was observed between the left amygdala and left insula, as well as the left 
amygdala and left TPJ during Fear trials. When these findings were then related 
to our self-report measures, we found that higher empathy, worry and rumination 
were all related to increased connectivity between the amygdala and insula 
during Neutral trials, while rumination was additionally related to connectivity 
between the amygdala and TPJ for Neutral trials. Rumination of all types has 
been shown to relate to increased and sustained amygdala reactivity (Mandell et 
al., 2014), lasting throughout subsequent non-emotional trials (Siegle et al., 
2002), and our results add that rumination may also be related to altered 
amygdala connectivity. Additionally, in support of our findings connecting 
empathy, worry and rumination through increased bottom-up connectivity, 
studies on autism spectrum disorders (ASDs), widely thought to be related to 
deficits in empathy, show decreased FC between the amygdala and insula (von 
dem Hagen et al., 2012), while resting state fMRI accounts report increased FC 
between these regions in relationship to state anxiety (Baur et al., 2013). Of 
interest, these FC results add to a growing list of curiously left-lateralized findings 
given the emotional nature of the task. However, worry, rumination and 
mentalizing are largely verbal or linguistic by nature (Fresco et al., 2002) and 
furthermore, participants were instructed to actively view and evaluate each face, 
hence promoting a more motivated "approach" response (Harmon-Jones et al., 
2006), both of which are predominantly left-lateralized. Nevertheless, collectively 







assertion of enhanced and prolonged emotional processing in association with 
these traits and outline a common neural mechanism linking empathy with 
worry/rumination (summary in Figure 23). 
Reduced Top-Down Attention Drives Prolonged Emotion Processing 
 
Finally, we pursued an exploratory whole-brain analysis to assess whether 
these neural commonalities were being driven by increased bottom-up 
processing, and/or decreased top-down control. Compared to the Upper halves, 
the Lower halves of anxiety, worry and rumination, but not empathy, were all 
associated with increased activations in the frontoparietal attentional network for 
fearful than neutral faces. This implies that in a naturalistic socioemotional 
setting, higher scores on these traits are all related to decreased top-down 
attentional control. Decreased activation in the dlPFC is thought to underlie 
disinhibition, allowing for sustained engagement of emotional-processing 
structures (Siegle et al., 2002). In support of this notion, higher brooding 
tendencies are associated with more errors when attempting to inhibit negative 
information (Vanderhasselt et al., 2011). Notably, these results demonstrate a 
common neural mechanism between anxiety, worry and rumination, but a 
dissociation from empathy, providing the indirect link between empathy and 
anxiety through worry that was previously observed behaviorally (summary in 
Figure 23). 







It should be noted that all measures of empathy, anxiety, worry and 
rumination were collected through self-report questionnaires, which have their 
limitations. In light of this, future studies should continue to investigate the 
relationship between empathy and anxiety using performance measures, or other 
tasks using a broader range of stimulus types that cover more diverse emotional 
states. Future research should additionally extend these findings by untangling 
the relationship between anxiety, worry and rumination with cognitive and 
affective empathy, which display both behavioral and neurologically distinct 
mechanisms (Preckel et al., 2018). Furthermore, the present study was 
conducted as part of a much larger investigation on emotion regulation in young 
adults, and as such, only one questionnaire for each construct was collected. 
While a multi-method multi-trait approach would be ideal, we have attempted to 
demonstrate that the utilized questionnaires have strong internal reliability and 
discriminant validity in measuring their putative constructs. Additionally, all of our 
participants were considered psychologically healthy, and while the measured 
empathy/anxiety/worry/rumination scores covered a broad range it would be 
worthwhile to explore whether individuals with clinical disorders show 
corresponding results. 
Previous literature has documented that many psychological disorders 
such as ASD (Baron-Cohen et al., 2005)and antisocial personality disorder (Blair, 
2001) demonstrate decreased empathy and impaired social functioning, however 







often impaired in individuals with anxiety disorders (Luebbe et al., 2010). It is 
possible that by excluding the extreme ends of each spectrum, our observed 
linear relationships may not be capturing the whole picture. Finally, although our 
sample size was ample with nearly equal numbers of males and females, looking 
at gender differences was beyond the scope of this article. However, because 
there are known gender differences in empathy (Schulte-Rüther et al., 2008), 
emotional processing and prevalence of psychiatric disorders (Brody, 1997; 
McLean et al., 2011; McRae et al., 2008; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2001), future studies 
should explore how these neural mechanisms may vary by gender.  
 
Summary 
In conclusion, the present study sought to investigate neural 
commonalities that may support correspondence between trait empathy and 
anxiety in a healthy population. While a direct behavioral relationship was not 
observed between these traits, the results revealed indirect links between 
empathy and anxiety through the mediation of worry, and shared associations 
with higher self-reflection and ruminative thinking style. These findings, first seen 
behaviorally, were echoed through convergent neural correlates found in worry 
and rumination (Figure 23). First, empathy alone was related to worry and 
ruminative thinking through increased bottom-up communication of emotional 
processing regions (i.e., FC between the amygdala and insula). Further, results 
showed that worry and rumination shared commonalities with anxiety through 







suggests that the enhanced and prolonged bottom-up processing of emotional 
information seen in empathy, in combination with the decreased top-down 
attentional control and repetitive negative thinking central to worry and 






























CHAPTER V: A CLOSER LOOK AT EMOTION REGULATION 
 
“He who does not control the signs of fear will experience fear in a greater 
degree, and he who remains passive when overwhelmed with grief loses his best 
chance of recovering elasticity of the mind” 
 
Charles Darwin  
 
EXPERIMENT 4:  
Cortical Morphometry and Structural Connectivity Relate to Executive Function 
and Estradiol Level in Healthy Adolescents 
 
Adolescence represents a dynamic developmental stage that corresponds 
with dramatic changes in brain architecture as it remodels itself to sustain the 
demands of a young adult physiology (Arain et al., 2013; Asato et al., 2010; 
Blakemore & Choudhury, 2006; Paus, 2005). Previous studies consistently 
demonstrate a nonlinear change in cortical grey matter (GM) while in contrast, 
white matter (WM) exhibits a steady linear increase during adolescence (Arain et 
al., 2013; Giedd et al., 1999; Paus, 2005; Elizabeth R Sowell et al., 1999). This 
monumental neural reorganization driven by gonadal hormone exposure is 
thought to increase neural efficiency between the prefrontal cortex (PFC) and 







(EF), a set of processes necessary for seamless integration of top-down cortical 
control which forms the basis of goal-directed behavior (Blakemore & Choudhury, 
2006; Caballero et al., 2016; Giedd et al., 1999; Paus, 2005; Smolker et al., 
2015; Elizabeth R Sowell et al., 1999).  
Relationship between Executive Function and Cortical Morphometry 
Despite EF’s critical role in guiding future-oriented behavior, inconsistencies 
exist regarding the morphological features that support it during adolescence. 
While some studies demonstrate that increases in total cortical and PFC GM 
volume (GMV) relate to higher scores on working memory and response inhibition 
tests   (Kharitonova et al., 2013; Mahone et al., 2009; Yurgelun-Todd, 2007); others 
show that GMV decreases in the PFC relate to increased ability to regulate 
emotion, better working memory capacity and higher scores on verbal memory 
tests (Caballero et al., 2016; Yurgelun-Todd, 2007). Similarly, higher IQ during 
adolescence is associated with cortical thinning of left superior orbitofrontal cortex 
and superior motor area, and higher bilateral hemispheric surface area (SA) 
(Schnack et al., 2014). Thus, bi-directional morphological results in relation to EF 
need not be interpreted as contradictory, instead they could possibly reflect the 
fact that GM maturation follows an inverted-U shape over development, peaking 
at different ages depending on the region (Ducharme et al., 2015; E R Sowell et 
al., 2001). Therefore, GM is considered closely related to maturation of a brain 
region (Crone, 2009; Giedd, 2004), suggesting that controlling for age is 







Relationship between Executive Function and Structural Connectivity 
In a more consistent pattern than GM maturation during adolescence, 
studies examining fractional anisotropy (FA; a WM integrity descriptor) during this 
period indicate relatively linear increases coinciding with improved EF 
performance. Specifically, increases in FA in the posterior corpus callosum during 
adolescence are associated with better working memory and IQ scores (Giedd, 
2004; Giorgio et al., 2010; Nagy et al., 2004). Similarly, research indicates 
increased FA of fronto-temporal-subcortical WM tracts (inferior fronto-occipital 
longitudinal fasciculus (iFOF), superior longitudinal fasciculus (SLF), arcuate 
fasciculus and the cortico-spinal tract) support enhanced communication between 
disparate regions of the cortex and reflect increases in top-down cognitive control 
of behavior (Asato et al., 2010; Peper et al., 2015). While previous studies show 
specific changes in GM and FA and indicate relationships with some facets of EF, 
a comprehensive cortical morphometry and structural connectivity investigation 
concerning the full range of EF constructs is lacking. 
Measuring Executive Function in Children and Adolescents  
A tool often used to investigate multiple EF constructs and occasionally, 
their underlying neural substrates, is the Behavior Rating Inventory of Executive 
Function (BRIEF). This reliable and validated psychological battery is designed to 
measure EF behavior in children and adolescents (5–18 years) during everyday 
situations through behavioral observation (Clark et al., 2010). Initial factor analytic 







(BRI)—emphasizing inhibitory and emotional control (EC), and a Metacognition 
Index (MCI)—emphasizing working memory, planning, and strategic response 
preparation (Mahone et al., 2009). The sum of the two indices provides a Global 
Executive Composite (GEC), whereby elevated scores indicate more observed 
problems with EF behavior. Neurobiologically, research indicates that the BRIEF 
captures unique variance in predicting PFC development in children and 
adolescents  (Mahone et al., 2009) and provides an economical port of entry to 
both behavioral regulation and cognitive issues that may in turn relate to cortical 
morphometry and structural connectivity measurements. 
Relationship between Executive Function, Cortical Morphometry and Structural 
Connectivity 
However, findings from the few studies that have investigated cortical 
morphometry in healthy, typically developing adolescents in relation to EF are 
inconsistent, likely due to the magnitude of change during adolescence. While 
some studies demonstrate that increased frontal GMV relates to decreased 
Working Memory and Emotional Control (Faridi et al., 2015; Mahone et al., 
2009), others show the inverse pattern: decreased temporal lobe GMV relates to 
decreased Inhibition and Emotional Control (Faridi et al., 2015). Conversely, 
relationships between structural connectivity and the BRIEF during this variable 
period reflect an evident pattern: reductions in FA relate to decreased EF 
behavior. A variety of pediatric clinical populations exhibit reduced FA in 







GEC (Antshel et al., 2005; Herting et al., 2014; Wozniak et al., 2007). The sole 
study linking EF behavior with FA in a healthy adolescent sample investigated 
the frontal aslant tract (FAT), a newly discovered white matter tract which 
connects posterior inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) with the pre-supplementary and 
supplementary motor areas (pre-SMA and SMA), regions proposed to underlie 
inhibition. The study indicates the FAT develops in a protracted manner into late 
adolescence/early adulthood, and that right lateralization of this fiber pathway is 
significantly associated with decreased EF behavior as measured by the BRIEF 
(Garic et al., 2018). Taken together, scant evidence indicates that EF behavior is 
associated with both GM and FA changes during childhood and adolescence, yet 
the results are conflicting. Therefore, a comprehensive cortical morphometry and 
structural connectivity study using the BRIEF to assess EF behavior within a 
healthy sample of adolescents can help clarify previous findings. 
Relationship between Executive Function, Cortical Morphometry, Structural 
Connectivity and Estradiol 
During this developmental period of high flux, the hormone estradiol, the 
predominant estrogen, has been shown to have a significant impact on the 
structural reorganization of the prefrontal cortex (McCarthy, 2008; Nguyen et al., 
2013), a crucial region underlying EF (Yuan & Raz, 2014). The hormone has 
complex effects in the two genders however, because estrogen receptor 
distribution in the prefrontal cortex varies (Cooke et al., 2017; Gillies & McArthur, 







opposite effects) due to underlying brain dimorphisms. Nonetheless, this hormone 
influences cognitive function through complex interactions with dopaminergic and 
oxytocinergic systems that govern EF (Kuhn et al., 2010; Steinberg, 2005), the 
description of which is not within the scope of this paper. The complex, menstrual-
phase dependent evidence from studies in adult women points to estradiol level 
playing both a facilitative and/or hindering role in cognitive function. Some studies 
report higher levels of circulating estradiol being associated with improved working 
memory performance (Hampson & Morley, 2013), while others show increased 
estradiol had a negative impact on general processing speed, working memory 
performance (Sommer et al., 2018), and slower response times and decreased 
accuracy on EF tasks that were instead related to progesterone level during the 
luteal phase (Hidalgo-Lopez & Pletzer, 2017). Alongside the adult literature, 
morphometric studies in young adults demonstrate increased circulating levels of 
estradiol are associated with cortical thinning of the IFG (Witte et al., 2010), a 
region linked to self-regulation (Smolker et al., 2015; Witte et al., 2010). Structural 
connectivity evidence points to elevated estradiol level influencing decreases in 
FA, which is associated with reduced behavioral control during early pubertal 
development (Peper et al., 2015). Elevated estradiol level in adolescent girls 
shows a negative relationship with right angular gyrus (AG) and the superior 
longitudinal fasciculus (SLF) FA, a brain region and a WM tract involved in 







evidence between the relationship between EF behavior, estradiol and specific 
brain changes exists.  
Aims 
Therefore, the present study aimed to comprehensively investigate the 
relationship between EF behavior (as measured by the BRIEF questionnaire) and 
estradiol level, individually and interactively on cortical morphometry and FA in a 
healthy adolescent sample. Specifically, the aims were to examine the relation 
between: 1) the BRIEF and estradiol level, 2) the BRIEF, cortical morphometry and 
FA, 3) estradiol level, cortical morphometry and FA, and 4) any interaction between 
the BRIEF and estradiol level with cortical morphometry and FA.  
 
Hypotheses 
We hypothesized based on the limited literature findings that: 1) EF 
behavior and estradiol level will be inversely related, 2) Decreased EF behavior 
will relate to decreased GMV of the LPFC and decreased FA of WM tracts 
subserving EF (iFOF/SLF) 3) Increased estradiol level will relate to decreased FA 
and cortical morphometry of the LPFC and, 4) increased estradiol level combined 
with decreased EF behavior would subsequently exacerbate these previous 
findings. This comprehensive study, therefore, investigated how individual 
differences in EF behavior and estradiol level relate to variation in aspects of 










Cross-sectional data were obtained from the Pediatric MRI Data Repository 
(Release 4.0) of the NIH MRI Study of Normal Brain Development, a project 
developed to characterize healthy brain maturation in relation to behavior in a 
large, multisite study (Evans, 2006). This multi-center project conducted 
epidemiologically based recruitment of a large, demographically balanced sample 
across a wide age range, using strict exclusion factors and comprehensive 
clinical/behavioral measures. A mixed cross-sectional and longitudinal design was 
used to create an MRI/clinical/behavioral database from approximately 500 
children, aged 7 days to 18 years, to be shared with researchers and the clinical 
medicine community. Using a uniform acquisition protocol, data were collected at 
six Pediatric Study Centers and consolidated at a Data Coordinating 
Center.  Enrolled subjects underwent a standardized protocol to characterize 
neurobehavioral and pubertal status. The data was demographically 
representative of the U.S. population in terms of variables including gender, race, 
and socioeconomic status (Waber et al., 2012). Exclusion criteria included but 
were not limited to IQ < 70, history of medical illness with CNS implications, and 
any Axis I psychiatric disorder (other than simple or social phobia, adjustment 
disorder, oppositional defiant disorder, enuresis, encopresis, or nicotine 
dependency; see (Waber et al., 2007) for a complete list of inclusion and exclusion 







testing on up to three occasions at two-year intervals. For the purposes of this 
report, a sample of 55 participants (age range 7-18) with cross sectional data (1 
timepoint) was selected with structural imaging data (T1), diffusion tensor imaging 
data (DTI), behavioral (BRIEF) and hormonal data (estradiol). 7 participants were 
missing estradiol data, therefore they were not included in subsequent analyses 
involving estradiol. Collection site was treated as a nuisance factor in all 
subsequent analyses.  
Behavior Rating Inventory of Executive Function (BRIEF) 
The BRIEF was completed on the same day as the scan by a parent or 
guardian that had contact with the child within the prior 6 months. The 86-item 
questionnaire takes approximately 10 minutes to administer and can be 
administered and scored by a research assistant. The test was divided into the 
Behavioral Regulation Index (BRI) which comprised: Inhibit, Shift, Emotional 
Control subscales, and the Metacognition Index (MCI) which comprised: Initiate, 
Working Memory, Plan/Organize, Organization of Materials, and Monitor 
subscales. A higher score on each of the subscales signified decreased EF 
behavior. Subscales (Table 6) were used for further correlation and regression 
analyses with cortical, FA and hormonal measurements, controlling for age and 
gender. Multiple comparison correction was carried out using the Benjamini & 
Hochberg, 1995 procedure (Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995), controlling the false 
discovery rate (FDR) at p<.05.  
Inhibit Ability to control impulses (inhibitory control) and to stop 







Shift Ability to move freely from one activity or situation to another; 
to tolerate change; to switch or alternate attention 
Emotional 
Control 
Ability to regulate emotional responses appropriately 
Initiate Ability to begin an activity and to independently generate 
ideas or problem-solving strategies. 
Working 
Memory 
Ability to hold information when completing a task, when 
encoding information, or when generating goals/plans in a 
sequential manner. 
Plan/Organize Ability to anticipate future events; to set goals; to develop 
steps; to grasp main ideas; to organize and understand the 
main points in written or verbal presentations. 
Organization 
of Materials 
Ability to put order in work, play and storage spaces (e.g., 
desks, lockers, backpacks, and bedrooms). 
Monitor Ability to check work and to assess one’s own performance; 
ability to keep track of the effect of one’s own behavior on 
other people. 




At each visit during the assessment day, all subjects provided two separate 
1-3cc samples of saliva at two time points between 12 and 6 pm. The maximum 
range for the collection of the two hormonal time points was 7 hours and 40 min. 
Saliva was collected while the subject was relaxed and not after potentially 
stressful procedures (e.g. MRI). Samples were collected, stored at –20 to -80°C, 
and shipped in batches from each site to UCLA. Samples were assayed by 
published RIA methods for estradiol in Dr. McCracken's laboratory at UCLA. 
Estradiol level was moderately skewed 0.89 (SE = 0.34) and kurtosis 0.10 (SE = 
0.67), so appropriate log10 transformation was performed. Log10-transformed 







included as regressors in all subsequent multiple regression analyses. An average 
of the two-time points was used for further correlation and regression analyses, 
controlling for time of collection. Due to the strong hormonal impact on pubertal 
status, the sample (N=55) was divided into gender-specific pre (14 F, 9 M) and 
post (16 F, 8 M) pubertal groups (as indicated by the Tanner Stage) and use as a 
categorical variable to measure the impact of puberty on EF (as indicated by the 
BRIEF subscales), cortical morphometry and structural connectivity. We tested the 
multiple regression slopes (-weights) of the pre and post pubertal groups (Figure 
24) in the cortical morphometry analyses (including BRIEF subscale-by-estradiol 
interactions). We additionally performed independent samples T-tests comparing 
pre and post-pubertal groups by BRIEF subscales, estradiol level and structural 
connectivity. 










Imaging Data Acquisition 
 
Cortical Morphometry 
High-resolution, T1-weighted images were acquired using a 1.5-Tesla RI 
scanner from General Electric (GE) or Siemens Medical Systems (Siemens) 
(Evans, 2006). Imaging data were obtained for each participant on the day of or 
within a maximum of 28 days of psychometric testing at each visit. GE: SPGR, 
TR=22ms, TE=10-11ms, flip angle=30deg, sagittal orientation, FoV=250x250, 
Matrix=256x256x124-180 slices, 1-1.5 variable mm slice thickness. Siemens: 
SPGR, TR=25ms, TE=11ms, flip angle=30deg, sagittal orientation, FoV=256X256, 
Matrix=256X256X160-180, 1mm slice thickness. 
Diffusion Tensor Imaging (DTI) 
Data were acquired at a subset of sites (Boston, Cincinnati, Philadelphia, 
St. Louis) with a diffusion-encoded multislice spin echo EPI sequence. To avoid 
orientation bias, data were acquired on a 3 X 3 X 3 mm matrix covering the entire 
brain with straight axial slices. GE: diffusion encoded spin echo EPI, TR=3s, 
TE=minimum full, flip angle=90deg, axial orientation, FoV=192 if brain 19cm, 
Matrix=64X64X48; if brain larger than 19 cm FoV=384 with Matrix=128X128X60, 
4 series of 6 diffusion directions b=1000. Siemens: diffusion encoded spin echo 







brain less than 19cm with Matrix=64X64X48; if brain larger than 19cm FoV=384 
with Matrix=128X128X60, 4 series of 6 diffusion directions b=1000. 
Image Processing 
Surface Based Morphometry (SBM) 
Cortical reconstruction and volumetric segmentation was performed with 
the Freesurfer image analysis suite (v5.6.0), which is documented and freely 
available for download online (http://surfer.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/). The technical 
details of these procedures are described in prior publications (Bruce Fischl et al., 
1999). Briefly, this processing includes motion correction and averaging (Reuter et 
al., 2010) of volumetric T1-weighted images, removal of non-brain tissue using a 
hybrid watershed/surface deformation procedure (Ségonne et al., 2004), 
automated Talairach transformation, intensity normalization (Sled et al., 1998), 
tessellation of the grey matter white matter boundary, automated topology 
correction (B. Fischl et al., 2001; Segonne et al., 2007), and surface deformation 
following intensity gradients to optimally place the grey/white and 
grey/cerebrospinal fluid borders at the location where the greatest shift in intensity 
defines the transition to the other tissue class (Dale & Sereno, 1993; B Fischl & 
Dale, 2000; Bruce Fischl et al., 1999). Once the cortical models are complete, a 
number of deformable procedures were carried out for further data processing and 
analysis including surface inflation, registration to a spherical atlas which utilized 
individual cortical folding patterns to match cortical geometry across subjects, 







and creation of a variety of surface-based data including maps of cortical volume, 
surface area (SA), thickness, curvature, sulcal depth, and local gyrification index 
(Desikan et al., 2006; Bruce Fischl et al., 1999, 2004). The resulting probability 
maps were input into a general linear model (GLM) evaluating regressions 
between all vertices and BRIEF subscales, estradiol level, as well as the BRIEF 
subscale interaction with estradiol level (calculated by multiplying the raw BRIEF 
score with the estradiol level) controlling for age, gender, time of estradiol 
collection (when estradiol was present in the analysis), intracranial volume (ICV) 
and collection site. Vertex-wise threshold was set at p <  0.001 level. Cluster-wise 
threshold was corrected for at p < 0.05 level using non-parametric permutation 
testing with Monte Carlo simulation. 
DTI Data 
DTI images were acquired from the NIHPD database already brain 
extracted, corrected for eddy-current and EPI distortion. DTI images were then 
further processed using FSL’s (v5.0.8, https://fsl.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl/fslwiki/FSL) 
FDT toolbox (http://fsl.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl/fslwiki/ FDT) (Behrens et al., 2003). A 
diffusion tensor model was fit at each voxel, resulting in FA images. FA images 
from all subjects were registered to an MNI 1mm skeletonized DTI template using 
FNIRT, a non-linear registration tool in FSL. FA values for each subject were then 
extracted from masks of WM tracts created by the John Hopkins University (JHU) 
WM atlas: forceps major and minor and bilateral: anterior thalamic radiation, 







hippocampal region (CBh), inferior fronto-occipital fasciculus (iFOF), inferior 
longitudinal fasciculus (ILF), superior longitudinal fasciculus (SLF) and uncinate 
fasciculus.  FA values were used in further regression analyses using Pearson 
correlation coefficient, in SPSS (IBM SPSS Statistics for Macintosh, Version 22.0) 
using bootstrapping and permutation testing (3,000 simulations) to adjust for small 
sample size. All analyses were controlled for age, gender and collection time when 
estradiol was a included as a variable. Multiple comparison correction was carried 
out using the Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995 procedure, controlling the false 
discovery rate (FDR) at p<.05. Significant tracts were isolated using the tract 
visualization program TrackVis (Ruopeng Wang and Van J. Wedeen at Martinos 
Center for Biomedical Imaging, Massachusetts General Hospital, Charlestown, 
Mass., USA; trackvis.org, Version 0.6.1). A 3 mm-diameter disk-shaped ROI was 




No significant results were found when investigating the relationship 
between EF behavior and estradiol level (Table 7A).  Given the notable effects of 
age/gender in the sample, a separate analysis investigating the unique role of 
age/gender on the relationship between BRIEF subscales and estradiol level was 







significant findings, suggesting age and gender do not have an impact on 
executive function (EF) behavior and estradiol level in this sample.   
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0.16 0.31 0.16 0.27 
 
Table 7: Showing non-significant relationship between Male and Female 
estradiol level and EF Behavior subscales, A) Not Corrected and B) Corrected 
for age/gender, FDR corrected for multiple comparisons. Abbreviations: BRIEF, 
Behavior Rating Inventory of Executive Function; EF, executive function; FA, 




Next, we interrogated the BRIEF subscales, estradiol level, and their 
interaction, with cortical morphometry and FA. Of note, pubertal status showed no 
relationship with cortical morphometry or FA. The focus of this paper therefore, 
presents only estradiol level in relationship to EF, cortical morphometry and 
structural connectivity, as well as the impact of BRIEF subscale-by-estradiol 
interaction on brain measurements. The interaction between EF behavior and 
estradiol level is of particular interest; due to the fact previous studies suggest both 
variables have a close relationship to cortical morphometry and structural 
connectivity.   
Given the possible effects of age/gender in the sample, an analysis 
investigating the unique role of age and/or gender on cortical morphometry was 
explored. The results indicate a negative correlation between age and the right 
superior frontal gyrus [-log(p) = -4.00, p=0.0001] and right superior temporal sulcus 
SA [-log(p) = -4.00, p=0.0001], suggesting higher age is related to less SA in these 







Because the focus of the paper is concerned with EF behavior and estradiol level, 
age and gender are used as covariates in the remaining analyses. 
Therefore, the following sections present morphometric and FA results in 
the following manner: relationships of EF with: cortical GM and b) FA (Table 7, 
Figure 20); relationships of estradiol level with: a) cortical GM and b) FA (Table 8, 
Figure 21); relationships of the interaction of EF and estradiol level with:  a) cortical 
GM and b) FA (Table 9, Figure 22). To be consistent throughout the results and 
discussion we refer to the positive relationship between EF behavior and estradiol 
level from the standpoint of higher BRIEF subscale scores (i.e., decreased EF 
behavior) and elevated estradiol level, to explain their effects on cortical 
morphometry and FA.  
Executive Function Results 
Cortical Morphometry 
To examine relationships between cortical morphometry and EF (as 
measured by the BRIEF subscales), each subscale was regressed with surface-
based morphometry (SBM) measures (GMV, surface area and cortical thickness), 
controlling for age and gender. This analysis yielded a negative relationship 
between the Shift subscale and SA in the right pdlPFC [-log(p) = -2.19, p=0.006], 
indicating decreased ability shifting attention was related to less SA in the right 








Figure 25: Executive function behavior relationship with cortical morphometry and 
structural connectivity. (N = 51). (A) Significant negative relationship between 
surface area (SA) in the right pdlPFC and the BRIEF Shift subscale. (B) Significant 
relationships between two white matter tracts on a template atlas (forceps minor 
and major) with BRIEF Plan/Organize subscales and BRIEF Inhibit subscales, 
respectively. 
 
Measure EF Behavior Hemisphere Directionality Region/T
ract 
SA Shift R - pdlPFC 
FA Plan/Organize None - Forceps 
Minor 
FA Inhibit None + Forceps 
Major 
 
Table 8: Relationships of EF Behavior with cortical GM and FA.  Abbreviations: 
SA = surface area, FA = fractional anisotropy, pdlPFC = posterior dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex. EF, executive function; FA, fractional anisotropy; pdlPFC, 








White Matter Integrity 
Having examined grey matter relationships with EF behavior, we next 
investigated FA. The Plan/Organize subscale showed a negative relationship with 
FA of the forceps minor (R2=.07, p=0.01). Conversely, the Inhibit subscale showed 
a positive relationship with FA in the forceps major (R2=.04, p=0.02). These results 
indicated decreased ability putting order into play was associated with lower FA in 
the forceps minor, while decreased control over impulses was associated with 
higher FA in the forceps major (Figure 25B, Table 8). 
 
Estradiol Level Results 
Cortical Morphometry 
No significant results were observed between cortical morphometry and 
estradiol level. 
White Matter Integrity 
Next, we examined the relationship between estradiol level and FA. A 
negative relationship between estradiol level and FA was observed in the right 
inferior fronto-occipital fasciculus (iFOF) (R2=.09, p=0.01), indicating higher 







Figure 26: Estradiol relationship with structural connectivity (N = 51). (a) 
Significant negative relationship between right hemisphere iFOF fractional 





FA Estradiol R - R iFOF 
 
Table 9: Relationship of estradiol level with FA. Abbreviations: FA = fractional 
anisotropy iFOF = inferior fronto-occipital fasciculus. 
 
Executive Function and Estradiol Interaction Results 
Cortical Morphometry 
Because we hypothesized that estradiol level may interact with EF behavior, 
we investigated the BRIEF subscale-by-estradiol interaction and its effect on 
cortical morphometry. A negative relationship was observed between the Inhibit-
by-estradiol interaction and GMV in the right PMC and between the Working 
Memory-by-estradiol and GMV in the right PMC [ -log(p) = -4.00, p=0.0001; -log(p) 
= -2.47, p=0.003, respectively]. These results indicated that increased difficulty 
inhibiting one’s actions and increased levels of estradiol related to less GMV in the 







increased levels of estradiol related to less GMV in the right PMC (Figure 27A, 
Table 10). 
Figure 27: BRIEF subscale and estradiol interaction relationships with cortical 
morphometry and structural connectivity. (A) Significant negative relationship 
between volume in the right PMC and the Inhibit‐by‐estradiol interaction and 
Working Memory‐by‐estradiol interaction. (B) Significant negative relationship 
between right iFOF FA and Initiate‐by‐estradiol and Working Memory‐by‐estradiol 














Inhibit-by-Estradiol R - PMC 
Volum
e 
Working Memory-by-Estradiol R - PMC 
FA Initiate-by-Estradiol R - R iFOF 
FA Working Memory-by-Estradiol R - R iFOF 
 
Table 10. Relationships of BRIEF-by-estradiol subscales interaction with cortical 
GM and FA. Abbreviations: iFOF: inferior fronto-occipital fasciculus, PMC: 
primary motor cortex. 
 







Finally, we examined the relationship between BRIEF subscales-by-
estradiol and FA interaction. The results showed negative relationships between 
the Initiate-by-estradiol interaction and FA in the right iFOF (R2=0.15, p=0.01), and 
between the Working Memory-by-estradiol interaction and FA in the right iFOF 
(R2=0.16, p=0.008). The results suggested that increased estradiol level and 
decreased motivation of task initiation related to lower FA values in the right iFOF 
(Figure 27B, Table 10). 
 
Discussion 
Our results provide comprehensive evidence that individual differences in EF 
behavior and estradiol level, in a healthy adolescent sample, are linked to variation 
in aspects of cortical GM morphometry and FA of white matter tracts connecting 
the cerebral hemispheres and disparate anterior-posterior regions of the brain. 
Overall, decreased EF behavior related to decreased cortical grey matter 
morphometry and bidirectional white matter integrity, while increased estradiol 
level related to decreased white matter tract integrity. Lastly, increased magnitude 
of the interaction between EF behavior and estradiol level related to decreased 
cortical grey matter morphometry and white matter tract integrity. Below we 
discuss each finding and its relative implications. 
Relationship between Executive Function and Estradiol Level 
Firstly, we wanted to determine the relationship between estradiol level and 







and EF behavior, regardless of correcting or not correcting for age/gender. 
Previous evidence suggests that estradiol level is indeed related to EF (Hampson 
& Morley, 2013; Hidalgo-Lopez & Pletzer, 2017), albeit the results differ depending 
on the age range of the sample. It is possible our age range (7 to 18) did not have 
enough variability to produce statistically significant results.  
Relationship between Executive Function and Cortical Morphometry 
We next aimed to determine how EF behavior, aspects of cortical morphometry 
and FA are related.  We first hypothesized decreased EF behavior should be 
associated with decreased aspects of cortical morphometry of the LPFC and 
decreased FA of tracts that support communication between prefrontal structures, 
as they have prominent roles in cognitive and emotional function. Our cortical 
morphometry results demonstrated decreases in EF behavior relating to moving 
freely from one activity to another, tolerating change and switching attention (Shift 
subscale) was associated with decreased SA in the right pdlPFC.  Previous 
research indicates shifting, an EF feature imperative for changing one’s own 
behavior according to environmental contexts, relies on the dlPFC (Karbach & 
Unger, 2014; Ravizza & Carter, 2008). Furthermore, a recent cortical morphometry 
study indicates that multi-task training leads to increases in right dlPFC GMV 
(Takeuchi et al., 2014), supporting the notion that shifting behavior depends on the 
dlPFC.  
WM results indicated decreases in EF behavior relating to putting order into 







forceps minor. Research demonstrates the forceps minor is a fiber bundle which 
connects the lateral and medial surfaces of the frontal lobes and crosses the 
midline via the genu of the corpus callosum (Genova et al., 2013). When damaged 
by disease, the forceps minor is linked to robustly diminished processing speed 
and cognitive impairment, indicating its interhemispheric connections between the 
PFC contribute to EF (Biesbroek et al., 2016; Genova et al., 2013). The association 
between damage to these tracts and reduced performance in the Trail-Making task 
has been reported in schizophrenia (Pérez-Iglesias et al., 2010) and traumatic 
brain injury (Kraus et al., 2007). Previous studies in Multiple Sclerosis (MS) have 
also noted a correlation between reduced FA in the forceps minor and Paced 
Auditory Serial Addition Test (PASAT) performance (Hecke et al., 2010). Our 
results therefore echo previous findings: decreased EF behavior is related with 
decreased FA of the forceps minor. 
Conversely, decreased EF behavior related to controlling impulses (Inhibit 
subscale) was associated with increased FA in another WM tract, the forceps 
major. The forceps major is a is a fiber bundle which connects the occipital lobes 
and crosses the midline via the splenium of the corpus callosum (Prasad et al., 
2015), and is thought to aid visuo-spatial function (Tamura et al., 2007). Lesions 
of the forceps major are associated with deficits in multi-tasking (Burgess et al., 
2000), allocation of attentional resources and other information processing 
requiring integrated hemispheric function (Rossi et al., 2012). An increase of FA in 







spatial material and thus may result in difficulties inhibiting behavior. Indeed, 
patients with conditions posited to arise from axonal overconnectivity such as 
autism spectrum disorder (ASD), attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) 
and schizophrenia exhibit reduced inhibitory control (Solso et al., 2016; Tamm et 
al., 2012; R. Taylor et al., 2016). Thus, our findings suggest that FA changes in the 
forceps major affect attention-based cognitive functions such as impulse control 
and highlight the complex relationship between white matter structure and EF 
behavior. 
Relationship between Executive Function, Cortical Morphometry and Structural 
Connectivity 
We next investigated whether estradiol level had any relationship to cortical 
morphometry and FA. We next hypothesized decreased cortical morphometry in 
the LPFC and reduced FA, as studies indicate that decreased cortical 
morphometry and FA may both be related to increases in estradiol level in 
adolescent individuals (Herting et al., 2012; Peper et al., 2011; Witte et al., 2010). 
Contrary to our hypothesis, we found no such relationship with cortical 
morphometry. However, our results indicated that increased estradiol level related 
to decreased FA of the right iFOF. The iFOF, a long association WM bundle 
connects the inferior and lateral regions of the PFC through the inferior temporal 
lobes, terminating in lateral occipital regions (Ashtari, 2011). Research indicates 
the iFOF plays a critical role in attention and visual processing (Catani & Thiebaut 







significant differences in long-range association fibers including the iFOF during 
adolescence when relationships with estradiol level were considered (Herting et 
al., 2012). The present study’s results point to a relationship between estradiol 
level and this important WM tract connecting anterior-posterior regions of the 
cortex which may underlie EF behavior. 
Relationship between Executive Function, Cortical Morphometry, Structural 
Connectivity and Estradiol 
The final aim of the study was to determine the relationship between the 
interaction between BRIEF subscales and estradiol (i.e., BRIEF subscale-by-
Estradiol) with cortical GM and FA. At last, we hypothesized that decreased EF 
behavior would be related to increased levels of estradiol, which may consequently 
relate to reductions in aspects of cortical morphometry and structural connectivity. 
Our cortical morphometry findings indicated that decreased EF behavior related to 
controlling impulses (Inhibit subscale) and holding information online (Working 
Memory Subscale) coupled with increased estradiol level was associated with less 
GMV in the PMC.  Studies indicate extensive connections exist from the anterior 
PFC to PMC (Fregni et al., 2005), which are thought to coordinate the integration 
of higher level EF processes and motor planning in service of goal attainment.  
Moreover, research demonstrates the LPFC has an increased number of estradiol 
receptors (Almey et al., 2015) which may result in increased sensitivity of estradiol 
in this region posited to underlie EF processes. Indeed, estradiol’s impact on 







dependent working memory, while low level estradiol weakly facilitating it (Bimonte 
& Denenberg, 1999; Holmes et al., 2002; Wide et al., 2004). Therefore, our results 
append to existing findings, suggesting that changes in cortical morphometry may 
reflect more complex interactions between EF behavior and estradiol level 
affecting the LPFC. 
Finally, our study’s WM analyses suggested more difficulties with EF 
behavior related to beginning an activity (Initiate subscale), holding information 
online when completing a task (Working Memory subscale) and elevated estradiol 
level were associated with lower FA in the right iFOF. Previous research indicates 
that elevated estradiol level is related to decreases in EF behavior in adolescents 
(Lenroot & Giedd, 2010; Peper et al., 2009, 2011) and that FA in the iFOF may be 
an important neural correlate of EF (Santiago et al., 2015). Thus, our results 
suggest an important relationship between the interaction of EF behavior and 
estradiol level on FA in the iFOF, a WM tract providing communication between 
disparate anterior-posterior brain regions, putatively underlying EF behavior. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
The study had several limitations. First, the study design was cross-
sectional and not longitudinal, which prevented depiction of individual trajectories, 
differences in change and direct estimation of relationships between change 
across different morphometric measurements. The conclusions from the present 
study should be replicated in longitudinal studies. Although a longitudinal approach 







available for a large enough sample during one visit per participant, our study’s 
aims were only possible with a cross-sectional approach. Second, although 
pubertal status was taken into account (using the Tanner Stage), menstrual cycle 
data was not recorded for the female participants, which could further result in 
fluctuations in estradiol level across the cycle and affect EF behavior. Thirdly, since 
the BRIEF subscales are highly intercorrelated, discerning their individual impact 
on brain morphometry is difficult, but speak to their contribution to EF as a whole. 
Fourthly, no other hormones related to the menstrual cycle were collected. 
Literature suggests that during the menstrual cycle, both estradiol and 
progesterone levels fluctuate rapidly, and a difference of a few hours can matter 
dramatically for estradiol levels. Rapidly changing effects of this hormone, coupled 
with age differences, suggest that these are important factors to keep in mind when 
researching the effects of cycling in females. Lastly, the measurement of estradiol 
level from saliva has drawbacks, especially in an adolescent population. Although 
great care was taken to understand the relationship between estradiol level, EF 
behavior and aspects of cortical morphometry and structural connectivity, saliva 
measurements are greatly affected by the use of exogenous hormones such as 
birth control or transdermal creams (Lewis et al., 2002). Furthermore, results 
should be interpreted cautiously due to lack of contraceptive and menstrual cycle 
data. 
Future studies should continue to combine EF behavior (such as the BRIEF 







disentangle the function-estradiol-structure relationship in this critical 
neurodevelopmental period in cortical morphometry and structural connectivity 
thought to underlie EF processes. Specifically, the roles of peptide hormones like 
oxytocin and vasopressin should be investigated in the neural development of the 
adolescent brain and its relationship to EF processes. 
 
Summary 
To our knowledge, this is the only study investigating how individual 
differences in EF behavior and estradiol level relate to aspects of cortical 
morphometry and FA in a healthy, adolescent population. Our study implies that 
decreased EF behavior and elevated estradiol level relate to decreased aspects 
cortical morphometry and FA. Specifically, EF behavior and its interaction with 
estradiol level related to decreases in aspects of cortical morphometry in the 
pdlPFC, comprising the LPFC, an area well known to subserve goal directed 
behavior (Asplund et al., 2010; Yamagata et al., 2012). Further, EF behavior and 
its interaction with estradiol level were associated with bidirectional differences of 
FA measurements in interhemispheric connections (forceps minor and major, 
respectively) and long-range association fibers (iFOF) connecting anterior-
posterior regions of the cortex. Thus, the results imply that variation in EF behavior 










Gender Differences in Functional Connectivity during Emotion Regulation 
 
Beliefs in gender differences in emotion pervade our culture, with the striking 
stereotype being that women are more emotionally responsive to negative stimuli 
than men. While some empirical evidence mirrors the anecdotal conception (Fabes 
& Martin, 1991; Fischer, 1993; Grossman & Wood, 1993; Hess et al., 2000; Plant 
et al., 2000; Timmers et al., 2003), some researchers (Garnefski et al., 2004; 
Nolen-Hoeksema, 2001; Thayer et al., 1994) conjecture the basis for differences 
in emotion  arise due to variations in emotion regulation (ER). Yet, despite the 
increasing recognition that deficient ER is at the core of various affective disorders 
(Berking et al., 2014; Dalili et al., 2015; Green et al., 2007; Joormann & Stanton, 
2016; O’Driscoll et al., 2014; M. L. Phillips et al., 2008), and importantly, that 
women show an increased prevalence for these conditions (Kessler et al., 1993; 
Leach et al., 2008; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2001, 2012; Thomsen et al., 2005), the 
neural basis of gender differences in ER remains poorly understood.  
ER describes processes that individuals use to influence the experience 
and expression of emotions (Giombini, 2015; James J. Gross, 2015; Ochsner & 
Gross, 2005). ER is a complex process that includes the initiation, inhibition, or 
modulation of internal emotional states and emotion-related cognitions, 
physiological processes and behaviors (Compare et al., 2014). Importantly, an 







environments is crucial for mental health (James J. Gross & Muñoz, 1995).  The 
most prominent neurobiological ER model focuses on the modulatory effect of 
the prefrontal and cingulate regions involved in top-down control over the 
affective instantiation regions as a function of one’s regulatory goal, tactic, nature 
of stimuli and emotions being regulated (Ochsner & Gross, 2005; Ochsner et al., 
2012). Specifically, brain regions implicated in top-down control include the dorso 
and ventrolateral, and dorso and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (dlPFC, vlPFC, 
dmPFC, vmPFC), orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), inferior parietal cortex (IPC) and 
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), while those underlying emotion generation 
comprise the insulae, amygdalae and basal ganglia (Ochsner & Gross, 2005; 
Ochsner et al., 2012). Within this model however, few (and equivocal) findings 
have emerged from functional neuroimaging studies investigating gender 
differences. For example, McRae et al., 2008 showed lower increases in 
prefrontal activity (ACC, IPC) and greater decreases in amygdala activity during 
ER efforts in men compared to women, despite no difference in self-reported 
negative emotion between genders. Domes et al., 2010 found the opposite 
activation pattern, indicating greater prefrontal activity (vmPFC) in men compared 
to women during employment of ER, with no notable gender differences in 
amygdala activity or self-report regulation success. Interestingly, both studies 
indicate a more efficient ER process in men, suggesting less effortful cognitive 
control (McRae et al., 2008) and more precise recruitment of areas putatively 







et al., 2009’s study argues that while men tend to utilize brain regions underlying 
cognitive control  (lateral PFC and ACC) to a greater extent than women during 
ER, women tend to use emotion-associated ones (medial OFC), with comparable 
self-reported regulation success. In an effort to synthesize this contradictory 
information, a recent meta-analysis assembling the aforementioned studies 
proposes men may be more efficient (i.e., use less effortful cognitive control) in 
ER as evidenced by greater increases of fronto-parieto-temporal activity, and 
greater decreases of limbic/subcortical activity, while women may experience 
emotions with greater frequency and intensity as evidenced by increased activity 
in limbic regions (Whittle et al., 2011).  
While some information regarding gender differences in ER may be 
gleaned from functional activity studies, connectivity within ER-related brain 
regions may provide another avenue for understanding how men and women 
differ in regulatory mechanisms. Our previous work has detailed right-
hemispheric functional pathways responsible for inhibitory regulation of emotional 
reactivity between the right anterior middle frontal gyrus (aMFG) and the OFC, 
and between the right OFC with the amygdala (Depue et al., 2016). Previously, 
we proposed this network may function hierarchically, with higher-order 
maintenance and updating of task goals performed by the right aMFG, and 
modulation of the amygdala (downstream effectors) implemented by an 
intermediary region (OFC) that exhibits direct anatomical connectivity. Similar 







are more successful in regulating their emotion demonstrate greater effective 
connectivity (EC, a measure of connectivity relative to the task) between 
amygdala and lateral and medial PFC. Yet presently, scant functional 
connectivity (FC) data between these regions exists that examines gender 
differences related to ER. One such resting-state study found FC within the 
centromedial amygdala displayed gender-specific variations in association with 
trait-level ER (Yan Wu, Li, et al., 2016). The authors suggest connectivity 
patterns and higher ER (as determined by a self-reported behavioral measure) in 
this sub-region of the amygdala in women was linked to internal and emotional 
focus, while men’s connectivity pattern and higher ER related to a greater ability 
to downregulate negative emotion compared to women. Lastly, one study 
investigating gender differences in EC during negative emotion processing 
demonstrated EC from the right amygdala to the dmPFC is significantly stronger 
in men compared to women, with the authors concluding that men may have a 
more evaluative rather than purely affective, in-the-moment, brain response 
during negative emotion processing (Lungu et al., 2015). To the best of our 
knowledge, however, no study to date has utilized a network-based approach to 
examine gender differences in FC during an ER task. 
 
Aim 
The present fMRI study investigated whether FC between brain regions 









Based on prior studies investigating gender differences during ER, we 
have three hypotheses: (1) women will rate negative stimuli as more distressing, 
as compared to men; (2) women will show increased connectivity between brain 
regions putatively underlying emotional response (amygdala, hippocampus), as 
compared to men; (3) men will show increased connectivity between regions 
underlying top-down control of emotion (parietal cortex, dlPFC, VLPFC), as 
compared to women. 
 
Methods 
Participants and Procedure 
A total of 55 healthy young adults without a reported history of neurological or 
psychiatric disorders were recruited for this study. Seven participants were 
excluded from analyses due to incomplete behavioral data (n=1), various 
scanning issues resulting in incomplete fMRI data (n=4), and disclosed 
psychiatric diagnosis following consent (n=2). This left 48 (20 women) 
participants in the final sample. Men and women were comparable in age and 
years of education (t(46)=-3.99, p=0.69 and t(46)=-.15, p=0.88, respectively).  
fMRI Task - Emotion Regulation Task (ERT)  
The ERT was divided into three parts: (A) ER Baseline (B) Emotion Regulation 







(A) ER Baseline:  
The ER Baseline task employed a hybrid event-related design that contained 
mini-blocks presented in pseudorandom order. 20 negative International Affective 
Picture System (IAPS) pictures and 10 neutral pictures were displayed (Lang et 
al., 2005). The pictures were displayed for 4 seconds. This design was chosen to 
balance considerations for the psychological state of the participant with 
statistical power. Following presentation of each stimulus, participants rated the 
image for how negative it made them feel, using a 4-point Likert scale (1 = None 
to 4 = Extremely negative; 2 seconds to rate; Figure 28). This allowed acquisition 
of a subjective negative baseline rating for each participant. A pseudorandom 
variable jittered ITI was incorporated to increase design efficiency for 
hemodynamic response estimation (0-10 sec). Resultant behavioral ratings from 
the task were further used to calculate ER Suppression Score (see part C).  
Please rate how negative the emotional 
pictures make you feel. You should answer 
according to the following scale.













Figure 28: Example of a single trial from ER Baseline Task (Image displayed not 
part of actual stimuli set). 
 
(B) Emotion Regulation (ER): 
The ER task also employed a hybrid event-related design with mini blocks 
presented in pseudorandom order, whereby a different set of negative and 
neutral pictures selected from the IAPS database  were displayed (Lang et al., 
2005). Neutral and negative stimuli valence (M=5.68, SD=0.71; M=2.97, 
SD=0.61, respectively) and arousal (M=4.82, SD=0.62; M=5.27, SD=0.39, 
respectively) values both were statistically different between the two sets t(78)= 
18.35, p<.01; t(78)=-3.84, p<.01, respectively. First, the words ‘SUPPRESS’ in 
the color red or ‘VIEW’ in the color blue appeared as cues for 500 ms to prepare 
the participant for the upcoming picture. Next, negative pictures surrounded by a 
red border (Suppress trials) and neutral pictures surrounded by a blue border 
(View trials) were presented for 3.5 seconds (Suppress trials n = 30, View trials n 
= 12) (Figure 29). The participant was instructed to “‘decrease or detach’ from 
the emotion when the border was red, and ‘simply view’ the picture when the 
border was blue”. The “Suppress” instructions were worded simply in order to 
encourage the participant to use their default ER method. A pseudorandom 
variable jittered ITI was incorporated to increase design efficiency for 
hemodynamic response estimation (0-4 sec). The pictures repeated once, with a 
60 second break in-between. To test the successful induction of negative 







between mean ratings of the View (M=1.3, SD=0.52) and Suppress (M=2.5, 
SD=0.52) pictures, which revealed a significant difference between the two 










Figure 29: Example of a single trial of each condition from Emotion Regulation 
(ER) (Image displayed not part of actual stimuli set).  
 
(C) ER Rating  
During a structural scan, the same images used in part B were then displayed 
without any border for 4 seconds. Following presentation of each image, 
participants rated how negative the image made them feel, using a four-point 
Likert scale (1 = None to 4 = Extremely negative, displayed in the same way as 
ER Baseline). To test whether the participants were successfully able to down-
regulate their emotional response to the images, a two-tailed paired samples t-























and ER negative ratings (M=2.4, SD=0.52), showing a significant difference in 
scores t(46) = 5.4, p<0.01. Furthermore, the negative ER ratings from this part 
were subtracted from the earlier acquired negative baseline ratings (part A) in 
order to calculate a Suppression Score. The Suppression Score was derived 
from negative ratings only (rather than ratings on “View” trials) to ensure an 
accurate measurement of negative affect down-regulation success (i.e. 
comparing a response to negative stimuli before and after ER). The Suppression 
Score was used as an independent variable in subsequent FC analyses which 
served as the dependent variable.  
Self-Report ER Strategy Questionnaire 
Immediately after the scan, participants exited the scanner and were asked to 
view the ER task (part B) pictures on a computer screen. Each photo was 
followed by the instructions “type any strategies you may have used while down-
regulating your emotion on the following screen.” The resultant statements were 
coded and summed by two independent raters and categorized as: “Cognitive 
Reappraisal” if they were characterized by reframing the emotional situation (ex. 
“I tried not to think negatively, but to think positive”) (Ochsner & Gross, 2005), 
Attentional Control if they were characterized by volitionally diverting attention to 
something unrelated (ex. “I focused on my breathing and tried be analytical about 
the wound”) (Webb et al., 2012), and Other if it was characterized by another ER 







not available due to technical errors, and 2 subjects were removed for 
misunderstanding task instructions, leaving N=43 for analysis.  
Imaging Data Acquisition  
Functional 
 Functional blood oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD) images were collected 
using gradient-echo T2*-weighted echoplanar imaging (TE = 28 ms; TR = 2000 
ms; flip angle = 79°; FoV = 204 mm; voxel size = 3.2 mm3, 38 interleaved slices). 
Slices were oriented obliquely along the AC–PC line. 
Imaging Data Analysis 
All analyses and visualizations were conducted using the CONN toolbox 
18.b (Whitfield-Gabrieli & Nieto-Castanon, 2012) based on SPM12 (Penny et al., 
2007) in the 2017 version of MATLAB. Spatial preprocessing in the CONN 
toolbox included realignment, normalization and smoothing (8 mm FWHM 
Gaussian filter) using SPM12 default parameter settings. Anatomical volumes 
were segmented into gray matter, white matter and cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) 
areas, and the resulting masks were eroded to minimize partial volume effects. 
The temporal time series characterizing the estimated subject motion, as well as 
the blood-oxygen-level dependent (BOLD) fMRI time series within the subject-
specific white matter mask (five principal component analysis (PCA) parameters) 
and the CSF mask (five PCA parameters), were used as temporal covariates and 
removed from the BOLD functional data using linear regression. Stimuli onsets 







appropriately divided into task-specific mini blocks. Single trial regressors for the 
main effects were constructed by modeling each of the conditions versus low-
level fMRI baseline. For ER Baseline: Negative, Neutral; for ER Task: View, 
Suppress. The contrasts of interest were created by comparing conditions 
against one another: For ER Baseline, Negative>Neutral, Neutral> Negative and 
for ER Task, View> Suppress and Suppress>View. For each regressor, a 
double-gamma hemodynamic response function (HRF) was convolved with an 
event vector starting at the cue onset through stimulus presentation (baseline 
duration of 6 sec + variable jittered ITI, and for ER Task – 4 sec + variable jittered 
ITI). This data was subsequently temporally filtered and the resulting residual 
BOLD time series were then band-pass filtered (0.008 – inf Hz), as this filter 
benefits from keeping higher-frequency information fitting event-related tasks. A 
region of interest (ROI) based correlation approach was used to evaluate 
temporally correlated BOLD signal between 28 a priori selected 10mm ROI 
(sphere around provided coordinates with 10mm radius) from CONN’s default 
atlas which combines FSL’s Harvard-Oxford atlas and FOX’s ROIs. The selection 
of these ROIs was based on previous research demonstrating their involvement 
in ER (Depue et al., 2016; Kohn et al., 2014; Picó-Pérez et al., 2017). They 
included: bilateral – ventral frontal pole (FP), orbital frontal cortex (OFC), IFG 
operculum (IFG oper), middle frontal gyrus (MidFG), inferior frontal gyrus (IFG, 
pars opercularis), inferior frontal gyrus (IFG, pars triangularis), posterior 







gyrus (aPaHC), posterior parahippocampal gyrus (pPaHC), hippocampus, 
amygdala, and the subcallosal Cortex (SubCalc), dorsal anterior cingulate gyrus 
(dACC) (Table 11). 
Table 11 
 
Selected Regions of Interest (ROIs) for Connectivity Matrices 
 
 
ROI Abbreviation ROI Name MNI Coordinates 
    X Y Z  
R FP  R Ventral Frontal Pole 26.15 52.14 8.25 
L FP   L Ventral Frontal Pole 
-
24.72 52.95 7.5 
R OFC  R Orbital Frontal Cortex 29.11 23.07 -16.23 
L OFC L Orbital Frontal Cortex 
-
29.54 23.66 -16.57 
R IFG Oper  R IFG, Operculum Cortex 41.11 18.62 4.91 
L IFG Oper  L IFG, Operculum Cortex -39.7 18.32 4.52 
R MidFG  R Middle Frontal Gyrus  39.11 18.62 42.78 
L MidFG  L Middle Frontal Gyrus  
-
38.07 18.43 42.06 
R IFG tri R IFG, pars triangularis  51.86 27.76 7.7 
L IFG tri   L IFG, pars triangularis  
-
49.71 28.49 8.66 







L IFG oper L IFG, pars opercularis  
-
50.64 14.51 15.39 
R pSMG 
R Supramarginal Gyrus, 
posterior division 55.2 -40.36 33.6 
L pSMG  
L Supramarginal Gyrus, 
posterior division 
-
54.88 -46.02 33.24 
R AG  R Angular Gyrus  51.93 -51.8 32.35 
L AG   L Angular Gyrus  
-
50.35 -55.7 29.76 
dACC  
Dorsal Anterior Cingulate 
Gyrus   0.8 18.29 24.34 
R dACC 
R Anterior Dorsal Cingulate 
Gyrus 6.55 36.56 22.69 
L dACC 
L Anterior Dorsal Cingulate 
Gyrus -6.2 36.65 20.78 
R aPaHC  
R Parahippocampal Gyrus, 
anterior division  22.35 -8.05 -30.25 
L aPaHC  
L ParahippocampalGyrus, 
anterior division  
-
21.86 -9.1 -30.3 
R pPaHC 
R Parahippocampal Gyrus, 








L Parahippocampal Gyrus, 
posterior division  
-
21.89 -32.42 -16.88 
R Hip R Hippocampus 26.49 -20.95 -14.25 
L Hip L Hippocampus 
-
25.17 -23.19 -13.8 
R Amy R Amygdala 23.08 -3.98 -17.68 
L Amy L Amygdala 
-
22.99 -4.94 -17.73 
SubCalc SubcallosalCortex -0.07 20.53 -14.83 
 
The CONN toolbox was used to conduct an ROI-to-ROI analysis, by grouping 
voxels into ROIs based upon CONN’s default atlas. Each ROI value represents a 
mean functional connectivity estimate within that particular ROI. Connectivity 
values were computed as the Fisher-transformed bivariate correlation coefficient 
between a pair of ROI BOLD time series, where a positive correlation indicates 
positive FC and a negative correlation indicates negative FC between ROIs. To 
explore the effects of the different conditions (ER Baseline: Negative, Negative 
vs. Neutral; ER Task: Suppress, Suppress vs. View) and the two groups (men 
and women), Wilks’ lambda or F-statistics were used to illustrate main effects of 
each group together with the main and cross effects of the conditions. Effect 
sizes for connectivity contrasts between all ROI sources were calculated 







were calculated for each specified second-level analysis. The T-stat represents 
the results of between-subjects conditions contrasts when testing each individual 
connection separately between each pair of seed and target ROIs, while the F-
stat represents the same results but testing each individual seed region 
separately and looking for any effects across all target ROIs. We were interested 
which particular 28 a priori ROIs show differences in FC between genders, 
therefore we report T-stats and FDR-corrected (p-value of 0.05) (seed-level) 
results below. The CONN toolbox ROI-to-ROI analyses results are considered 
appropriately corrected for multiple comparisons across all brain and analysis 
voxels when the voxel-level and the extent cluster-level thresholds use an 
analysis-wise false positive control FDR-corrected p-values method (Whitfield-




To examine subjective emotion ratings prior to emotion regulation (ER Baseline; 
part A), we conducted an independent samples t-test comparing the means of 
self-reported negative affect between genders (based on 5000 bootstrap 
samples). Due to our small sample size, we performed the bootstrapped t-test to 
guarantee a good approximation of population measurements and conducted 
Levene’s test for homogeneity of variances due to unequal sample sizes. The 







SD=0.54) and women’s (M=2.99, SD=0.33) negative ER Baseline ratings, t(45)=-
3.04, p=0.004, 95% CI [ -0.70 to -0.14]. Levene’s test indicated unequal 
variances (F=5.40, p=.03), so degrees of freedom were adjusted from 45 to 44.6. 
No gender differences were observed between neutral ER baseline ratings 
t(45)=-1.35, p=0.18, 95% CI [-0.21 to 0.04] (Figure 30).  
 
Figure 30: Gender differences in ratings of self-reported negative affect during 
the ER Baseline Task (part A). Each subject was asked to look and respond 
naturally to neutral (Neutral) and negative pictures (Negative). Error bars 
represent standard error the mean (SEM), 
* represents p<0.01.  
 
To examine subjective emotion ratings during emotion regulation (ER Task; part 
B), as well as any gender differences in the ability to down-regulate negative 
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comparing the means of self-reported negative affect between genders (based 
on 5000 bootstrap samples) and tested for homogeneity of variances with 
Levene’s test. The results showed a statistically significant difference between 
men’s (M=2.29, SD=.52) and women’s (M=2.64, SD=.47) negative ER ratings 
t(45) =-0.35, p=0.02, 95% CI [-.65 to -.06], but not between their neutral ER 
ratings t(45)=-.75, p=0.45, 95% CI [-0.45 to 0.16] (Figure 31) or their 
Suppression Score t(45)=-.58, p=0.56, 95% CI [-0.30 to 0.17] (Figure 32).  
 
 
Figure 31: Gender differences in ratings of self-reported negative affect during 
the ER Task (part B). Each subject was asked to “simply view” the neutral 
pictures (“View” Pictures) and to “decrease or detach from the emotion” for 
negative pictures (“Suppress” Pictures). Error bars represent standard error of 








































Figure 32: Gender differences in negative emotion down-regulation success 
(Suppression Score). The Suppression Score was derived from subtracting 
negative ER ratings (part C) from the earlier acquired negative baseline ratings 
(part A). Error bars represent standard error of the mean (SEM). 
 
Finally, data regarding self-report ER strategy was analyzed. In order to 
determine inter-rater agreement, Cohen’s kappa was run and returned an 
outstanding level of agreement for “Cognitive Reappraisal” (kappa = 0.885 (95% 
CI 0.76, 0.80), p < 0.001) and “Attentional Control” (kappa = 0.866 (95% CI 0.67, 
0.86), p < 0.001) and substantial for “Other” (kappa = 0.696 (95% CI 0.59, 0.73), 
p < 0.001).  Then, to investigate any gender differences between the number of 
times a particular type of ER strategy was employed, we conducted a 2 (Gender) 
× 3 (type of ER Strategy: Cognitive Reappraisal, Attentional Control, Other) 




































of gender nor the ER Strategy X gender interaction reached statistical 
significance, therefore this variable was not used in subsequent analyses).  
Neuroimaging Results 
Gender Differences in Functional Connectivity during ER Baseline (part A) 
To examine whether men and women exhibited neurobiological differences when 
viewing negative stimuli, we tested the ER Baseline (part A) prior to emotion 
regulation. As shown in Figure 33, Table 12) below, during the Negative 
Condition of the ER Baseline, compared to men, women showed increased FC 
between L FP, L Hip and L pPaHC, and between the R Hip and R AG.   
Figure 33: Gender differences in 
functional connectivity during the negative 





























     
ER Baseline     
ROI ROI T p-FDR Effect Size 
L pPaHC L Hip -3.31 0.04 0.19 
L pPaHC L FP -3.24 0.04 0.14 
R Hip R AG -3.35 0.04 0.17 
ROI Abbreviations: pPaHC – posterior parahippocampal gyrus; Hip – 
Hippocampus; FP – Frontal Pole; AG – Angular Gyrus. 
 
Gender Differences in Functional Connectivity during ER Task (part B) 
To examine whether men and women exhibited FC differences during emotion 
regulation (ER Task; part B), we examined gender differences with respect to 
suppression, as well as the correlation of FC during the ER Task with self-
reported negative affect (ER Ratings, (part C)), and Suppression Score (ER 
Negative Baseline Ratings – Negative ER Ratings).  
ER task 
As shown in Figure 34, Table 13, women compared to men, during the 
Suppress Condition of the ER Task, showed increased FC between L IFG Oper 
and R pPaHC, between R IFG Oper and L pPaHC, and between L Hip and L 
pPaHC. In addition, women showed decreased connectivity between L pSMG, R 







Figure 34: Gender differences in functional 
connectivity during the suppress condition of 
the ER Task. Note: Color bar represents the 










Table 13     
     
ER Task    
ROI ROI T p-FDR Effect Size 
R AG L pSMG -3.94 0.007 0.27 
L pSMG R pSMG -3.86 0.009 0.31 
R pPaHC L IFG Oper 3.33 0.04 0.07 
L pPaHC  R IFG Oper 3.38 0.02 0.12 
L pPaHC  L Hip 3.26 0.02 0.18 
ROI Abbreviations: AG – Angular Gyrus; pSMG – posterior supramarginal gyrus, 
pPaHC – posterior parahippocampal gyrus; IFG Oper – Inferior frontal gyrus, 























ER Task Regressed with Self-Reported Negative Affect 
When assessing the relationship between ER Task FC and self-reported 
negative affect (negative ratings from ER Rating Task (part C)), women’s 
decreased self-reported negative affect compared to men’s related to increased 
FC between R pSMG and L IFG Oper, and between R pSMG and R IFG Oper, L 
OFC and dACC during suppression (Figure 35, Table 14). 
 
Figure 35: Gender differences in 
functional connectivity during the 
suppress condition of the ER Task, 
regressed with self-reported negative 
affect. Note: Color bar represents the 
strength of the t-statistic. 
 
Table 14     
     
ER Task Connectivity with Self-Reported Negative Affect 
ROI ROI T p-FDR 
Effect 
Size 
R pSMG L IFG Oper 3.24 0.01 0.41 
ER Task


















R pSMG R IFG Oper 3.84 0.01 0.43 
R pSMG L OFC 3.49 0.01 0.35 
R pSMG dACC 3.36 0.01 0.35 
ROI Abbreviations: pSMG – posterior supramarginal gyrus; IFG Oper – inferior 
frontal gyrus, pars opercularis; OFC – orbitofrontal cortex; dACC – dorsal anterior 
cingulate gyrus. 
 
ER Task Regressed with Suppression Score 
Lastly, we assessed the relationship between ER Task FC and Suppression 
Score (ER negative ratings (part C) subtracted from ER negative baseline 
ratings). In the Suppress contrast, increased Suppression Score (better 
suppression) in women, compared to men, was associated with increased FC 
between L IFG tri and R IFG Oper, and between L IFG tri and R dACC (Figure 







Figure 36: Gender differences in FC 
during the ER task, Suppress 
Condition, regressed with Suppression 
Score. Note: Color bar represents the 













ROI Abbreviations: IFG tri – Inferior Frontal Gyrus, pars triangularis; IFG Oper – 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus, pars opercularis; dACC – dorsal anterior cingulate gyrus.  
 
ER Task Connectivity with Suppression Score 
ROI ROI T p-FDR 
Effect 
Size 
L IFG tri R IFG Oper 4.83 0.0005 0.63 
L IFG tri R dACC 3.18 0.0300 0.47 
ER Task 



















The present fMRI study investigated whether gender differences existed in 
FC between brain regions underlying regulation of negative emotion during an 
ER task. Behaviorally, we observed that despite women rating the negative 
stimuli as more distressing compared to men, they had comparable Suppression 
Scores. However, the ER task revealed gender differences in FC. Specifically, in 
women enhanced ability to down-regulate negative emotion related to increased 
recruitment of a cingulo-opercular network, and in men, to posterior regions of a 
ventral attention network. Altogether, our results suggest men and women may 
utilize distinct executive control neural mechanisms in the control of negative 
emotion. To our knowledge, this is the first study to explore FC differences 
between men and women while engaging in ER and relate those differences to 
self-reported negative affect and suppression ability. 
Behavioral Findings 
Women self-reported as having more negative affect than men across 
tasks as we predicted, yet this difference disappeared in the process of down-
regulating negative emotion. Our results are consistent with previous findings 
showing women are more expressive, experientially reactive and sensitive to 
negative stimuli (Gard & Kring, 2007; Hampson et al., 2006; Kring & Gordon, 
1998; H. Li et al., 2008). Moreover, our results mirror the Domes et al., 2010 and 
McRae et al., 2008 observations. Namely, that despite their heightened 







degree as men. This disassociation implies that there could be gender-related 
differences in the pattern of FC associated with ER. Furthermore, no gender 
differences were observed in what ER strategy was employed, in contrast to 
other research examining this topic (Tamres et al., 2002). We speculate that 
within our sample, a combination of ER strategies was used, although a paucity 
of research remains on such “coactive” emotion regulation, with most research to 
date simply reporting that individuals indeed deploy a variety of ER strategies 
(James J. Gross, 2002).  
Neuroimaging Findings 
We observed that while viewing negative stimuli (ER Baseline task), 
women exhibited increased FC between the left ventral FP, hippocampus and 
pPaHC, as well as between right AG and hippocampus compared to men. 
Connectivity between ventral FP and hippocampus has been consistently 
associated with the recollection memory network (Adnan et al., 2016; Greenberg 
et al., 2005) and memory-based decision making (Weilbächer & Gluth, 2017).  In 
regard to the pPaHC, this structure has been shown to be a key node of the 
recollection memory network, which together with lateral parietal cortices are 
preferentially engaged when individuals recall rich contextual details (Adnan et 
al., 2016), particularly about novel scenes (Howard et al., 2013). Furthermore, 
the AG is part of a largely right-lateralized, well validated ventral attention system 
specialized for the detection of behaviorally relevant stimuli (Corbetta & Shulman, 







towards a novel item than men (Brown, 2013; Stoet, 2010). Together, our FC 
findings suggest that compared to men, women may engage a bottom-up 
emotional memory processing network when simply viewing negative stimuli, 
likely due to the allocation of attention to the highly salient stimuli.  
During the regulation of negative emotion (ER Task), we observed women 
exhibited increased FC between the bilateral IFG and hippocampus and pPaHC, 
while men exhibited increased FC between the AG and bilateral pSMG. The IFG 
has been well established as a crucial brain region recruited during the volitional 
inhibition of affective response (Aron et al., 2014; Konishi et al., 1999; Ochsner et 
al., 2012), as well as pivotal in coordinating encoding processes in conjunction 
with the hippocampus (Addis & McAndrews, 2006). The AG and pSMG, regions 
which underlie attention re-allocation to behaviorally salient stimuli (Corbetta & 
Shulman, 2002), have previously been associated with a more automatic ER 
process (Viviani, 2013). Furthermore, a recent meta-analysis suggested the ER 
process may be explained not only as frontal regions inhibiting limbic regions, but 
also those underlying attention (Frank et al., 2014). In contrast to previous 
findings arguing men may utilize brain regions underlying top-down cognitive 
control to a greater extent than women during ER (Mak et al., 2009), our results 
suggest that women employ a bilateral top-down cingulo-opercular control 
network in order to suppress negative emotion. Regarding the FC findings in 
men, ER theorists have suggested the existence of an automatic (Mauss et al., 







(Bargh & Williams, 2007) which contrasts with the deliberate voluntary form 
typically interrogated (Ochsner & Gross, 2005; Ochsner et al., 2012) and relies 
on the attentional reorienting mechanisms located in the ventral attention network 
(Viviani, 2013). Therefore, we speculate women may utilize a more deliberate ER 
process reliant on frontal regions, while men may employ a more efficient (less 
cognitively effortful) ER process dependent on regions within the posterior 
regions of the ventral attention network.  
In parallel, we found decreased self-reported negative affect in women 
(compared to men) related to increased connectivity between right pSMG and left 
IFG, dACC and OFC. The dACC lies in a unique anatomical position, with 
connections to both the limbic system and PFC, and has an important role in 
integrating neuronal circuitry for affect regulation (Stevens et al., 2011). 
Moreover, the dACC plays a crucial role in conflict monitoring (Lau et al., 2006; 
Stuss & Levine, 2002; Thomsen et al., 2005) as well as integration of attentional 
and emotional stimuli (Yamasaki et al., 2002). Hence, dACC connectivity with 
frontal and parietal structures in our results may point to a deliberate effort on the 
part of women to resolve the heightened emotional conflict during the ER 
process. Similarly, previous studies implicate the OFC in top-down modulation of 
autonomic responses to emotional experiences (Ohira et al., 2006; Mary L. 
Phillips et al., 2003), and it appears larger in women than men (Gur et al., 2002). 
Therefore, our findings suggest decreased self-reported negative affect in 







network in order to modulate the autonomic physiological responses evoked by 
the highly salient emotional stimuli.  
Lastly, we observed that in women (compared to men), better suppression 
of negative emotion related to increased connectivity between bilateral IFG and 
R dACC. Along with the IFG, robust evidence exists for the recruitment of the 
dACC during the ER process as a conflict monitoring tool (Mak et al., 2009; 
McRae et al., 2008; Ochsner & Gross, 2005; Ochsner et al., 2012; Weissman et 
al., 2005). That is, the dACC may underlie monitoring cognitive conflict and 
recruits other prefrontal regions to resolve this conflict when necessary (Botvinick 
et al., 2004; J. Fan et al., 2003), putatively in order to reduce amygdala activity 
(Etkin et al., 2006). Previous studies investigating gender differences in ER 
suggest women tend to utilize emotion-associated brain areas, while men tend to 
utilize cognitive ones (Kohn et al., 2014; Mak et al., 2009), and even that men 
may possess a greater ability to regulate their emotions compared to women 
(Kong et al., 2014). In contrast, our novel FC findings demonstrate that women 
downregulate negative emotion as successfully as men by recruiting a cingulo-
opercular network.   
To our knowledge, these results provide the first FC evidence that indicate 
women suppress negative emotion as well as men by exhibiting a cingulo-
opercular network, while men exhibit a posterior region of the ventral attentional 
network. Since women reported increased negative affect compared to men, we 







down cingulo-opercular control network to effectively downregulate the negative 
emotion. Men recruited posterior regions of the ventral attentional network while 
suppressing negative emotion, perhaps due to finding the negative stimuli less 
aversive as women, and conceivably requiring an efficient and automatic form of 
ER. The FC findings contribute an alternate avenue for investigating gender 
differences within the neural correlates of ER, which may explain women’s 
greater prevalence of developing affective disorders, particularly depression and 
anxiety (Kessler et al., 1993; Leach et al., 2008; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2001, 2012; 
Thomsen et al., 2005). Indeed, research suggests that in major depressive 
disorder, functional and structural abnormalities within cingulo-opercular 
pathways could contribute to maladaptive forms of self-focused processing and 
rumination (Pizzagalli, 2011).  
Limitations and Future Directions 
A few limitations in our study should be noted. The lack of control of 
hormonal cycle or contraception method for female participants poses a problem. 
Indeed, it has been shown that social processes, and in particular the neural 
response to emotion regulation, may vary as a function of hormonal phase of the 
women (Dan et al., 2019). In the same vein, testosterone has been shown to 
modulate brain networks important for social-emotional processing in men 
(Votinov et al., 2020) and should be taken account in future investigations. It 
should also be noted that we had small, unequal sample sizes which may reduce 







connectivity analysis included a large number of individual ROIs, caution should 
be exercised in order to avoid the reverse inference fallacy (Poldrack, 2000). 
However, we assert that sensitivity and specificity are high enough, and therefore 
our analysis has a high positive predictive value— that is, a high likelihood of 
implying the down regulation of negative emotion (Poldrack, 2011). Additionally, 
subjective negative affect ratings may not be the most valid measures to reflect 
emotional experiences, and that the inclusion of physiological responses to 
emotion could have provided a more reliable index (Ohira et al., 2006).  
 
Summary 
In conclusion, the present study demonstrated gender-specific FC 
patterns associated with negative emotion suppression during an ER task, which 
corresponded with self-reported negative affect and its downregulation success 
in a group of healthy individuals. Specifically, the results indicated women utilize 
a cingulo-opercular network to downregulate negative emotion, while men 
employ posterior regions of the ventral attention network, with comparable 
suppression outcomes. We speculate the dissociation in the use of executive 
control mechanisms is likely due to increased emotional reactivity commonly 
observed among women and an enhanced need to resolve heightened emotional 
conflict. The findings may provide a better understanding of the mechanisms 
underlying gender differences with respect to ER. Enhanced knowledge of 







affective disorders and critically, may facilitate the design of personalized 
therapeutic interventions, for instance utilizing neurofeedback (Linhartová et al., 


















































CHAPTER VI: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
 
“Sustained shortfalls in emotional intelligence are, sadly, no minor matter. There 
are few catastrophes, in our own lives or in those of nations, that do not 
ultimately have their origins in emotional ignorance.” 
 
Alain de Botton 
 
 
An Integrative Neurocognitive EI Model 
 
Through the different studies this dissertation presented, we utilized a 
myriad of neuroimaging analyses to elucidate the neural correlates of the 
proposed cognitive-emotional EI framework, comprising empathy and ER. In 
Experiment 1, we demonstrated that these processes are intimately related 
through the temporal interplay of the CEN, DMN and SN, and that these flexible 
network (re)configurations relate to trait empathy and ER. In Experiment 2, we 
showed that empathy is related to sensitivity to one’s own bodily changes 
(interoception), which is anchored in regions of the SN. In Experiment 3, we 
suggested that enhanced bottom-up processing seen in empathy and worry, 
reliant on the SN, contributed to trait anxiety due to decreased activation of CEN 
regions. In Experiment 4, we demonstrated that in a healthy adolescent sample, 
decreased structural brain measurements and increased estradiol related to 







of the CEN to down-regulate negative emotion, albeit with comparable 
suppression scores. Collectively, the studies imply that harmonious 
socioemotional communication may arise from effective communication between 
neurocircuitry underlying the CEN, DMN and SN, and is furthermore modulated 
by gender, as well as physiological and psychological characteristics. In addition, 
we propose a role for the SN as a “switch” between internal and external 
attention which may contribute to favorable socioemotional communication 
outcomes.  Therefore, this dissertation contributes a neural basis for the 
proposed cognitive-emotional EI framework, bridging the conceptual divide 
between “emotional” and “cognitive” EI processes and creating a new integrative 
neurocognitive EI model (Figure 37).  
Figure 37: Schematic illustration of the proposed neurocognitive EI model. As 
the self observes emotions in the other, regions anchored in the SN contribute to 
automatically sharing the emotion (Affective Empathy). Facilitated by the SN, 
attention is externally modulated, whereby understanding emotion (Cognitive 







between the SN, DMN and CEN. To modulate the resultant emotion, CEN brain 
regions come online to down-regulate limbic regions such as the amygdala, 
which eventually lead to behavior execution. Based on iterative observations of 
the other, the cycle may begin again to produce desired emotional attunement. 
  
While real-world emotional attunement reflects a bi-directional process, in 
which the state of the self and other may both change in response to one 
another, for the sake of parsimony, we focus here only on the emotional 
landscape of the self. It is also important to note that an individual’s 
understanding of, and response to, another’s emotions reflects both their 
capacity as well as their propensity to engage in these attunement processes 
(Cameron et al., 2017; Zaki, 2014).  
During an emotional interchange, the self observes concrete cues from 
the other such as facial, bodily or vocal expressions that prompts creation of an 
embodied emotion in the self (Affective Empathy). Although previous findings 
anchor this type of automatic processing solely in the SN (Decety et al., 2013), 
our results extend this conclusion by indicating that Affective Empathy may arise 
from the dynamic interplay between the SN, CEN and DMN (Experiment 1); and 
furthermore, that Affective Empathy shares rsFC with interoception, the 
awareness of changes in bodily sensations (Experiment 2). Affective Empathy, 
therefore, enables a direct mapping of another’s emotion on the brain system of 
the observer, without an explicit need for complex cognition (Adolphs, 2002; Carr 
et al., 2003; De Waal & Preston, 2017; Jabbi & Keysers, 2008). To wit, this type 
of rudimentary emotional processing serves as the blueprint from which the self 







In addition to the SN being implicated in monitoring and processing body 
state changes, it also plays a critical and causal role in engaging the brain’s 
attentional, working memory and higher-order control processes (CEN) while 
disengaging other systems that are not immediately task relevant (Menon & 
Uddin, 2010). In the context of the neurocognitive EI model proposed, the self’s 
SN may generate a state of heightened physiological awareness due to the 
other’s emotional state, which subsequently results in either internal or external 
attention allocation. In the case of shifting attention internally, the CEN and DMN 
may come online for better understanding and subsequently regulating the 
instantiated emotion. In the case of shifting attention externally, sustained use of 
the SN may be needed to gather additional emotional information from the other. 
Given its crucial role in attention allocation, atypical SN activity may lead to 
psychopathology. Indeed, SN hyperactivity has been implicated in anxiety 
disorders, suggesting that when the SN goes into overdrive, pathology 
subsequently results (Feinstein et al., 2006; Paulus & Stein, 2006; M. B. Stein et 
al., 2007). In line with this thinking, we demonstrated that increased anxiety in 
Experiment 3 was related to increased SN, but decreased CEN processing.  
Therefore, in the context of the neurocognitive EI model, we propose the SN has 
a crucial role in triggering a cascade of cognitive control signals that have a 
major impact on how emotional stimuli are subsequently processed.  
Once concrete emotional cues are available and attention is directed 







represent their own and the other’s emotional state and inhibit their default 
egocentric perspective in order to take the perspective of the other – i.e., 
Cognitive Empathy (Chakrabarti and Baron-Cohen, 2006; Coplan and Goldie, 
2012; O’Connell et al., 2013). Previous research suggests that Cognitive 
Empathy involves switching between the representations of self and other in 
service of inferences based on emotional cues that require temporal binding of 
the available information; therefore, it relies on brain regions anchored in the SN, 
CEN and DMN (Atique et al., 2011; Corradi-Dell’Acqua et al., 2014; Goel et al., 
1995; Lamm et al., 2011; Morelli et al., 2014; Van Overwalle, 2009). While in 
agreement, our studies provide novel perspectives on this claim using enhanced 
neuroimaging methodologies. Namely, the dynFC findings from Experiment 1 
suggest mentalizing is indeed an effortful process that may not be able to occur 
at the same time as other taxing cognitive processes. In addition, the rsBOLD 
findings from Experiment 2 suggest flexibility between networks underlying 
mentalizing relates to an improved sense of interconnectedness between one’s 
own mind and body. Therefore, taking the other’s perspective needs more 
cortical resources and time compared to the automatic sharing of emotion, i.e., 
Affective Empathy.  
Additionally, research suggests Cognitive Empathy shares neural 
resources with ER (Kalisch, 2009; Ozonoff et al., 1991; Sabbagh et al., 2006; 
Urry et al., 2009), which is thought to be mediated by neural circuits involving 







(Davidson et al., 2000; Etkin et al., 2015). Our studies corroborate this evidence, 
and additionally contribute valuable information regarding gender differences 
within this process, and ER’s relationship to empathy and estradiol. In 
Experiment 1, we show a behavioral and dynFC overlap between Cognitive 
Empathy and Cognitive Reappraisal. In Experiment 4, we show that in an 
adolescent sample, increased estradiol and decreased structural brain 
measurements were related to decreased executive functions (i.e., ER). Finally, 
in Experiment 5, we show men and women utilize different parts of the CEN to 
down-regulate negative emotion. Therefore, we provide evidence that suggests 
ER is a complex cognitive process that may be modulated by gender, 
physiological and psychological variables.  
Following ER due to another’s emotional distress, behavior execution may 
occur (for example, comforting the other); or the iterative process may continue 
based on sensory information gathered from the other, processed by the SN. We 
also note that previous research shows reward value assigned to the observed 
other modulates the extent of embodiment and related neural responses in an 
observer (Sims et al., 2014; Trilla et al., 2015), therefore, this model is highly 
context dependent.  
 
Clinical Implications  
 
The proposed integrative neurocognitive EI model has clear applications 







example, mentalization-based approaches to treating borderline personality 
disorder (Fonagy & Luyten, 2009) depend on representing and attending to the 
emotions of self and others. Cognitive-behavioral therapy (Beck, 2011) can also 
be understood to promote the use of higher order executive control processes. 
Moreover, promising research suggests these EI constructs can be trained, 
leading to improved psychological outcomes (Bagheri et al., 2017). The 
(demonstrably trainable) emotion abilities we have discussed have been found to 
be lower in several clinical populations, including major depression (Demiralp et 
al., 2012), social anxiety disorder (Kashdan & Farmer, 2014), autism spectrum 
disorder (Erbas et al., 2013), eating disorders (Selby et al., 2013), and borderline 
personality disorder (Suvak et al., 2011). In combination with the recently 
suggested genetic links of EI (Vladimir et al., 2019), this integrative 
neurocognitive EI model illuminates avenues for treatment such as deep brain 
stimulation (DBS) to target a subset of networks underlying specific deficits, 






The proposed neurocognitive EI model can also be useful in the design of 
future EI training programs. For example, evidence already exists that 
mindfulness meditation improves EI by increasing cognitive and emotional 







of meditation techniques, in combination with real-time fMRI approaches, and 
psycho-physiological measurements (for ex., skin conductance) could improve 
socioemotional communication.  It is worth noting given the problems of “reverse 
inference” associated with neuroimaging (Poldrack, 2011) there are important 
limitations when attempting to infer psychological differences based on observed 
neural differences; thus, this particular use of our model should be treated with 
some caution. With regard to emotion recognition, the model suggests that a 
primary training target may be the sculpting of new attentional dispositions. That 
is, if individuals were trained to shift attention to the most emotionally informative 
facial, bodily, and voice cues in particular contexts, emotion recognition, and 
subsequently empathy, may improve. With regard to improving ER, our model 
suggests that ER skills are part of the higher-order cognitive repertoire, and thus 
ER may benefit from greater emotional working memory capacity; it is unclear at 
present, however, whether training programs can effectively increase working 
memory capacity for the emotions of self and others, thus research on this topic 





 EI is a crucial ability that allows the processing of emotion in both self and 
others, leading to harmonious social encounters. The work presented here 
contributes important neurobiological insights in regard to two constructs 







these constructs dynamically communicate to support optimal emotional 
processing, reconciling the seemingly opposing perspectives of functional 
segregation and integration. Secondly, we show empathy has neurobiological 
links to interoception and anxiety, providing evidence for theories positing 
relationships among these constructs. Thirdly, we illustrate that ER is a complex 
higher-order cognitive process that may be modulated by brain structure and 
function, as well as hormones and gender. Finally, the proposed integrative 
neurocognitive EI model based on this data can serve as a blueprint for 
developing EI training programs and offers a (currently lacking) performance-
based neurobiological cognitive test of EI.  
Perhaps now more than ever, there is a dire need for embracing the 
nuances of human emotion.  In addition to the social isolation experienced by 
many individuals during the Covid-19 global pandemic, social unrest and political 
divisiveness arose during this time, fueled by the tendency to see groups as not 
belonging, fitting in or just being different, otherwise known as “othering” (Brons, 
2015). This disturbing pattern also affects the environment, as experts estimate 
that humans are driving one million species of plants and animals to extinction by 
refusing to cooperate to pass conservation legislature (Tollefson, 2019). 
Understanding how other’s emotional landscapes are different from ours not only 
offers enormous interpersonal benefits, but has the potential to ripple throughout 


















Adamaszek, M., D’Agata, F., Ferrucci, R., Habas, C., Keulen, S., Kirkby, K. C., 
Leggio, M., Mariën, P., Molinari, M., & Moulton, E. (2017). Consensus paper: 
cerebellum and emotion. The Cerebellum, 16(2), 552–576. 
Addis, D. R., & McAndrews, M. P. (2006). Prefrontal and hippocampal 
contributions to the generation and binding of semantic associations during 
successful encoding. NeuroImage, 33(4), 1194–1206. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2006.07.039 
Adnan, A., Barnett, A., Moayedi, M., McCormick, C., Cohn, M., & McAndrews, M. 
P. (2016). Distinct hippocampal functional networks revealed by 
tractography-based parcellation. Brain Structure and Function, 221(6), 
2999–3012. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00429-015-1084-x 
Adolfi, F., Couto, B., Richter, F., Decety, J., Lopez, J., Sigman, M., Manes, F., & 
Ibáñez, A. (2017). Convergence of interoception, emotion, and social 
cognition: A twofold fMRI meta-analysis and lesion approach. Cortex, 88, 
124–142. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cortex.2016.12.019 
Adolphs, R. (2002). Neural systems for recognizing emotion. Current Opinion in 
Neurobiology, 12(2), 169–177. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0959-
4388(02)00301-X 
Adolphs, R., Damasio, H., Tranel, D., Cooper, G., & Damasio, A. R. (2000). A 
role for somatosensory cortices in the visual recognition of emotion as 
revealed by three-dimensional lesion mapping. Journal of Neuroscience, 
20(7), 2683–2690. https://doi.org/10.1523/jneurosci.20-07-02683.2000 
Aliakbari, M., Juibari, A. K., Amirabadi, F., Shaghaghi, F., Zare, N., & Khaleghi, 
F. (2013). The role of Theory of Mind and executive function in predicting 
empathy. In Advances in Cognitive Science (Vol. 15, Issues 2[58]; 58, pp. 1–







Allen, E. A., Damaraju, E., Plis, S. M., Erhardt, E. B., Eichele, T., & Calhoun, V. 
D. (2014). Tracking whole-brain connectivity dynamics in the resting state. 







Almey, A., Milner, T. A., & Brake, W. G. (2015). Estrogen receptors in the central 
nervous system and their implication for dopamine-dependent cognition in 
females. Hormones and Behavior, 74, 125–138. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.yhbeh.2015.06.010 
Amodio, D. M., & Frith, C. D. (2006). Meeting of minds: the medial frontal cortex 
and social cognition. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 7(4), 268–277. 
https://doi.org/10.1038/nrn1884 
Anderson, M. (2014). After phrenology: neural reuse and the interactive brain 
(Issue 8). MIT Press. https://doi.org/10.1080/00140139.2017.1314655 
Andersson, J., Smith, S., & Jenkinson, M. (2008). FNIRT-FMRIB’s non-linear 
image registration tool. 14Th Annual Meeting of the Organization for Human 
Brain Mapping (OHBM), 15–19. 
Andrews-Hanna, J. R. (2011). The Brain’s Default Network and Its Adaptive Role 
in Internal Mentation. The Neuroscientist, 18(3), 251–270. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1073858411403316 
Antshel, K. M., Conchelos, J., Lanzetta, G., Fremont, W., & Kates, W. R. (2005). 
Behavior and corpus callosum morphology relationships in velocardiofacial 
syndrome (22q11.2 deletion syndrome). Psychiatry Research: 
Neuroimaging, 138(3), 235–245. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pscychresns.2005.02.003 
Arain, M., Haque, M., Johal, L., Mathur, P., Nel, W., Rais, A., Sandhu, R., & 
Sharma, S. (2013). Maturation of the adolescent brain. Neuropsychiatric 
Disease and Treatment, 9, 449–461. https://doi.org/10.2147/NDT.S39776 
Armbruster-Genç, D. J. N., Ueltzhöffer, K., & Fiebach, C. J. (2016). Brain signal 
variability differentially affects cognitive flexibility and cognitive stability. 
Journal of Neuroscience, 36(14), 3978–3987. 
https://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.2517-14.2016 
Aron, A. R., Robbins, T. W., & Poldrack, R. A. (2014). Inhibition and the right 
inferior frontal cortex: One decade on. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 18(4), 
177–185. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2013.12.003 
Asato, M. R., Terwilliger, R., Woo, J., & Luna, B. (2010). White matter 
development in adolescence: a DTI study. Cerebral Cortex (New York, N.Y. : 
1991), 20(9), 2122–2131. https://doi.org/10.1093/cercor/bhp282 
ASHTARI, M. (2011). Anatomy and functional role of the inferior longitudinal 
fasciculus: a search that has just begun. Developmental Medicine & Child 
Neurology, 54(1), 6–7. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-8749.2011.04122.x 
Asplund, C. L., Todd, J. J., Snyder, A. P., & Marois, R. (2010). A central role for 
the lateral prefrontal cortex in goal-directed and stimulus-driven attention. 
Nature Neuroscience, 13(4), 507–512. https://doi.org/10.1038/nn.2509 
Austin, E. J., Saklofske, D. H., Huang, S. H. S., & McKenney, D. (2004). 
Measurement of trait emotional intelligence: Testing and cross-validating a 
modified version of Schutte et al.’s (1998) measure. Personality and 








Bagheri, Z., Mohd Kosnin, A., & Besharat, M. A. (2017). Improving Emotion 
Regulation skills through an Emotional Intelligence Training Course. Khazar 
Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences, 19(4), 36–48. 
https://doi.org/10.5782/2223-2621.2016.19.4.36 
Banks, S. J., Eddy, K. T., Angstadt, M., Nathan, P. J., & Luan Phan, K. (2007). 
Amygdala-frontal connectivity during emotion regulation. Social Cognitive 
and Affective Neuroscience, 2(4), 303–312. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/scan/nsm029 
Bar-On, R., Tranel, D., Denburg, N. L., & Bechara, A. (2003). Exploring the 
neurological substrate of emotional and social intelligence. Brain, 126(8), 
1790–1800. https://doi.org/10.1093/brain/awg177 
Barbey, A. K., Koenigs, M., & Grafman, J. (2011). Orbitofrontal contributions to 
human working memory. Cerebral Cortex, 21(4), 789–795. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/cercor/bhq153 
Barbey, A. K., Koenigs, M., & Grafman, J. (2013). Dorsolateral prefrontal 
contributions to human working memory. Cortex, 49(5), 1195–1205. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cortex.2012.05.022 
Bardi, L., Desmet, C., Nijhof, A., Wiersema, J. R., & Brass, M. (2017). Brain 
activation for spontaneous and explicit false belief tasks overlaps: New fMRI 
evidence on belief processing and violation of expectation. Social Cognitive 
and Affective Neuroscience, 12(3), 391–400. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/scan/nsw143 
Bargh, J. A., & Williams, L. E. (2007). The case for nonconscious emotion 
regulation. In J.J. Gross (Ed.), Handbook of emotion regulation (pp. 429–
445). Guilford Press. 
Barnes, L. L. B., Harp, D., & Jung, W. S. (2002). Reliability Generalization of 
Scores on the Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory. Educational and 
Psychological Measurement, 62(4), 603–618. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0013164402062004005 
Baron-Cohen, S., Jolliffe, T., Mortimore, C., & Robertson, M. (1997). Another 
advanced test of theory of mind: Evidence from very high functioning adults 
with autism or Asperger syndrome. In Journal of Child Psychology and 
Psychiatry and Allied Disciplines (Vol. 38, Issue 7, pp. 813–822). 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-7610.1997.tb01599.x 
Baron-Cohen, S., Knickmeyer, R. C., & Belmonte, M. K. (2005). Sex Differences 
in the Brain: Implications for Explaining Autism. Science, 310(5749), 819–
823. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1115455 
Baron-Cohen, S., Ring, H., Chitnis, X., Wheelwright, S., Gregory, L., Williams, S., 
Brammer, M., & Bullmore, E. (2006). fMRI of parents of children with 
Asperger Syndrome: A pilot study. Brain and Cognition, 61(1), 122–130. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bandc.2005.12.011 
Baron-Cohen, S., & Wheelwright, S. (2004). The empathy quotient: An 
investigation of adults with asperger syndrome or high functioning autism, 







Disorders (Vol. 34, Issue 2, pp. 163–175). 
https://doi.org/10.1023/B:JADD.0000022607.19833.00 
Baron-Cohen, S., Wheelwright, S., Hill, J., Raste, Y., & Plumb, I. (2001). The 
“Reading the Mind in the Eyes” Test revised version: a study with normal 
adults, and adults with Asperger syndrome or high-functioning autism. The 
Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry and Allied Disciplines, 42(2), 
241–251. 
Barrett, L. F. (2004). Feelings or words? Understanding the content in self-report 
ratings of experienced emotion. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 87(2), 266–281. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.87.2.266 
Barrett, L. F., Bliss-Moreau, E., Quigley, K. S., & Aronson, K. R. (2004). 
Interoceptive sensitivity and self-reports of emotional experience. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 87(5), 684–697. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.87.5.684 
Barrett, L. F., & Satpute, A. B. (2013). Large-scale brain networks in affective and 
social neuroscience: Towards an integrative functional architecture of the 
brain. Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 23(3), 361–372. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.conb.2012.12.012 
Barrett, L. F., & Simmons, W. K. (2015). Interoceptive predictions in the brain. 
Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 16(7), 419–429. 
https://doi.org/10.1038/nrn3950 
Baumann, O., & Mattingley, J. B. (2012). Functional topography of primary 
emotion processing in the human cerebellum. NeuroImage, 61(4), 805–811. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2012.03.044 
Baur, V., Hänggi, J., Langer, N., & Jäncke, L. (2013). Resting-State Functional 
and Structural Connectivity Within an Insula–Amygdala Route Specifically 
Index State and Trait Anxiety. Biological Psychiatry, 73(1), 85–92. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biopsych.2012.06.003 
Bechara, A., Damasio, A. R., Damasio, H., & Anderson, S. W. (1994). 
Insensitivity to future consequences following damage to human prefrontal 
cortex. Cognition, 50(1–3), 7–15. https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-
0277(94)90018-3 
Bechara, A., Damasio, H., & Damasio, A. R. (2000). Emotion, decision making 
and the orbitofrontal cortex. Cerebral Cortex, 10(3), 295–307. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/cercor/10.3.295 
Beck, J. S. (2011). Cognitive behavior therapy. New York: Basics and beyond. 
Guilford Publication. 
Behrens, T. E. J., Woolrich, M. W., Jenkinson, M., Johansen-Berg, H., Nunes, R. 
G., Clare, S., Matthews, P. M., Brady, J. M., & Smith, S. M. (2003). 
Characterization and propagation of uncertainty in diffusion-weighted MR 
imaging. Magnetic Resonance in Medicine, 50(5), 1077–1088. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/mrm.10609 
Behzadi, Y., Restom, K., Liau, J., & Liu, T. T. (2007). A component based noise 







NeuroImage, 37(1), 90–101. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2007.04.042 
Benjamini, Y., & Hochberg, Y. (1995). Controlling the False Discovery Rate: A 
Practical and Powerful Approach to Multiple Testing. Journal of the Royal 
Statistical Society: Series B (Methodological), 57(1), 289–300. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2517-6161.1995.tb02031.x 
Berking, M., Wirtz, C. M., Svaldi, J., & Hofmann, S. G. (2014). Emotion regulation 
predicts symptoms of depression over five years. Behaviour Research and 
Therapy, 57(1), 13–20. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.brat.2014.03.003 
Bernhardt, B. C., & Singer, T. (2012). The neural basis of empathy. Annual 
Review of Neuroscience, 35(1), 1–23. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-
neuro-062111-150536 
Bewernick, B. H., Hurlemann, R., Matusch, A., Kayser, S., Grubert, C., 
Hadrysiewicz, B., Axmacher, N., Lemke, M., Cooper-Mahkorn, D., & Cohen, 
M. X. (2010). Nucleus accumbens deep brain stimulation decreases ratings 
of depression and anxiety in treatment-resistant depression. Biological 
Psychiatry, 67(2), 110–116. 
Biesbroek, J. M., Weaver, N. A., Hilal, S., Kuijf, H. J., Ikram, M. K., Xu, X., Tan, 
B. Y., Venketasubramanian, N., Postma, A., Biessels, G. J., & Chen, C. P. L. 
H. (2016). Impact of Strategically Located White Matter Hyperintensities on 
Cognition in Memory Clinic Patients with Small Vessel Disease. PloS One, 
11(11), e0166261–e0166261. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0166261 
Bilevicius, E., Kolesar, T. A., Smith, S. D., Trapnell, P. D., & Kornelsen, J. (2018). 
Trait emotional empathy and resting state functional connectivity in default 
mode, salience, and central executive networks. Brain Sciences, 8(7). 
https://doi.org/10.3390/brainsci8070128 
Bimonte, H. A., & Denenberg, V. H. (1999). Estradiol facilitates performance as 
working memory load increases. Psychoneuroendocrinology, 24(2), 161–
173. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0306-4530(98)00068-7 
Bird, G., Silani, G., Brindley, R., White, S., Frith, U., & Singer, T. (2010). 
Empathic brain responses in insula are modulated by levels of alexithymia 
but not autism. Brain, 133(5), 1515–1525. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/brain/awq060 
Biundo, R., Weis, L., Facchini, S., Formento-Dojot, P., Vallelunga, A., Pilleri, M., 
Weintraub, D., & Antonini, A. (2015). Patterns of cortical thickness 
associated with impulse control disorders in Parkinson’s disease. Movement 
Disorders, 30(5), 688–695. https://doi.org/10.1002/mds.26154 
Blair, R. J. R. (2001). ADVANCES IN NEUROPSYCHIATRY: Neurocognitive 
models of aggression, the antisocial personality disorders, and psychopathy. 
Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery & Psychiatry, 71(6), 727–731. 
https://doi.org/10.1136/jnnp.71.6.727 
Blair, R. J. R. (2005). Responding to the emotions of others: Dissociating forms 
of empathy through the study of typical and psychiatric populations. 








Blakemore, S.-J. (2008). The social brain in adolescence. Nature Reviews 
Neuroscience, 9(4), 267–277. https://doi.org/10.1038/nrn2353 
Blakemore, S.-J., & Choudhury, S. (2006). Development of the adolescent brain: 
implications for executive function and social cognition. Journal of Child 
Psychology and Psychiatry, 47(3–4), 296–312. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-7610.2006.01611.x 
Bogg, T., & Lasecki, L. (2015). Reliable gains? Evidence for substantially 
underpowered designs in studies of working memory training transfer to fluid 
intelligence. In Frontiers in Psychology (Vol. 6, Issue JAN, p. 589). 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00589 
Borkovec, T. D., Robinson, E., Pruzinsky, T., & DePree, J. A. (1983). Preliminary 
exploration of worry: Some characteristics and processes. Behaviour 
Research and Therapy, 21(1), 9–16. https://doi.org/10.1016/0005-
7967(83)90121-3 
Bornstein, M. H., & Gardner, H. (1986). Frames of Mind: The Theory of Multiple 
Intelligences. In Journal of Aesthetic Education (Vol. 20, Issue 2). Basic 
Books. https://doi.org/10.2307/3332707 
Botvinick, M. M., Cohen, J. D., & Carter, C. S. (2004). Conflict monitoring and 
anterior cingulate cortex: An update. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 8(12), 
539–546. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2004.10.003 
Brackett, M. A., Mayer, J. D., & Warner, R. M. (2004). Emotional intelligence and 
its relation to everyday behaviour. Personality and Individual Differences, 
36(6), 1387–1402. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0191-8869(03)00236-8 
Brackett, M. A., Rivers, S. E., Reyes, M. R., & Salovey, P. (2012). Enhancing 
academic performance and social and emotional competence with the 
RULER feeling words curriculum. Learning and Individual Differences, 22(2), 
218–224. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.lindif.2010.10.002 
Brannick, M. T., Wahi, M. M., Arce, M., Johnson, H. A., Nazian, S., & Goldin, S. 
B. (2009). Comparison of trait and ability measures of emotional intelligence 
in medical students. Medical Education, 43(11), 1062–1068. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1365-2923.2009.03430.x 
Brody, L. R. (1997). Gender and emotion: Beyond stereotypes. Journal of Social 
Issues, 53(2), 369–393. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-4560.1997.tb02448.x 
Brons, L. L. (2015). Othering, an analysis. Transcience, a Journal of Global 
Studies, 6(1). 
Brown, J. M. (2013). A sex difference in location-based inhibition-of-return. 
Personality and Individual Differences, 54(6), 721–725. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2012.11.029 
Burgess, P. W., Veitch, E., de Lacy Costello, A., & Shallice, T. (2000). The 
cognitive and neuroanatomical correlates of multitasking. Neuropsychologia, 
38(6), 848–863. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0028-3932(99)00134-7 
Caballero, A., Granberg, R., & Tseng, K. Y. (2016). Mechanisms contributing to 







Biobehavioral Reviews, 70, 4–12. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2016.05.013 
Cacioppo, J. T., Berntson, G. G., Sheridan, J. F., & McClintock, M. K. (2000). 
Multilevel integrative analyses of human behavior: Social neuroscience and 
the complementing nature of social and biological approaches. 
Psychological Bulletin, 126(6), 829–843. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-
2909.126.6.829 
Calhoun, V. D., Adali, T., Pearlson, G. D., & Pekar, J. J. (2001). A method for 
making group inferences from functional MRI data using independent 
component analysis. Human Brain Mapping, 14(3), 140–151. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/hbm.1048 
Cameron, Cunningham, W., Saunders, B., & Inzlicht, M. (2017). The ends of 
empathy: Constructing empathy from value-based choice. 
https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/d99bp 
Cameron, O. G. (2001). Interoception: The inside story - A model for 
psychosomatic processes. Psychosomatic Medicine, 63(5), 697–710. 
https://doi.org/10.1097/00006842-200109000-00001 
Carlson, S. M., Mandell, D. J., & Williams, L. (2004). Executive function and 
theory of mind: Stability and prediction from ages 2 to 3. Developmental 
Psychology, 40(6), 1105–1122. https://doi.org/10.1037/0012-1649.40.6.1105 
Carney, D. R., & Harrigan, J. A. (2003). It takes one to know one: Interpersonal 
sensitivity is related to accurate assessments of others’ interpersonal 
sensitivity. Emotion, 3(2), 194–200. https://doi.org/10.1037/1528-
3542.3.2.194 
Carr, L., Iacoboni, M., Dubeau, M.-C., Mazziotta, J. C., & Lenzi, G. L. (2003). 
Neural mechanisms of empathy in humans: A relay from neural systems for 
imitation to limbic areas. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 
100(9), 5497–5502. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0935845100 
Catani, M., & Thiebaut de Schotten, M. (2008). A diffusion tensor imaging 
tractography atlas for virtual in vivo dissections. Cortex, 44(8), 1105–1132. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cortex.2008.05.004 
Cauda, F., D’Agata, F., Sacco, K., Duca, S., Geminiani, G., & Vercelli, A. (2011). 
Functional connectivity of the insula in the resting brain. NeuroImage, 55(1), 
8–23. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2010.11.049 
Cerami, C., Dodich, A., Canessa, N., Crespi, C., Marcone, A., Cortese, F., 
Chierchia, G., Scola, E., Falini, A., & Cappa, S. F. (2014). Neural correlates 
of empathic impairment in the behavioral variant of frontotemporal dementia. 
Alzheimer’s & Dementia, 10(6), 827–834. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jalz.2014.01.005 
Chan, R. C. K., Shum, D., Toulopoulou, T., & Chen, E. Y. H. (2008). Assessment 
of executive functions: Review of instruments and identification of critical 
issues. Archives of Clinical Neuropsychology, 23(2), 201–216. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.acn.2007.08.010 







Intelligence, General Self-Efficacy, and Perceived Stress: Evidence from 
Thailand. Journal of Spirituality in Mental Health, 16(3), 171–192. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/19349637.2014.925364 
Chhatwal, J., & Lane, R. D. (2016). A cognitive-developmental model of 
emotional awareness and its application to the practice of psychotherapy. In 
Psychodynamic Psychiatry (Vol. 44, Issue 2, pp. 305–325). Guilford 
Publications. https://doi.org/10.1521/pdps.2016.44.2.305 
Christov-Moore, L., Reggente, N., Douglas, P. K., Feusner, J. D., & Iacoboni, M. 
(2020). Predicting Empathy From Resting State Brain Connectivity: A 
Multivariate Approach. In Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience (Vol. 14, p. 
3). https://doi.org/10.3389/fnint.2020.00003 
Christov-Moore, L., Simpson, E. A., Coudé, G., Grigaityte, K., Iacoboni, M., & 
Ferrari, P. F. (2014). Empathy: Gender effects in brain and behavior. 
Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 46(P4), 604–627. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2014.09.001 
Chu, L.-C. (2010). The benefits of meditation vis-à-vis emotional intelligence, 
perceived stress and negative mental health. Stress and Health, 26(2), 169–
180. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1002/smi.1289 
Cilia, R., Cho, S. S., van Eimeren, T., Marotta, G., Siri, C., Ko, J. H., Pellecchia, 
G., Pezzoli, G., Antonini, A., & Strafella, A. P. (2011). Pathological gambling 
in patients with Parkinson’s disease is associated with fronto-striatal 
disconnection: A path modeling analysis. Movement Disorders, 26(2), 225–
233. https://doi.org/10.1002/mds.23480 
Clark, C. A. C., Pritchard, V. E., & Woodward, L. J. (2010). Preschool executive 
functioning abilities predict early mathematics achievement. Developmental 
Psychology, 46(5), 1176–1191. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0019672 
Cocchi, L., Zalesky, A., Fornito, A., & Mattingley, J. B. (2013). Dynamic 
cooperation and competition between brain systems during cognitive control. 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 17(10), 493–501. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2013.08.006 
Compare, A., Zarbo, C., Shonin, E., Van Gordon, W., & Marconi, C. (2014). 
Emotional regulation and depression: A potential mediator between heart 
and mind. Cardiovascular Psychiatry and Neurology, 2014, 324374. 
https://doi.org/10.1155/2014/324374 
Cooke, P. S., Nanjappa, M. K., Ko, C., Prins, G. S., & Hess, R. A. (2017). 
Estrogens in Male Physiology. Physiological Reviews, 97(3), 995–1043. 
https://doi.org/10.1152/physrev.00018.2016 
Cooney, R. E., Joormann, J., Eugène, F., Dennis, E. L., & Gotlib, I. H. (2010). 
Neural correlates of rumination in depression. Cognitive, Affective, & 
Behavioral Neuroscience, 10(4), 470–478. 
https://doi.org/10.3758/cabn.10.4.470 
Cooper, A., & Petrides, K. V. (2010). A psychometric analysis of the Trait 
Emotional Intelligence Questionnaire-Short Form (TEIQue-SF) using item 








Corbetta, M., & Shulman, G. L. (2002). Control of goal-directed and stimulus-
driven attention in the brain. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 3(3), 201–215. 
https://doi.org/10.1038/nrn755 
Cordes, D., Haughton, V. M., Arfanakis, K., Carew, J. D., Turski, P. A., Moritz, C. 
H., Quigley, M. A., & Meyerand, M. E. (2001). Frequencies contributing to 
functional connectivity in the cerebral cortex in “resting-state” data. American 
Journal of Neuroradiology, 22(7), 1326–1333. 
Core R Team. (2019). A Language and Environment for Statistical Computing. In 
R Foundation for Statistical Computing (Vol. 2, p. https://www.R--
project.org). R Foundation for Statistical Computing. http://www.r-project.org 
Cox, C. L., Uddin, L. Q., Di martino, A., Castellanos, F. X., Milham, M. P., & 
Kelly, C. (2012). The balance between feeling and knowing: Affective and 
cognitive empathy are reflected in the brain’s intrinsic functional dynamics. 
Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 7(6), 727–737. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/scan/nsr051 
Craig, A. D. (2002). How do you feel? Interoception: the sense of the 
physiological condition of the body. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 3(8), 
655–666. https://doi.org/10.1038/nrn894 
Craig, A. D. (2009). How do you feel - now? The anterior insula and human 
awareness. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 10(1), 59–70. 
https://doi.org/10.1038/nrn2555 
Critchley, H. D. (2005). Neural mechanisms of autonomic, affective, and 
cognitive integration. Journal of Comparative Neurology, 493(1), 154–166. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/cne.20749 
Critchley, H. D., & Garfinkel, S. N. (2017). Interoception and emotion. Current 
Opinion in Psychology, 17, 7–14. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2017.04.020 
Critchley, H. D., Wiens, S., Rotshtein, P., Öhman, A., & Dolan, R. J. (2004). 
Neural systems supporting interoceptive awareness. Nature Neuroscience, 
7(2), 189–195. https://doi.org/10.1038/nn1176 
Crocker, L. D., Heller, W., Warren, S. L., O’Hare, A. J., Infantolino, Z. P., & Miller, 
G. A. (2013). Relationships among cognition, emotion, and motivation: 
Implications for intervention and neuroplasticity in psychopathology. In 
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience (Vol. 7, Issue MAY, p. 261). 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2013.00261 
Crone, E. A. (2009). Executive functions in adolescence: inferences from brain 
and behavior. Developmental Science, 12(6), 825–830. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2009.00918.x 
D’Esposito, M., Postle, B. R., Ballard, D., & Lease, J. (1999). Maintenance 
versus manipulation of information held in working memory: An event-related 
fMRI study. Brain and Cognition, 41(1), 66–86. 
https://doi.org/10.1006/brcg.1999.1096 







(2016). Interplay between heightened temporal variability of spontaneous 
brain activity and task-evoked hyperactivation in the blind. Frontiers in 
Human Neuroscience, 10(DEC2016), 632. 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2016.00632 
Dale, A. M., & Sereno, M. I. (1993). Improved Localizadon of Cortical Activity by 
Combining EEG and MEG with MRI Cortical Surface Reconstruction: A 
Linear Approach. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 5(2), 162–176. 
https://doi.org/10.1162/jocn.1993.5.2.162 
Dalili, M. N., Penton-Voak, I. S., Harmer, C. J., & Munafò, M. R. (2015). Meta-
analysis of emotion recognition deficits in major depressive disorder. 
Psychological Medicine, 45(6), 1135–1144. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0033291714002591 
Damaraju, E., Allen, E. A., Belger, A., Ford, J. M., McEwen, S., Mathalon, D. H., 
Mueller, B. A., Pearlson, G. D., Potkin, S. G., Preda, A., Turner, J. A., 
Vaidya, J. G., Van Erp, T. G., & Calhoun, V. D. (2014). Dynamic functional 
connectivity analysis reveals transient states of dysconnectivity in 
schizophrenia. NeuroImage: Clinical, 5, 298–308. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.nicl.2014.07.003 
Damasio, A. R. (2005). Descartes’ error : emotion, reason, and the human brain. 
Damasio, A. R., Grabowski, T. J., Bechara, A., Damasio, H., Ponto, L. L. B., 
Parvizi, J., & Hichwa, R. D. (2000). Subcortical and cortical brain activity 
during the feeling of self-generated emotions. Nature Neuroscience, 3(10), 
1049–1056. https://doi.org/10.1038/79871 
Dan, R., Canetti, L., Keadan, T., Segman, R., Weinstock, M., Bonne, O., 
Reuveni, I., & Goelman, G. (2019). Sex differences during emotion 
processing are dependent on the menstrual cycle phase. 
Psychoneuroendocrinology, 100, 85–95. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psyneuen.2018.09.032 
Davidson, R. J. (1998). Affective Style and Affective Disorders: Perspectives 
from Affective Neuroscience. Cognition and Emotion, 12(3), 307–330. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/026999398379628 
Davidson, R. J., Putnam, K. M., & Larson, C. L. (2000). Dysfunction in the neural 
circuitry of emotion regulation - A possible prelude to violence. Science, 
289(5479), 591–594. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.289.5479.591 
Davies, M., Stankov, L., & Roberts, R. D. (1998). Emotional intelligence: in 
search of an elusive construct. In Journal of personality and social 
psychology (Vol. 75, Issue 4, pp. 989–1015). American Psychological 
Association. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.75.4.989 
Davis. (1983). Measuring individual differences in empathy: Evidence for a 
multidimensional approach. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
44(1), 113–126. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.44.1.113 
Davis, M. H. (1980). A multidimensional approach to individual differences in 








Day, A. L., & Carroll, S. A. (2004). Using an ability-based measure of emotional 
intelligence to predict individual performance, group performance, and group 
citizenship behaviours. Personality and Individual Differences, 36(6), 1443–
1458. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0191-8869(03)00240-X 
De Waal, F. B. M., & Preston, S. D. (2017). Mammalian empathy: Behavioural 
manifestations and neural basis. In Nature Reviews Neuroscience (Vol. 18, 
Issue 8, pp. 498–509). Nature Publishing Group. 
https://doi.org/10.1038/nrn.2017.72 
Decety, J., Chen, C., Harenski, C., & Kiehl, K. A. (2013). An fMRI study of 
affective perspective taking in individuals with psychopathy: Imagining 
another in pain does not evoke empathy. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 
7(SEP), 489. https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2013.00489 
Decety, J., Chen, C., Harenski, C. L., & Kiehl, K. A. (2015). Socioemotional 
processing of morally-laden behavior and their consequences on others in 
forensic psychopaths. Human Brain Mapping, 36(6), 2015–2026. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/hbm.22752 
Decety, J., & Jackson, P. L. (2004). The functional architecture of human 
empathy. Behavioral and Cognitive Neuroscience Reviews, 3(2), 71–100. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1534582304267187 
Decety, J., & Lamm, C. (2006). Human Empathy Through the Lens of Social 
Neuroscience. The Scientific World JOURNAL, 6, 1146–1163. 
https://doi.org/10.1100/tsw.2006.221 
Decety, J., & Moriguchi, Y. (2007). The empathic brain and its dysfunction in 
psychiatric populations: Implications for intervention across different clinical 
conditions. In BioPsychoSocial Medicine (Vol. 1). 
https://doi.org/10.1186/1751-0759-1-22 
Decety, J., & Sommerville, J. A. (2003). Shared representations between self and 
other: A social cognitive neuroscience view. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 
7(12), 527–533. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2003.10.004 
Denkova, E., Nomi, J. S., Uddin, L. Q., & Jha, A. P. (2019). Dynamic brain 
network configurations during rest and an attention task with frequent 
occurrence of mind wandering. Human Brain Mapping, 40(15), 4564–4576. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/hbm.24721 
Depue, B. E., Orr, J. M., Smolker, H. R., Naaz, F., & Banich, M. T. (2016). The 
Organization of Right Prefrontal Networks Reveals Common Mechanisms of 
Inhibitory Regulation Across Cognitive, Emotional, and Motor Processes. 
Cerebral Cortex, 26(4), 1634–1646. https://doi.org/10.1093/cercor/bhu324 
Derksen, J., Kramer, I., & Katzko, M. (2002). Does a self-report measure for 
emotional intelligence assess something different than general intelligence? 
Personality and Individual Differences, 32(1), 37–48. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0191-8869(01)00004-6 
Desikan, R. S., Ségonne, F., Fischl, B., Quinn, B. T., Dickerson, B. C., Blacker, 
D., Buckner, R. L., Dale, A. M., Maguire, R. P., Hyman, B. T., Albert, M. S., 







human cerebral cortex on MRI scans into gyral based regions of interest. 
NeuroImage, 31(3), 968–980. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2006.01.021 
Dimaggio, G., Lysaker, P. H., Carcione, A., Nicolò, G., & Semerari, A. (2008). 
Know yourself and you shall know the other… to a certain extent: Multiple 
paths of influence of self-reflection on mindreading. Consciousness and 
Cognition, 17(3), 778–789. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2008.02.005 
Domes, G., Schulze, L., Böttger, M., Grossmann, A., Hauenstein, K., Wirtz, P. H., 
Heinrichs, M., & Herpertz, S. C. (2010). The neural correlates of sex 
differences in emotional reactivity and emotion regulation. Human Brain 
Mapping, 31(5), 758–769. https://doi.org/10.1002/hbm.20903 
Donders, F. C. (1969). On the speed of mental processes. Acta Psychologica, 
30(C), 412–431. https://doi.org/10.1016/0001-6918(69)90065-1 
Dorris, L., Espie, C. A. E., Knott, F., & Salt, J. (2004). Mind-reading difficulties in 
the siblings of people with Asperger’s syndrome: Evidence for a genetic 
influence in the abnormal development of a specific cognitive domain. 
Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry and Allied Disciplines, 45(2), 
412–418. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-7610.2004.00232.x 
Doucet. (2019). Consensual Atlas of REsting-state Networks (CAREN). 
Doucet, Naveau, M., Petit, L., Delcroix, N., Zago, L., Crivello, F., Jobard, G., 
Tzourio-Mazoyer, N., Mazoyer, B., Mellet, E., & Joliot, M. (2011). Brain 
activity at rest: A multiscale hierarchical functional organization. Journal of 
Neurophysiology, 105(6), 2753–2763. https://doi.org/10.1152/jn.00895.2010 
Doucet, Rasgon, N., Mcewen, B., Micali, N., & Frangou, S. (2018). 
BrainFunctionalAtlas.zip. 
Ducharme, S., Albaugh, M. D., Nguyen, T.-V., Hudziak, J. J., Mateos-Pérez, J. 
M., Labbe, A., Evans, A. C., Karama, S., & Group, B. D. C. (2015). 
Trajectories of cortical surface area and cortical volume maturation in normal 
brain development. Data in Brief, 5, 929–938. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dib.2015.10.044 
Dunn, B. D., Galton, H. C., Morgan, R., Evans, D., Oliver, C., Meyer, M., Cusack, 
R., Lawrence, A. D., & Dalgleish, T. (2010). Listening to your heart: How 
interoception shapes emotion experience and intuitive decision making. 
Psychological Science, 21(12), 1835–1844. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797610389191 
Dvash, J., & Shamay-Tsoory, S. G. (2014). Theory of Mind and Empathy as 
Multidimensional Constructs. Topics in Language Disorders, 34(4), 282–295. 
https://doi.org/10.1097/tld.0000000000000040 
Elton, A., & Gao, W. (2014). Divergent task-dependent functional connectivity of 
executive control and salience networks. Cortex, 51(1), 56–66. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cortex.2013.10.012 
Epskamp, S., Cramer, A. O. J., Waldorp, L. J., Schmittmann, V. D., & Borsboom, 
D. (2012). Qgraph: Network visualizations of relationships in psychometric 








Ernst, J., Northoff, G., Böker, H., Seifritz, E., & Grimm, S. (2013). Interoceptive 
awareness enhances neural activity during empathy. Human Brain Mapping, 
34(7), 1615–1624. https://doi.org/10.1002/hbm.22014 
Etkin, A., Büchel, C., & Gross, J. J. (2015). The neural bases of emotion 
regulation. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 16(11), 693–700. 
https://doi.org/10.1038/nrn4044 
Etkin, A., Egner, T., Peraza, D. M., Kandel, E. R., & Hirsch, J. (2006). Resolving 
Emotional Conflict: A Role for the Rostral Anterior Cingulate Cortex in 
Modulating Activity in the Amygdala. Neuron, 51(6), 871–882. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2006.07.029 
Etkin, A., & Wager, T. D. (2007). Functional Neuroimaging of Anxiety: A Meta-
Analysis of Emotional Processing in PTSD, Social Anxiety Disorder, and 
Specific Phobia. American Journal of Psychiatry, 164(10), 1476–1488. 
https://doi.org/10.1176/appi.ajp.2007.07030504 
Evans, A. C. (2006). The NIH MRI study of normal brain development. 
NeuroImage, 30(1), 184–202. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2005.09.068 
Fabes, R. A., & Martin, C. L. (1991). Gender and Age Stereotypes of 
Emotionality. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 17(5), 532–540. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167291175008 
Faisal, A. A., Selen, L. P. J., & Wolpert, D. M. (2008). Noise in the nervous 
system. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 9(4), 292–303. 
https://doi.org/10.1038/nrn2258 
Fan, J., Flombaum, J. I., McCandliss, B. D., Thomas, K. M., & Posner, M. I. 
(2003). Cognitive and brain consequences of conflict. NeuroImage, 18(1), 
42–57. https://doi.org/10.1006/nimg.2002.1319 
Fan, Y., Duncan, N. W., de Greck, M., & Northoff, G. (2011). Is there a core 
neural network in empathy? An fMRI based quantitative meta-analysis. In 
Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews (Vol. 35, Issue 3, pp. 903–911). 
Pergamon. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2010.10.009 
Faridi, N., Karama, S., Burgaleta, M., White, M. T., Evans, A. C., Fonov, V., 
Collins, D. L., & Waber, D. P. (2015). Neuroanatomical correlates of 
behavioral rating versus performance measures of working memory in 
typically developing children and adolescents. Neuropsychology, 29(1), 82–
91. https://doi.org/10.1037/neu0000079 
Feinstein, J. S., Stein, M. B., & Paulus, M. P. (2006). Anterior insula reactivity 
during certain decisions is associated with neuroticism. Social Cognitive and 
Affective Neuroscience, 1(2), 136–142. https://doi.org/10.1093/scan/nsl016 
Finn, E. S., Shen, X., Scheinost, D., Rosenberg, M. D., Huang, J., Chun, M. M., 
Papademetris, X., & Constable, R. T. (2015). Functional connectome 
fingerprinting: Identifying individuals using patterns of brain connectivity. 
Nature Neuroscience, 18(11), 1664–1671. https://doi.org/10.1038/nn.4135 







Feminism & Psychology, 3(3), 303–318. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0959353593033002 
Fischl, B., Liu, A., & Dale, A. M. (2001). Automated manifold surgery: 
constructing geometrically accurate and topologically correct models of the 
human cerebral cortex. IEEE Transactions on Medical Imaging, 20(1), 70–
80. https://doi.org/10.1109/42.906426 
Fischl, B, & Dale, A. M. (2000). Measuring the thickness of the human cerebral 
cortex from magnetic resonance images. Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 97(20), 11050–
11055. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.200033797 
Fischl, Bruce, Sereno, M. I., & Dale, A. M. (1999). Cortical Surface-Based 
Analysis: II: Inflation, Flattening, and a Surface-Based Coordinate System. 
NeuroImage, 9(2), 195–207. https://doi.org/10.1006/nimg.1998.0396 
Fischl, Bruce, van der Kouwe, A., Destrieux, C., Halgren, E., Ségonne, F., Salat, 
D. H., Busa, E., Seidman, L. J., Goldstein, J., Kennedy, D., Caviness, V., 
Makris, N., Rosen, B., & Dale, A. M. (2004). Automatically parcellating the 
human cerebral cortex. Cerebral Cortex (New York, N.Y. : 1991), 14(1), 11–
22. https://doi.org/10.1093/CERCOR/BHG087 
Fonagy, P., & Luyten, P. (2009). A developmental, mentalization-based approach 
to the understanding and treatment of borderline personality disorder. 
Development and Psychopathology, 21(4), 1355–1381. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0954579409990198 
Fox, R. (2005). Cataloging our information architecture. OCLC Systems and 
Services, 21(1), 23–29. https://doi.org/10.1108/10650750510578118 
Frank, D. W., Dewitt, M., Hudgens-Haney, M., Schaeffer, D. J., Ball, B. H., 
Schwarz, N. F., Hussein, A. A., Smart, L. M., & Sabatinelli, D. (2014). 
Emotion regulation: Quantitative meta-analysis of functional activation and 
deactivation. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 45, 202–211. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2014.06.010 
Fregni, F., Boggio, P. S., Nitsche, M., Bermpohl, F., Antal, A., Feredoes, E., 
Marcolin, M. A., Rigonatti, S. P., Silva, M. T. A., Paulus, W., & Pascual-
Leone, A. (2005). Anodal transcranial direct current stimulation of prefrontal 
cortex enhances working memory. Experimental Brain Research, 166(1), 
23–30. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00221-005-2334-6 
Fresco, D. M., Frankel, A. N., Mennin, D. S., Turk, C. L., & Heimberg, R. G. 
(2002). No Title. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 26(2), 179–188. 
https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1014517718949 
Frith, C. D., & Frith, U. (2006). The Neural Basis of Mentalizing. Neuron, 50(4), 
531–534. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2006.05.001 
Frith, U., Morton, J., & Leslie, A. M. (1991). The cognitive basis of a biological 
disorder: autism. Trends in Neurosciences, 14(10), 433–438. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/0166-2236(91)90041-R 
Gambin, M., & Sharp, C. (2016). The Differential Relations Between Empathy 







Child Psychiatry and Human Development, 47(6), 966–974. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10578-016-0625-8 
Gambin, M., & Sharp, C. (2018). Relations between empathy and anxiety 
dimensions in inpatient adolescents. Anxiety, Stress, & Coping, 31(4), 447–
458. https://doi.org/10.1080/10615806.2018.1475868 
Gannon, N., & Ranzijn, R. (2005). Does emotional intelligence predict unique 
variance in life satisfaction beyond IQ and personality? Personality and 
Individual Differences, 38(6), 1353–1364. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2004.09.001 
Garcia-Larrea, L. (2012). The posterior insular-opercular region and the search of 
a primary cortex for pain. Neurophysiologie Clinique, 42(5), 299–313. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neucli.2012.06.001 
Gard, M. G., & Kring, A. M. (2007). Sex differences in the time course of emotion. 
In Emotion (Vol. 7, Issue 2, pp. 429–437). American Psychological 
Association. https://doi.org/10.1037/1528-3542.7.2.429 
Garic, D., Broce, I., Graziano, P., Mattfeld, A., & Dick, A. S. (2018). Laterality of 
the frontal aslant tract ( FAT ) explains externalizing behaviors through its 
association with executive function. Developmental Science, 22(2). 
https://doi.org/10.1111/desc.12744 
Garnefski, N., Teerds, J., Kraaij, V., Legerstee, J., & van den Kommer, T. (2004). 
Cognitive emotion regulation strategies and depressive symptoms: 
Differences between males and females. Personality and Individual 
Differences, 36(2), 267–276. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0191-8869(03)00083-
7 
Garrett, D. D., Kovacevic, N., McIntosh, A. R., & Grady, C. L. (2010). Blood 
oxygen level-dependent signal variability is more than just noise. Journal of 
Neuroscience, 30(14), 4914–4921. 
https://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.5166-09.2010 
Garrett, D. D., Kovacevic, N., McIntosh, A. R., & Grady, C. L. (2013). The 
modulation of BOLD variability between cognitive states varies by age and 
processing speed. Cerebral Cortex, 23(3), 684–693. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/cercor/bhs055 
Garrett, D. D., Samanez-Larkin, G. R., MacDonald, S. W. S., Lindenberger, U., 
McIntosh, A. R., & Grady, C. L. (2013). Moment-to-moment brain signal 
variability: A next frontier in human brain mapping? Neuroscience and 
Biobehavioral Reviews, 37(4), 610–624. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2013.02.015 
Gaut, G., Li, X., Turner, B., Cunningham, W. A., Lu, Z. L., & Steyvers, M. (2018). 
Predicting task and subject differences with functional connectivity and bold 
variability. ArXiv, 9(6), 451–463. 
Gavazzi, G., Orsolini, S., Rossi, A., Bianchi, A., Bartolini, E., Nicolai, E., Soricelli, 
A., Aiello, M., Diciotti, S., Viggiano, M. P., & Mascalchi, M. (2017). 
Alexithymic trait is associated with right IFG and pre-SMA activation in non-








Gawronski, I., & Privette, G. (1997). Empathy and reactive depression. 
Psychological Reports, 80(3), 1043–1049. 
https://doi.org/10.2466/pr0.1997.80.3.1043 
Genova, H. M., DeLuca, J., Chiaravalloti, N., & Wylie, G. (2013). The relationship 
between executive functioning, processing speed, and white matter integrity 
in multiple sclerosis. Journal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology, 
35(6), 631–641. https://doi.org/10.1080/13803395.2013.806649 
Giedd, J. N. (2004). Structural magnetic resonance imaging of the adolescent 
brain. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1021(1), 77–85. 
https://doi.org/10.1196/annals.1308.009 
Giedd, J. N., Blumenthal, J., Jeffries, N. O., Castellanos, F. X., Liu, H., Zijdenbos, 
A., Paus, T., Evans, A. C., & Rapoport, J. L. (1999). Brain development 
during childhood and adolescence: a longitudinal MRI study. Nature 
Neuroscience, 2(10), 861–863. https://doi.org/10.1038/13158 
Gillies, G. E., & McArthur, S. (2010). Estrogen actions in the brain and the basis 
for differential action in men and women: a case for sex-specific medicines. 
Pharmacological Reviews, 62(2), 155–198. 
https://doi.org/10.1124/pr.109.002071 
Giombini, L. (2015). Handbook of emotion regulation. In Advances in Eating 
Disorders (Vol. 3, Issue 1). https://doi.org/10.1080/21662630.2014.953321 
Giorgio, A., Watkins, K. E., Chadwick, M., James, S., Winmill, L., Douaud, G., De 
Stefano, N., Matthews, P. M., Smith, S. M., Johansen-Berg, H., & James, A. 
C. (2010). Longitudinal changes in grey and white matter during 
adolescence. NeuroImage, 49(1), 94–103. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2009.08.003 
Goleman, D. (1995). Emotional Intelligence. Random House. 
Gonzalez-Castillo, J., Hoy, C. W., Handwerker, D. A., Robinson, M. E., 
Buchanan, L. C., Saad, Z. S., & Bandettini, P. A. (2015). Tracking ongoing 
cognition in individuals using brief, whole-brain functional connectivity 
patterns. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United 
States of America, 112(28), 8762–8767. 
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1501242112 
Good, T. J., Villafuerte, J., Ryan, J. D., Grady, C. L., & Barense, M. D. (2020). 
Resting state bold variability of the posterior medial temporal lobe correlates 
with cognitive performance in older adults with and without risk for cognitive 
decline. ENeuro, 7(3), ENEURO.0290-19.2020. 
https://doi.org/10.1523/ENEURO.0290-19.2020 
Gordon, E. M., Laumann, T. O., Adeyemo, B., Huckins, J. F., Kelley, W. M., & 
Petersen, S. E. (2016). Generation and Evaluation of a Cortical Area 
Parcellation from Resting-State Correlations. Cerebral Cortex, 26(1), 288–
303. https://doi.org/10.1093/cercor/bhu239 
Gray, M. A., Harrison, N. A., Wiens, S., & Critchley, H. D. (2007). Modulation of 







2(6), e546. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0000546 
Green, M. J., Cahill, C. M., & Malhi, G. S. (2007). The cognitive and 
neurophysiological basis of emotion dysregulation in bipolar disorder. 
Journal of Affective Disorders, 103(1–3), 29–42. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jad.2007.01.024 
Greenberg, D. L., Rice, H. J., Cooper, J. J., Cabeza, R., Rubin, D. C., & LaBar, 
K. S. (2005). Co-activation of the amygdala, hippocampus and inferior frontal 
gyrus during autobiographical memory retrieval. Neuropsychologia, 43(5), 
659–674. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2004.09.002 
Greicius, M. D., Krasnow, B., Reiss, A. L., & Menon, V. (2003). Functional 
connectivity in the resting brain: A network analysis of the default mode 
hypothesis. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United 
States of America, 100(1), 253–258. 
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0135058100 
Grewal, D., Brackett, M., & Salovey, P. (2006). Emotional intelligence and the 
self-regulation of affect. 
Gross, James J. (1998). The emerging field of emotion regulation: An integrative 
review. Review of General Psychology, 2(3), 271–299. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/1089-2680.2.3.271 
Gross, James J. (2002). Emotion regulation: Affective, cognitive, and social 
consequences. Psychophysiology. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0048577201393198 
Gross, James J. (2015). Emotion Regulation: Current Status and Future 
Prospects. Psychological Inquiry, 26(1), 1–26. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2014.940781 
Gross, James J., & John, O. P. (2003). Individual Differences in Two Emotion 
Regulation Processes: Implications for Affect, Relationships, and Well-
Being. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85(2), 348–362. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.85.2.348 
Gross, James J., & Muñoz, R. F. (1995). Emotion Regulation and Mental Health. 
Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice, 2(2), 151–164. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2850.1995.tb00036.x 
Grossman, M., & Wood, W. (1993). Sex Differences in Intensity of Emotional 
Experience: A Social Role Interpretation. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 65(5), 1010–1022. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.65.5.1010 
Gur, R. C., Gunning-Dixon, F., Bilker, W. B., & Gur, R. E. (2002). Sex differences 
in temporo-limbic and frontal brain volumes of healthy adults. Cerebral 
Cortex, 12(9), 998–1003. https://doi.org/10.1093/cercor/12.9.998 
Gurney, E. (1884). “What is an emotion?” In Mind: Vol. os-IX (Issue 35). 
https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/os-IX.35.421 
Hagelskamp, C., Brackett, M. A., Rivers, S. E., & Salovey, P. (2013). Improving 
Classroom Quality with The RULER Approach to Social and Emotional 
Learning: Proximal and Distal Outcomes. American Journal of Community 







Hampshire, A., Thompson, R., Duncan, J., & Owen, A. M. (2009). Selective 
tuning of the right inferior frontal gyrus during target detection. Cognitive, 
Affective and Behavioral Neuroscience, 9(1), 103–112. 
https://doi.org/10.3758/CABN.9.1.103 
Hampson, E., & Morley, E. E. (2013). Estradiol concentrations and working 
memory performance in women of reproductive age. 
Psychoneuroendocrinology, 38(12), 2897–2904. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psyneuen.2013.07.020 
Hampson, E., van Anders, S. M., & Mullin, L. I. (2006). A female advantage in the 
recognition of emotional facial expressions: test of an evolutionary 
hypothesis. Evolution and Human Behavior, 27(6), 401–416. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2006.05.002 
Hansen, S. (2011). Inhibitory control and empathy-related personality traits: Sex-
linked associations. Brain and Cognition, 76(3), 364–368. 
Harkness, K., Sabbagh, M., Jacobson, J., Chowdrey, N., & Chen, T. (2005). 
Enhanced accuracy of mental state decoding in dysphoric college students. 
Cognition & Emotion, 19(7), 999–1025. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/02699930541000110 
Harmon-Jones, E., Lueck, L., Fearn, M., & Harmon-Jones, C. (2006). The Effect 
of Personal Relevance and Approach-Related Action Expectation on 
Relative Left Frontal Cortical Activity. Psychological Science, 17(5), 434–
440. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01724.x 
Hatfield, E., Cacioppo, J. T., & Rapson, R. L. (1993). Emotional Contagion. 
Current Directions in Psychological Science, 2(3), 96–100. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8721.ep10770953 
Hayes, A. F. (2012). PROCESS: A versatile computational tool for observed 
variable moderation, mediation, and conditional process modeling. 
Manuscript Submitted for Publication, January, 1–39. 
http://www.afhayes.com/public/process2012.pdf 
Healey, M. L., & Grossman, M. (2018). Cognitive and affective perspective-
taking: Evidence for shared and dissociable anatomical substrates. In 
Frontiers in Neurology (Vol. 9, Issue JUN, p. 491). 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fneur.2018.00491 
Hecke, W. Van, Nagels, G., Leemans, A., Vandervliet, E., Sijbers, J., & Parizel, 
P. M. (2010). Correlation of cognitive dysfunction and diffusion tensor MRI 
measures in patients with mild and moderate multiple sclerosis. Journal of 
Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 31(6), 1492–1498. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/jmri.22198 
Hemmati, T., Mills, J. F., & Kroner, D. G. (2004). The validity of the Bar-On 
emotional intelligence quotient in an offender population. Personality and 
Individual Differences, 37(4), 695–706. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2003.10.003 
Herting, M. M., Gautam, P., Spielberg, J. M., Kan, E., Dahl, R. E., & Sowell, E. R. 







across adolescence: a longitudinal structural MRI study. Human Brain 
Mapping, 35(11), 5633–5645. https://doi.org/10.1002/hbm.22575 
Herting, M. M., Maxwell, E. C., Irvine, C., & Nagel, B. J. (2012). The impact of 
sex, puberty, and hormones on white matter microstructure in adolescents. 
Cerebral Cortex (New York, N.Y. : 1991), 22(9), 1979–1992. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/cercor/bhr246 
Hess, U., Senecal, S., Kirouac, G., Herrera, P., Philippot, P., & Kleck, R. E. 
(2000). Emotional expressivity in men and women: Stereotypes and self-
perceptions. Cognition and Emotion, 14(5), 609–642. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/02699930050117648 
Hidalgo-Lopez, E., & Pletzer, B. (2017). Interactive Effects of Dopamine Baseline 
Levels and Cycle Phase on Executive Functions: The Role of Progesterone. 
Frontiers in Neuroscience, 11, 403. https://doi.org/10.3389/fnins.2017.00403 
Higo, T., Mars, R. B., Boorman, E. D., Buch, E. R., & Rushworth, M. F. S. (2011). 
Distributed and causal influence of frontal operculum in task control. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of 
America, 108(10), 4230–4235. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1013361108 
Himberg, J., Hyvärinen, A., & Esposito, F. (2004). Validating the independent 
components of neuroimaging time series via clustering and visualization. 
NeuroImage, 22(3), 1214–1222. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2004.03.027 
Holmes, M. M., Wide, J. K., & Galea, L. A. M. (2002). Low levels of estradiol 
facilitate, whereas high levels of estradiol impair, working memory 
performance on the radial arm maze. Behavioral Neuroscience, 116(5), 
928–934. https://doi.org/10.1037/0735-7044.116.5.928 
Hooker, C. I., Verosky, S. C., Germine, L. T., Knight, R. T., & D’Esposito, M. 
(2008). Mentalizing about emotion and its relationship to empathy. Social 
Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 3(3), 204–217. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/scan/nsn019 
Horley, K., Williams, L. M., Gonsalvez, C., & Gordon, E. (2004). Face to face: 
visual scanpath evidence for abnormal processing of facial expressions in 
social phobia. Psychiatry Research, 127(1–2), 43–53. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psychres.2004.02.016 
Hornak, J., Bramham, J., Rolls, E. T., Morris, R. G., O’Doherty, J., Bullock, P. R., 
& Polkey, C. E. (2003). Changes in emotion after circumscribed surgical 
lesions of the orbitofrontal and cingulate cortices. Brain, 126(7), 1691–1712. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/brain/awg168 
Howard, L. R., Kumaran, D., Ólafsdóttir, H. F., & Spiers, H. J. (2013). 
Dissociation between Dorsal and Ventral Posterior Parietal Cortical 
Responses to Incidental Changes in Natural Scenes. PLoS ONE, 8(7), 
e67988–e67988. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0067988 
Hutchison, R. M., Womelsdorf, T., Allen, E. A., Bandettini, P. A., Calhoun, V. D., 
Corbetta, M., Della Penna, S., Duyn, J. H., Glover, G. H., Gonzalez-Castillo, 







Pasquale, F., Sporns, O., Walter, M., & Chang, C. (2013). Dynamic 
functional connectivity: Promise, issues, and interpretations. NeuroImage, 
80, 360–378. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2013.05.079 
Hyde, D. C., Aparicio Betancourt, M., & Simon, C. E. (2015). Human temporal-
parietal junction spontaneously tracks others’ beliefs: A functional near-
infrared spectroscopy study. Human Brain Mapping, 36(12), 4831–4846. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/hbm.22953 
Iacoboni, M. (2005). Understanding others: Imitation, language, empathy. 
Perspectives on Imitation: From Cognitive Neuroscience to Social Science, 
1, 77–99. 
Ickes, W., & Hodges, S. D. (2013). Empathic Accuracy in Close Relationships. In 
Oxford Handbooks Online. Oxford University Press. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195398694.013.0016 
Iriki, A. (2006). The neural origins and implications of imitation, mirror neurons 
and tool use. Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 16(6), 660–667. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.conb.2006.10.008 
Isen, A. M., Rosenzweig, A. S., & Young, M. J. (1991). The influence of positive 
affect on clinical problem solving. Medical Decision Making, 11(3), 221–227. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0272989X9101100313 
Jabbi, M., & Keysers, C. (2008). Inferior Frontal Gyrus Activity Triggers Anterior 
Insula Response to Emotional Facial Expressions. In Emotion (Vol. 8, Issue 
6, pp. 775–780). American Psychological Association. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/a0014194 
Jabbi, M., Swart, M., & Keysers, C. (2007). Empathy for positive and negative 
emotions in the gustatory cortex. NeuroImage, 34(4), 1744–1753. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2006.10.032 
Jackson, P. L., Meltzoff, A. N., & Decety, J. (2005). How do we perceive the pain 
of others? A window into the neural processes involved in empathy. 
NeuroImage, 24(3), 771–779. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2004.09.006 
Johnson, M. (2001). The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the 
Making of Consciousness (review). In The Journal of Speculative Philosophy 
(Vol. 15, Issue 4). Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. 
https://doi.org/10.1353/jsp.2001.0038 
Joireman, J. A., III, L. P., & Hammersla, J. (2002). Empathy and the Self-
Absorption Paradox: Support for the Distinction Between Self-Rumination 
and Self-Reflection. Self and Identity, 1(1), 53–65. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/152988602317232803 
Joormann, J., & Stanton, C. H. (2016). Examining emotion regulation in 
depression: A review and future directions. In Behaviour Research and 
Therapy (Vol. 86, pp. 35–49). Elsevier Ltd. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.brat.2016.07.007 
Joseph, R. M., & Tager-Flusberg, H. (2004). The relationship of theory of mind 







autism. Development and Psychopathology, 16(1), 137–155. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S095457940404444X 
Kafetsios, K. (2004). Attachment and emotional intelligence abilities across the 
life course. Personality and Individual Differences, 37(1), 129–145. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2003.08.006 
Kalisch, R. (2009). The functional neuroanatomy of reappraisal: Time matters. 
Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 33(8), 1215–1226. 
https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2009.06.003 
Karbach, J., & Unger, K. (2014). Executive control training from middle childhood 
to adolescence. Frontiers in Psychology, 5, 390. 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00390 
Kastner, S., De Weerd, P., Desimone, R., & Ungerleider, L. G. (1998). 
Mechanisms of directed attention in the human extrastriate cortex as 
revealed by functional MRI. Science, 282(5386), 108–111. 
https://doi.org/10.1126/science.282.5386.108 
Kaźmierczak, M., Pastwa-Wojciechowska, B., & Błazek, M. (2013). A 
multidimensional model of empathy, and the occurrence of personality 
disorders and stress in social settings. Acta Neuropsychologica, 11(2), 113–
125. https://doi.org/10.5604/17307503.1073470 
Keidar, D. (2015). Emotional Intelligence and Education. Studia Edukacyjne, 37, 
327–348. https://doi.org/10.14746/se.2015.37.19 
Kessler, R. C., McGonagle, K. A., Swartz, M., Blazer, D. G., & Nelson, C. B. 
(1993). Sex and depression in the National Comorbidity Survey I: Lifetime 
prevalence, chronicity and recurrence. Journal of Affective Disorders, 29(2–
3), 85–96. https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-0327(93)90026-G 
Keysers, C., Wicker, B., Gazzola, V., Anton, J. L., Fogassi, L., & Gallese, V. 
(2004). A touching sight: SII/PV activation during the observation and 
experience of touch. Neuron, 42(2), 335–346. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0896-
6273(04)00156-4 
Khalsa, S. S., Adolphs, R., Cameron, O. G., Critchley, H. D., Davenport, P. W., 
Feinstein, J. S., Feusner, J. D., Garfinkel, S. N., Lane, R. D., Mehling, W. E., 
Meuret, A. E., Nemeroff, C. B., Oppenheimer, S., Petzschner, F. H., 
Pollatos, O., Rhudy, J. L., Schramm, L. P., Simmons, W. K., Stein, M. B., … 
Zucker, N. (2018). Interoception and Mental Health: A Roadmap. Biological 
Psychiatry: Cognitive Neuroscience and Neuroimaging, 3(6), 501–513. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bpsc.2017.12.004 
Kharitonova, M., Martin, R. E., Gabrieli, J. D. E., & Sheridan, M. A. (2013). 
Cortical gray-matter thinning is associated with age-related improvements on 
executive function tasks. Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience, 6, 61–71. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dcn.2013.07.002 
Killgore, W. D. S., & Yurgelun-Todd, D. A. (2007). The right-hemisphere and 
valence hypotheses: Could they both be right (and sometimes left)? Social 








Kim, J. A., Szatmari, P., Bryson, S. E., Streiner, D. L., & Wilson, F. J. (2000). The 
prevalence of anxiety and mood problems among children with autism and 
Asperger syndrome. Autism, 4(2), 117–132. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1362361300004002002 
Kleckner, I. R., Zhang, J., Touroutoglou, A., Chanes, L., Xia, C., Simmons, W. K., 
Quigley, K. S., Dickerson, B. C., & Feldman Barrett, L. (2017). Evidence for 
a large-scale brain system supporting allostasis and interoception in 
humans. Nature Human Behaviour, 1(5), 69. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-
017-0069 
Kohn, N., Eickhoff, S. B., Scheller, M., Laird, A. R., Fox, P. T., & Habel, U. 
(2014). Neural network of cognitive emotion regulation - An ALE meta-
analysis and MACM analysis. NeuroImage, 87, 345–355. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2013.11.001 
Kong, F., Zhen, Z., Li, J., Huang, L., Wang, X., Song, Y., & Liu, J. (2014). Sex-
related neuroanatomical basis of emotion regulation ability. PLoS ONE, 9(5), 
e97071–e97071. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0097071 
Konishi, S., Nakajima, K., Uchida, I., Kikyo, H., Kameyama, M., & Miyashita, Y. 
(1999). Common inhibitory mechanism in human inferior prefrontal cortex 
revealed by event-related functional MRI. Brain, 122(5), 981–991. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/brain/122.5.981 
Konstantareas, M. M., & Stewart, K. (2006). Affect regulation and temperament 
in children with Autism Spectrum Disorder. Journal of Autism and 
Developmental Disorders, 36(2), 143–154. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-
005-0051-4 
Kovács, Á. M., Kühn, S., Gergely, G., Csibra, G., & Brass, M. (2014). Are all 
beliefs equal? Implicit belief attributions recruiting core brain regions of 
theory of mind. PLoS ONE, 9(9). 
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0106558 
Kraus, M. F., Susmaras, T., Caughlin, B. P., Walker, C. J., Sweeney, J. A., & 
Little, D. M. (2007). White matter integrity and cognition in chronic traumatic 
brain injury: a diffusion tensor imaging study. Brain, 130(10), 2508–2519. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/brain/awm216 
Kring, A. M., & Gordon, A. H. (1998). Sex Differences in Emotion: Expression, 
Experience, and Physiology. In Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 
(Vol. 74, Issue 3, pp. 686–703). American Psychological Association. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.74.3.686 
Kringelbach, M. L. (2005). The human orbitofrontal cortex: Linking reward to 
hedonic experience. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 6(9), 691–702. 
https://doi.org/10.1038/nrn1747 
Kross, E., Davidson, M., Weber, J., & Ochsner, K. (2009). Coping with Emotions 
Past: The Neural Bases of Regulating Affect Associated with Negative 
Autobiographical Memories. Biological Psychiatry, 65(5), 361–366. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biopsych.2008.10.019 







Interoceptive awareness changes the posterior insula functional connectivity 
profile. Brain Structure and Function, 221(3), 1555–1571. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00429-015-0989-8 
Kuhn, C., Johnson, M., Thomae, A., Luo, B., Simon, S. A., Zhou, G., & Walker, 
Q. D. (2010). The emergence of gonadal hormone influences on 
dopaminergic function during puberty. Hormones and Behavior, 58(1), 122–
137. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.yhbeh.2009.10.015 
Kumral, D., Şansal, F., Cesnaite, E., Mahjoory, K., Al, E., Gaebler, M., Nikulin, V. 
V., & Villringer, A. (2020). BOLD and EEG signal variability at rest differently 
relate to aging in the human brain. NeuroImage, 207, 116373. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2019.116373 
Laird, J. D., Alibozak, T., Davainis, D., Deignan, K., Fontanella, K., Hong, J., 
Levy, B., & Pacheco, C. (1994). Individual differences in the effects of 
spontaneous mimicry on emotional contagion. Motivation and Emotion, 
18(3), 231–247. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02254830 
Lamm, C., Batson, C. D., & Decety, J. (2007). The neural substrate of human 
empathy: Effects of perspective-taking and cognitive appraisal. Journal of 
Cognitive Neuroscience, 19(1), 42–58. 
https://doi.org/10.1162/jocn.2007.19.1.42 
Lane, R. D. (2008). Neural substrates of implicit and explicit emotional 
processes: A unifying framework for psychosomatic medicine. 
Psychosomatic Medicine, 70(2), 214–231. 
https://doi.org/10.1097/PSY.0b013e3181647e44 
Lang, P., Bradley, M., & Cuthbert, B. (2005). International Affective Picture 
System (IAPS): Digitized Photographs, Instruction Manual and Affective 
Ratings. Technical Report A-6. In 2005. 
Lau, H., Rogers, R. D., & Passingham, R. E. (2006). Dissociating response 
selection and conflict in the medial frontal surface. NeuroImage, 29(2), 446–
451. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2005.07.050 
Lawrence, E. J., Shaw, P., Giampietro, V. P., Surguladze, S., Brammer, M. J., & 
David, A. S. (2006). The role of “shared representations” in social perception 
and empathy: An fMRI study. NeuroImage, 29(4), 1173–1184. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2005.09.001 
Lazarus, R. S., & Alfert, E. (1964). Short-circuiting of threat by experimentally 
altering cognitive appraisal. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 
69(2), 195–205. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0044635 
Leach, L. S., Christensen, H., Mackinnon, A. J., Windsor, T. D., & Butterworth, P. 
(2008). Gender differences in depression and anxiety across the adult 
lifespan: The role of psychosocial mediators. Social Psychiatry and 
Psychiatric Epidemiology, 43(12), 983–998. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00127-
008-0388-z 
Lee, E. (1920). Intelligence and its use. Harper’s Magazine, 227–235. 
Lee, K. H., & Siegle, G. J. (2012). Common and distinct brain networks 







Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 7(5), 521–534. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/scan/nsp001 
Lee, T. W., Dolan, R. J., & Critchley, H. D. (2008). Controlling emotional 
expression: Behavioral and neural correlates of nonimitative emotional 
responses. Cerebral Cortex, 18(1), 104–113. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/cercor/bhm035 
Leiberg, S., & Anders, S. (2006). Chapter 23 The multiple facets of empathy: a 
survey of theory and evidence. In S. Anders, G. Ende, M. Junghofer, J. 
Kissler, & D. B. T.-P. in B. R. Wildgruber (Eds.), Progress in Brain Research 
(Vol. 156, pp. 419–440). Elsevier. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0079-
6123(06)56023-6 
Leigh, R., Oishi, K., Hsu, J., Lindquist, M., Gottesman, R. F., Jarso, S., 
Crainiceanu, C., Mori, S., & Hillis, A. E. (2013). Acute lesions that impair 
affective empathy. Brain, 136(8), 2539–2549. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/brain/awt177 
Lenroot, R. K., & Giedd, J. N. (2010). Sex differences in the adolescent brain. 
Brain and Cognition, 72(1), 46–55. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bandc.2009.10.008 
Lewis, J. G., McGill, H., Patton, V. M., & Elder, P. A. (2002). Caution on the use 
of saliva measurements to monitor absorption of progesterone from 
transdermal creams in postmenopausal women. Maturitas, 41(1), 1–6. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/s0378-5122(01)00250-x 
Li, H., Yuan, J., & Lin, C. (2008). The neural mechanism underlying the female 
advantage in identifying negative emotions: An event-related potential study. 
NeuroImage, 40(4), 1921–1929. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2008.01.033 
Li, X., Lu, Z. L., D’Argembeau, A., Ng, M., & Bechara, A. (2010). The Iowa 
Gambling Task in fMRI images. Human Brain Mapping, 31(3), 410–423. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/hbm.20875 
Liberzon, I., Duval, E., & Javanbakht, A. (2015). Neural circuits in anxiety and 
stress disorders: a&nbsp;focused review. Therapeutics and Clinical Risk 
Management, 115. https://doi.org/10.2147/tcrm.s48528 
Lieberman, M. D., & Eisenberger, N. I. (2009). Neuroscience: Pains and 
pleasures of social life. Science, 323(5916), 890–891. 
https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1170008 
Linden, D. E. J. (2007). The working memory networks of the human brain. 
Neuroscientist, 13(3), 257–267. https://doi.org/10.1177/1073858406298480 
Lindström, B. R., & Bohlin, G. (2011). Emotion processing facilitates working 
memory performance. Cognition and Emotion, 25(7), 1196–1204. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/02699931.2010.527703 
Linhartová, P., Látalová, A., Kóša, B., Kašpárek, T., Schmahl, C., & Paret, C. 
(2019). fMRI neurofeedback in emotion regulation: A literature review. 
NeuroImage, 193, 75–92. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2019.03.011 







abilities and the quality of social interaction. In R. E. Petty (Ed.), Emotion 
(Vol. 5, Issue 1, pp. 113–118). American Psychological Association. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/1528-3542.5.1.113 
Losh, M., Adolphs, R., Poe, M. D., Couture, S., Penn, D., Baranek, G. T., & 
Piven, J. (2009). Neuropsychological profile of autism and the broad autism 
phenotype. Archives of General Psychiatry, 66(5), 518–526. 
https://doi.org/10.1001/archgenpsychiatry.2009.34 
Luebbe, A. M., Bell, D. J., Allwood, M. A., Swenson, L. P., & Early, M. C. (2010). 
Social Information Processing in Children: Specific Relations to Anxiety, 
Depression, and Affect. Journal of Clinical Child & Adolescent Psychology, 
39(3), 386–399. https://doi.org/10.1080/15374411003691685 
Lungu, O., Potvin, S., Tikàsz, A., & Mendrek, A. (2015). Sex differences in 
effective fronto-limbic connectivity during negative emotion processing. 
Psychoneuroendocrinology, 62, 180–188. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psyneuen.2015.08.012 
Lutkenhoff, E. S., Rosenberg, M., Chiang, J., Zhang, K., Pickard, J. D., Owen, A. 
M., & Monti, M. M. (2014). Optimized Brain Extraction for Pathological Brains 
(optiBET). PLoS ONE, 9(12), e115551. 
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0115551 
MacDonald, S. W. S., Nyberg, L., & Bäckman, L. (2006). Intra-individual 
variability in behavior: links to brain structure, neurotransmission and 
neuronal activity. Trends in Neurosciences, 29(8), 474–480. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tins.2006.06.011 
MacKinnon, D. P., Krull, J. L., & Lockwood, C. M. (2000). Equivalence of the 
mediation, confounding and suppression effect. Prevention Science, 1(4), 
173–181. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1026595011371 
Mahler K. (2015). Interoception: The Eighth Sensory System: Practical Solutions 
for Improving Self-Regulation, Self-Awareness and Social Understanding. 
AAPC Publishing. 
Mahone, E. M., Martin, R., Kates, W. R., Hay, T., & Horská, A. (2009). 
Neuroimaging correlates of parent ratings of working memory in typically 
developing children. Journal of the International Neuropsychological 
Society : JINS, 15(1), 31–41. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1355617708090164 
Mak, A. K. Y., Hu, Z. guo, Zhang, J. X. X., Xiao, Z., & Lee, T. M. C. (2009). Sex-
related differences in neural activity during emotion regulation. 
Neuropsychologia, 47(13), 2900–2908. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2009.06.017 
Mandell, D., Siegle, G. J., Shutt, L., Feldmiller, J., & Thase, M. E. (2014). Neural 
substrates of trait ruminations in depression. Journal of Abnormal 
Psychology, 123(1), 35–48. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0035834 
Mar, R. A. (2011). The neural bases of social cognition and story comprehension. 
Annual Review of Psychology, 62, 103–134. 
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-120709-145406 







Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 1(1), 146–167. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-9004.2007.00005.x 
Mayer, J. D. (2004). What is Emotional Intelligence? What is Emotional 
Intelligence? What Is Emotional Intelligence? Contents. Emotional 
Development and Emotional Intelligence: Implications for Educators. 
https://scholars.unh.edu/personality_lab 
Mayer, J. D., Caruso, D. R., & Salovey, P. (1999). Emotional intelligence meets 
traditional standards for an intelligence. Intelligence, 27(4), 267–298. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0160-2896(99)00016-1 
Mayer, J. D., Caruso, D. R., & Salovey, P. (2016). The Ability Model of Emotional 
Intelligence: Principles and Updates. Emotion Review, 8(4), 290–300. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1754073916639667 
Mayer, J. D., Salovey, P., Caruso, D. R., & Sitarenios, G. (2003). Measuring 
Emotional Intelligence with the MSCEIT V2.0. In Emotion (Vol. 3, Issue 1, 
pp. 97–105). American Psychological Association. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/1528-3542.3.1.97 
McCarthy, M. M. (2008). Estradiol and the developing brain. Physiological 
Reviews, 88(1), 91–124. https://doi.org/10.1152/physrev.00010.2007 
McEvoy, P. M., Watson, H., Watkins, E. R., & Nathan, P. (2013). The relationship 
between worry, rumination, and comorbidity: Evidence for repetitive negative 
thinking as a transdiagnostic construct. Journal of Affective Disorders, 
151(1), 313–320. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jad.2013.06.014 
McIntosh, A. R., Kovacevic, N., & Itier, R. J. (2008). Increased brain signal 
variability accompanies lower behavioral variability in development. PLoS 
Computational Biology, 4(7), e1000106–e1000106. 
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000106 
McLaughlin, K. A., & Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (2011). Rumination as a 
transdiagnostic factor in depression and anxiety. Behaviour Research and 
Therapy, 49(3), 186–193. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.brat.2010.12.006 
McLean, C. P., Asnaani, A., Litz, B. T., & Hofmann, S. G. (2011). Gender 
differences in anxiety disorders: Prevalence, course of illness, comorbidity 
and burden of illness. Journal of Psychiatric Research, 45(8), 1027–1035. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpsychires.2011.03.006 
McRae, K., Ochsner, K. N., Mauss, I. B., Gabrieli, J. J. D., & Gross, J. J. (2008). 
Gender differences in emotion regulation: An fMRI study of cognitive 
reappraisal. Group Processes and Intergroup Relations, 11(2), 143–162. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430207088035 
Mehling, W. E., Price, C., Daubenmier, J. J., Acree, M., Bartmess, E., & Stewart, 
A. (2012). The Multidimensional Assessment of Interoceptive Awareness 
(MAIA). PLoS ONE, 7(11), e48230. 
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0048230 
Menon, & Uddin. (2010). Saliency, switching, attention and control: a network 








Menon, V. (2015). Salience Network. Brain Mapping: An Encyclopedic 
Reference, 2, 597–611. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-397025-1.00052-
X 
Mesulam, M. ‐Marchsel. (1981). A cortical network for directed attention and 
unilateral neglect. Annals of Neurology, 10(4), 309–325. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/ana.410100402 
Meyer, T. J., Miller, M. L., Metzger, R. L., & Borkovec, T. D. (1990). Development 
and validation of the penn state worry questionnaire. Behaviour Research 
and Therapy, 28(6), 487–495. https://doi.org/10.1016/0005-7967(90)90135-6 
Mišíc, B., Vakorin, V. A., Paus, T., & McIntosh, A. R. (2011). Functional 
embedding predicts the variability of neural activity. Frontiers in Systems 
Neuroscience, 5(NOVEMBER 2011), 90. 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fnsys.2011.00090 
Mueller, S. C. (2011). The influence of emotion on cognitive control: Relevance 
for development and adolescent psychopathology. In Frontiers in 
Psychology (Vol. 2, Issue NOV, p. 327). 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00327 
Mullins-Nelson, J. L., Salekin, R. T., & Leistico, A. M. R. (2006). Psychopathy, 
empathy, and perspective -taking ability in a community sample: Implications 
for the successful psychopathy concept. International Journal of Forensic 
Mental Health, 5(2), 133–149. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14999013.2006.10471238 
Nagy, Z., Westerberg, H., & Klingberg, T. (2004). Maturation of White Matter is 
Associated with the Development of Cognitive Functions during Childhood. 
Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 16(7), 1227–1233. 
https://doi.org/10.1162/0898929041920441 
Naughtin, C. K., Horne, K., Schneider, D., Venini, D., York, A., & Dux, P. E. 
(2017). Do implicit and explicit belief processing share neural substrates? 
Human Brain Mapping, 38(9), 4760–4772. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/hbm.23700 
Nejad, A. B., Fossati, P., & Lemogne, C. (2013). Self-Referential Processing, 
Rumination, and Cortical Midline Structures in Major Depression. Frontiers in 
Human Neuroscience, 7. https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2013.00666 
Nelson, S. M., Dosenbach, N. U. F., Cohen, A. L., Wheeler, M. E., Schlaggar, B. 
L., & Petersen, S. E. (2010). Role of the anterior insula in task-level control 
and focal attention. Brain Structure & Function, 214(5–6), 669–680. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00429-010-0260-2 
Nguyen, T.-V., McCracken, J., Ducharme, S., Botteron, K. N., Mahabir, M., 
Johnson, W., Israel, M., Evans, A. C., Karama, S., & Group, B. D. C. (2013). 
Testosterone-related cortical maturation across childhood and adolescence. 
Cerebral Cortex (New York, N.Y. : 1991), 23(6), 1424–1432. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/cercor/bhs125 
Nichols, T. E., & Holmes, A. P. (2001). Nonparametric permutation tests for 







15(1), 1–25. https://doi.org/10.1002/hbm.1058 
Nieto-Castanon, A. (2014). NITRC: CONN : functional connectivity toolbox: File 
Release Notes and Changelog. 
https://www.nitrc.org/frs/shownotes.php?release_id=2733 
Nieto-Castanon, A. (2015). NITRC: CONN : functional connectivity toolbox: RE: 
Conn-Preprocessing-Band-Pass. 
https://www.nitrc.org/forum/message.php?msg_id=12691 
Nieto-Castanon, A. (2020). NITRC: CONN : ICA variability calculation method. 
https://www.nitrc.org/forum/forum.php?set=custom&forum_id=1144&style=n
ested&max_rows=50 
Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (1998). The Other End of the Continuum: The Costs of 
Rumination. Psychological Inquiry, 9(3), 216–219. 
https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327965pli0903_5 
Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (2001). Gender differences in depression. In Current 
Directions in Psychological Science (Vol. 10, Issue 5, pp. 173–176). 
Blackwell Publishing Inc. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8721.00142 
Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (2012). Emotion regulation and psychopathology: The role 
of gender. Annual Review of Clinical Psychology, 8(1), 161–187. 
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-clinpsy-032511-143109 
Nomi, J. S., Bolt, T. S., Chiemeka Ezie, C. E., Uddin, L. Q., & Heller, A. S. 
(2017). Moment-to-moment BOLD signal variability reflects regional changes 
in neural flexibility across the lifespan. Journal of Neuroscience, 37(22), 
5539–5548. https://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.3408-16.2017 
Northoff, G., Heinzel, A., de Greck, M., Bermpohl, F., Dobrowolny, H., & 
Panksepp, J. (2006). Self-referential processing in our brain-A meta-analysis 
of imaging studies on the self. NeuroImage, 31(1), 440–457. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2005.12.002 
O’Driscoll, C., Laing, J., & Mason, O. (2014). Cognitive emotion regulation 
strategies, alexithymia and dissociation in schizophrenia, a review and meta-
analysis. Clinical Psychology Review, 34(6), 482–495. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpr.2014.07.002 
Ochsner, K. N., Bunge, S. A., Gross, J. J., & Gabrieli, J. D. E. (2002). Rethinking 
feelings: An fMRI study of the cognitive regulation of emotion. Journal of 
Cognitive Neuroscience, 14(8), 1215–1229. 
https://doi.org/10.1162/089892902760807212 
Ochsner, K. N., & Gross, J. J. (2005). The cognitive control of emotion. Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences, 9(5), 242–249. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2005.03.010 
Ochsner, K. N., Silvers, J. A., & Buhle, J. T. (2012). Functional imaging studies of 
emotion regulation: a synthetic review and evolving model of the cognitive 
control of emotion. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1251(1), 
E1–E24. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-6632.2012.06751.x 
Ohira, H., Nomura, M., Ichikawa, N., Isowa, T., Iidaka, T., Sato, A., Fukuyama, 
S., Nakajima, T., & Yamada, J. (2006). Association of neural and 







29(3), 721–733. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2005.08.047 
Olatunji, B. O., Naragon-Gainey, K., & Wolitzky-Taylor, K. B. (2013). Specificity 
of Rumination in Anxiety and Depression: A Multimodal Meta-Analysis. 
Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice, 20(3), 225–257. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/cpsp.12037 
Ondobaka, S., Kilner, J., & Friston, K. (2017). The role of interoceptive inference 
in theory of mind. Brain and Cognition, 112, 64–68. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bandc.2015.08.002 
Osaka, M., Yaoi, K., Minamoto, T., & Osaka, N. (2013). When do negative and 
positive emotions modulate working memory performance? Scientific 
Reports, 3(1), 1375. https://doi.org/10.1038/srep01375 
Owens, A. P., Allen, M., Ondobaka, S., & Friston, K. J. (2018). Interoceptive 
inference: From computational neuroscience to clinic. Neuroscience and 
Biobehavioral Reviews, 90, 174–183. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2018.04.017 
Ozonoff, S., Pennington, B. F., & Rogers, S. J. (1991). Executive Function 
Deficits in High-Functioning Autistic Individuals: Relationship to Theory of 
Mind. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 32(7), 1081–1105. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-7610.1991.tb00351.x 
Pan, J., Zhan, L., Hu, C. L., Yang, J., Wang, C., Gu, L., Zhong, S., Huang, Y., 
Wu, Q., Xie, X., Chen, Q., Zhou, H., Huang, M., & Wu, X. (2018). Emotion 
regulation and complex brain networks: Association between expressive 
suppression and efficiency in the fronto-parietal network and default-mode 
network. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 12. 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2018.00070 
Pardini, M., & Nichelli, P. F. (2009). Age-related decline in mentalizing skills 
across adult life span. Experimental Aging Research, 35(1), 98–106. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/03610730802545259 
Paulesu, E., Sambugaro, E., Torti, T., Danelli, L., Ferri, F., Scialfa, G., Sberna, 
M., Ruggiero, G. M., Bottini, G., & Sassaroli, S. (2009). Neural correlates of 
worry in generalized anxiety disorder and in normal controls: a functional 
MRI study. Psychological Medicine, 40(1), 117–124. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/s0033291709005649 
Paulus, M. P., & Stein, M. B. (2006). An insular view of anxiety. Biological 
Psychiatry, 60(4), 383–387. 
Paus, T. (2005). Mapping brain maturation and cognitive development during 
adolescence. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 9(2), 60–68. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2004.12.008 
Peiffer, C., Costes, N., Hervé, P., & Garcia-Larrea, L. (2008). Relief of dyspnea 
involves a characteristic brain activation and a specific quality of sensation. 
American Journal of Respiratory and Critical Care Medicine, 177(4), 440–
449. https://doi.org/10.1164/rccm.200612-1774OC 
Peña-Sarrionandia, A., Mikolajczak, M., & Gross, J. J. (2015). Integrating 







Frontiers in Psychology, 6(FEB), 160. 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00160 
Penny, W., Friston, K., Ashburner, J., Kiebel, S., & Nichols, T. (2007). Statistical 
Parametric Mapping: The Analysis of Functional Brain Images. In Statistical 
Parametric Mapping: The Analysis of Functional Brain Images. Elsevier Ltd. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-372560-8.X5000-1 
Peper, J. S., Brouwer, R. M., Schnack, H. G., van Baal, G. C., van Leeuwen, M., 
van den Berg, S. M., Delemarre-Van de Waal, H. A., Boomsma, D. I., Kahn, 
R. S., & Hulshoff Pol, H. E. (2009). Sex steroids and brain structure in 
pubertal boys and girls. Psychoneuroendocrinology, 34(3), 332–342. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psyneuen.2008.09.012 
Peper, J. S., de Reus, M. A., van den Heuvel, M. P., & Schutter, D. J. L. G. 
(2015). Short fused? associations between white matter connections, sex 
steroids, and aggression across adolescence. Human Brain Mapping, 36(3), 
1043–1052. https://doi.org/10.1002/hbm.22684 
Peper, J. S., van den Heuvel, M. P., Mandl, R. C. W., Pol, H. E. H., & van Honk, 
J. (2011). Sex steroids and connectivity in the human brain: A review of 
neuroimaging studies. Psychoneuroendocrinology, 36(8), 1101–1113. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psyneuen.2011.05.004 
Pérez-Iglesias, R., Tordesillas-Gutiérrez, D., McGuire, P. K., Barker, G. J., Roiz-
Santiañez, R., Mata, I., de Lucas, E. M., Rodríguez-Sánchez, J. M., Ayesa-
Arriola, R., Vazquez-Barquero, J. L., & Crespo-Facorro, B. (2010). White 
Matter Integrity and Cognitive Impairment in First-Episode Psychosis. 
American Journal of Psychiatry, 167(4), 451–458. 
https://doi.org/10.1176/appi.ajp.2009.09050716 
Perrett, D. I., Hietanen, J. K., Oram, M. W., & Benson, P. J. (1992). Organization 
and functions of cells responsive to faces in the temporal cortex. 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, 
Biological Sciences, 335(1273), 23–30. 
https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.1992.0003 
Perrett, D. I., Rolls, E. T., & Caan, W. (1982). Visual neurones responsive to 
faces in the monkey temporal cortex. Experimental Brain Research, 47(3), 
329–342. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00239352 
Perrett, D. I., Smith, P. A. J., Potter, D. D., Mistlin, A. J., Head, A. S., Milner, A. 
D., & Jeeves, M. A. (1985). Visual cells in the temporal cortex sensitive to 
face view and gaze direction. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London - 
Biological Sciences, 223(1232), 293–317. 
https://doi.org/10.1098/rspb.1985.0003 
Perry, D., Hendler, T., & Shamay-Tsoory, S. G. (2011). Projecting memories: The 
role of the hippocampus in emotional mentalizing. NeuroImage, 54(2), 1669–
1676. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2010.08.057 
Pessoa, L., Padmala, S., Kenzer, A., & Bauer, A. (2012). Interactions between 








Petrides, K. V., & Furnham, A. (2000). On the dimensional structure of emotional 
intelligence. Personality and Individual Differences, 29(2), 313–320. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0191-8869(99)00195-6 
Phillips, M. L., Ladouceur, C. D., & Drevets, W. C. (2008). A neural model of 
voluntary and automatic emotion regulation: Implications for understanding 
the pathophysiology and neurodevelopment of bipolar disorder. Molecular 
Psychiatry, 13(9), 833–857. https://doi.org/10.1038/mp.2008.65 
Phillips, Mary L., Drevets, W. C., Rauch, S. L., & Lane, R. (2003). Neurobiology 
of emotion perception II: Implications for major psychiatric disorders. 
Biological Psychiatry, 54(5), 515–528. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0006-
3223(03)00171-9 
Picó-Pérez, M., Radua, J., Steward, T., Menchón, J. M., & Soriano-Mas, C. 
(2017). Emotion regulation in mood and anxiety disorders: A meta-analysis 
of fMRI cognitive reappraisal studies. In Progress in Neuro-
Psychopharmacology and Biological Psychiatry (Vol. 79, pp. 96–104). 
Elsevier Inc. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pnpbp.2017.06.001 
Pizzagalli, D. A. (2011). Frontocingulate dysfunction in depression: Toward 
biomarkers of treatment response. Neuropsychopharmacology, 36(1), 183–
206. https://doi.org/10.1038/npp.2010.166 
Plant, E. A., Hyde, J. S., Keltner, D., & Devine, P. G. (2000). The gender 
stereotyping of emotions. Psychology of Women Quarterly, 24(1), 81–92. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1471-6402.2000.tb01024.x 
Poldrack, R. A. (2000). Imaging brain plasticity: Conceptual and methodological 
issues - A theoretical review. NeuroImage, 12(1), 1–13. 
https://doi.org/10.1006/nimg.2000.0596 
Poldrack, R. A. (2011). Inferring mental states from neuroimaging data: From 
reverse inference to large-scale decoding. Neuron, 72(5), 692–697. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2011.11.001 
Pollatos, O., Gramann, K., & Schandry, R. (2007). Neural systems connecting 
interoceptive awareness and feelings. Human Brain Mapping, 28(1), 9–18. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/hbm.20258 
Pollatos, O., & Schandry, R. (2008). Emotional processing and emotional 
memory are modulated by interoceptive awareness. Cognition and Emotion, 
22(2), 272–287. https://doi.org/10.1080/02699930701357535 
Powell, P. A. (2018). Individual differences in emotion regulation moderate the 
associations between empathy and affective distress. Motivation and 
Emotion, 42(4), 602–613. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11031-018-9684-4 
Prasad, K. M., Upton, C. H., Nimgaonkar, V. L., & Keshavan, M. S. (2015). 
Differential susceptibility of white matter tracts to inflammatory mediators in 
schizophrenia: an integrated DTI study. Schizophrenia Research, 161(1), 
119–125. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.schres.2014.09.043 
Preacher, K. J., & Hayes, A. F. (2004). SPSS and SAS procedures for estimating 
indirect effects in simple mediation models. Behavior Research Methods, 








Preckel, K., Kanske, P., & Singer, T. (2018). On the interaction of social affect 
and cognition: empathy, compassion and theory of mind. Current Opinion in 
Behavioral Sciences, 19, 1–6. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cobeha.2017.07.010 
Premack, D., & Woodruff, G. (1978). Chimpanzee problem-solving: A test for 
comprehension. Science, 202(4367), 532–535. 
https://doi.org/10.1126/science.705342 
PRIBRAM, K. H. (1973). the Primate Frontal Cortex – Executive of the Brain. In 
Psychophysiology of the Frontal Lobes (pp. 293–314). Elsevier. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-12-564340-5.50019-6 
Pruim, R. H. R., Mennes, M., van Rooij, D., Llera, A., Buitelaar, J. K., & 
Beckmann, C. F. (2015). ICA-AROMA: A robust ICA-based strategy for 
removing motion artifacts from fMRI data. NeuroImage, 112, 267–277. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2015.02.064 
Raichle, M. E. (2015). The Brain’s Default Mode Network. Annual Review of 
Neuroscience, 38(1), 433–447. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-neuro-
071013-014030 
Raichle, M. E., MacLeod, A. M., Snyder, A. Z., Powers, W. J., Gusnard, D. A., & 
Shulman, G. L. (2001). A default mode of brain function. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 98(2), 676–
682. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.98.2.676 
Ramasubbu, R., Lang, S., & Kiss, Z. H. T. (2018). Dosing of electrical 
parameters in deep brain stimulation (DBS) for intractable depression: a 
review of clinical studies. Frontiers in Psychiatry, 9, 302. 
Rapps, N., van Oudenhove, L., Enck, P., & Aziz, Q. (2008). Brain imaging of 
visceral functions in healthy volunteers and IBS patients. Journal of 
Psychosomatic Research, 64(6), 599–604. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpsychores.2008.02.018 
Rashid, B., Damaraju, E., Pearlson, G. D., & Calhoun, V. D. (2014). Dynamic 
connectivity states estimated from resting fMRI Identify differences among 
Schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and healthy control subjects. Frontiers in 
Human Neuroscience, 8(November), 897. 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2014.00897 
Ravizza, S. M., & Carter, C. S. (2008). Shifting set about task switching: 
behavioral and neural evidence for distinct forms of cognitive flexibility. 
Neuropsychologia, 46(12), 2924–2935. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2008.06.006 
Reuter, M., Rosas, H. D., & Fischl, B. (2010). Highly accurate inverse consistent 
registration: A robust approach. NeuroImage, 53(4), 1181–1196. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2010.07.020 
Revelle, W. (2010). psych: Procedures for personality and psychological 
research [Computer software manual]. In https://CRAN.R-
project.org/package=psych. Northwestern University. https://cran.r-







Riess, H. (2017). The Science of Empathy. Journal of Patient Experience, 4(2), 
74–77. https://doi.org/10.1177/2374373517699267 
Roberts, R. D., Zeidner, M., & Matthews, G. (2001). Does Emotional Intelligence 
Meet Traditional Standards for an Intelligence? Some New Data and 
Conclusions. In Emotion (Vol. 1, Issue 3, pp. 196–231). American 
Psychological Association. https://doi.org/10.1037/1528-3542.1.3.196 
Rombouts, S. A. R. B., Barkhof, F., Hoogenraad, F. G. C., Sprenger, M., & 
Scheltens, P. (1998). Within-subject reproducibility of visual activation 
patterns with functional magnetic resonance imaging using multislice echo 
planar imaging. Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 16(2), 105–113. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0730-725X(97)00253-1 
Rossi, F., Giorgio, A., Battaglini, M., Stromillo, M. L., Portaccio, E., Goretti, B., 
Federico, A., Hakiki, B., Amato, M. P., & De Stefano, N. (2012). Relevance 
of brain lesion location to cognition in relapsing multiple sclerosis. PloS One, 
7(11), e44826–e44826. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0044826 
Rubia, K., Russell, T., Overmeyer, S., Brammer, M. J., Bullmore, E. T., Sharma, 
T., Simmons, A., Williams, S. C. R., Giampietro, V., Andrew, C. M., & Taylor, 
E. (2001). Mapping motor inhibition: Conjunctive brain activations across 
different versions of go/no-go and stop tasks. NeuroImage, 13(2), 250–261. 
https://doi.org/10.1006/nimg.2000.0685 
Rucker, D. D., Preacher, K. J., Tormala, Z. L., & Petty, R. E. (2011). Mediation 
Analysis in Social Psychology: Current Practices and New 
Recommendations. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 5(6), 359–
371. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-9004.2011.00355.x 
Rusticus, S. A., & Lovato, C. Y. (2014). Impact of sample size and variability on 
the power and type I error rates of equivalence tests: A simulation study. 
Practical Assessment, Research and Evaluation, 19(11), 1–10. 
Sabbagh, M. A., Xu, F., Carlson, S. M., Moses, L. J., & Lee, K. (2006). The 
development of executive functioning and theory of mind: A comparison of 
Chinese and U.S. preschoolers. Psychological Science, 17(1), 74–81. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2005.01667.x 
Samson, A. C., Huber, O., & Gross, J. J. (2012). Emotion regulation in 
Asperger’s syndrome and high-functioning autism. Emotion, 12(4), 659–665. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/a0027975 
Santiago, C., Herrmann, N., Swardfager, W., Saleem, M., Oh, P. I., Black, S. E., 
& Lanctôt, K. L. (2015). White Matter Microstructural Integrity Is Associated 
with Executive Function and Processing Speed in Older Adults with 
Coronary Artery Disease. The American Journal of Geriatric Psychiatry, 
23(7), 754–763. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jagp.2014.09.008 
Saxe, R., & Powell, L. J. (2006). It’s the thought that counts: Specific brain 
regions for one component of theory of mind. Psychological Science, 17(8), 
692–699. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01768.x 
Scarapicchia, V., Mazerolle, E. L., Fisk, J. D., Ritchie, L. J., & Gawryluk, J. R. 







cognitive decline or cerebrovascular status? In Frontiers in Aging 
Neuroscience (Vol. 10, Issue FEB, p. 39). 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fnagi.2018.00039 
Schienle, A., & Scharmüller, W. (2013). Cerebellar activity and connectivity 
during the experience of disgust and happiness. Neuroscience, 246, 375–
381. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroscience.2013.04.048 
Schmahmann, J. D. (2001). The cerebrocerebellar system: Anatomic substrates 
of the cerebellar contribution to cognition and emotion. International Review 
of Psychiatry, 13(4), 247–260. https://doi.org/10.1080/09540260120082092 
Schmahmann, Jeremy D., & Pandya, D. N. (1995). Prefrontal cortex projections 
to the basilar pons in rhesus monkey: implications for the cerebellar 
contribution to higher function. Neuroscience Letters, 199(3), 175–178. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-3940(95)12056-A 
Schnack, H. G., van Haren, N. E. M., Brouwer, R. M., Evans, A., Durston, S., 
Boomsma, D. I., Kahn, R. S., & Hulshoff Pol, H. E. (2014). Changes in 
Thickness and Surface Area of the Human Cortex and Their Relationship 
with Intelligence. Cerebral Cortex, 25(6), 1608–1617. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/cercor/bht357 
Schreiter, S., Pijnenborg, G. H. M., & Aan Het Rot, M. (2013). Empathy in adults 
with clinical or subclinical depressive symptoms. Journal of Affective 
Disorders, 150(1), 1–16. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jad.2013.03.009 
Schuett, A. M. (2016). Attention Directs Emotion: Directed Attention Drives 
Emotional Intensity and Distinctiveness of Facial Perception. 
http://scholar.colorado.edu/honr_theses/1072/%5Cnhttp://scholar.colorado.e
du/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2380&context=honr_theses 
Schulte-Rüther, M., Markowitsch, H. J., Shah, N. J., Fink, G. R., & Piefke, M. 
(2008). Gender differences in brain networks supporting empathy. 
NeuroImage, 42(1), 393–403. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2008.04.180 
Schultz, W., Tremblay, L., & Hollerman, J. R. (2000). Reward processing in 
primate orbitofrontal cortex and basal ganglia. Cerebral Cortex, 10(3), 272–
283. https://doi.org/10.1093/cercor/10.3.272 
Schurz, M., Radua, J., Aichhorn, M., Richlan, F., & Perner, J. (2014). 
Fractionating theory of mind: A meta-analysis of functional brain imaging 
studies. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 42, 9–34. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2014.01.009 
Sedeño, L., Couto, B., Melloni, M., Canales-Johnson, A., Yoris, A., Baez, S., 
Esteves, S., Velásquez, M., Barttfeld, P., Sigman, M., Kichic, R., Chialvo, D., 
Manes, F., Bekinschtein, T. A., & Ibanez, A. (2014). How do you feel when 
you can’t feel your body? Interoception, functional connectivity and 
emotional processing in depersonalization-derealization disorder. PLoS 
ONE, 9(6). https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0098769 
Seeley, W. W., Menon, V., Schatzberg, A. F., Keller, J., Glover, G. H., Kenna, H., 







networks for salience processing and executive control. Journal of 
Neuroscience, 27(9), 2349–2356. https://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.5587-
06.2007 
Segerstrom, S. C., Tsao, J. C. I., Alden, L. E., & Craske, M. G. (2000). No Title. 
Cognitive Therapy and Research, 24(6), 671–688. 
https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1005587311498 
Ségonne, F., Dale, A. M., Busa, E., Glessner, M., Salat, D., Hahn, H. K., & 
Fischl, B. (2004). A hybrid approach to the skull stripping problem in MRI. 
NeuroImage, 22(3), 1060–1075. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2004.03.032 
Segonne, F., Pacheco, J., & Fischl, B. (2007). Geometrically Accurate Topology-
Correction of Cortical Surfaces Using Nonseparating Loops. IEEE 
Transactions on Medical Imaging, 26(4), 518–529. 
https://doi.org/10.1109/TMI.2006.887364 
Seth, A. K. (2013). Interoceptive inference, emotion, and the embodied self. 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 17(11), 565–573. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2013.09.007 
Shamay-tsoory, S. (2015). The neuropsychology of empathy : evidence from 
lesion studies Neuropsychologie de l ’ apathie : apports des études 
lésionnelles. Rev Neuropsychol, 7(4), 237–243. 
https://doi.org/10.1684/nrp.2015.0356 
Shamay-Tsoory, S G, Tomer, R., Berger, B. D., & Aharon-Peretz, J. (2003). 
Characterization of Empathy Deficits following Prefrontal Brain Damage: The 
Role of the Right Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex. Journal of Cognitive 
Neuroscience, 15(3), 324–337. 
https://doi.org/10.1162/089892903321593063 
Shamay-Tsoory, Simone G., Aharon-Peretz, J., & Perry, D. (2009). Two systems 
for empathy: A double dissociation between emotional and cognitive 
empathy in inferior frontal gyrus versus ventromedial prefrontal lesions. 
Brain, 132(3), 617–627. https://doi.org/10.1093/brain/awn279 
Shamay-Tsoory, Simone G., Harari, H., Aharon-Peretz, J., & Levkovitz, Y. 
(2010). The role of the orbitofrontal cortex in affective theory of mind deficits 
in criminal offenders with psychopathic tendencies. Cortex, 46(5), 668–677. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cortex.2009.04.008 
Shamay-Tsoory, Simone G., Shur, S., Harari, H., & Levkovitz, Y. (2007). 
Neurocognitive Basis of Impaired Empathy in Schizophrenia. 
Neuropsychology, 21(4), 431–438. https://doi.org/10.1037/0894-
4105.21.4.431 
Shin, L. M., & Liberzon, I. (2009). The Neurocircuitry of Fear, Stress, and Anxiety 
Disorders. Neuropsychopharmacology, 35(1), 169–191. 
https://doi.org/10.1038/npp.2009.83 
Shu, J., Hassell, S., Weber, J., Ochsner, K. N., & Mobbs, D. (2017). The role of 
empathy in experiencing vicarious anxiety. Journal of Experimental 








Siegle, G. J., Steinhauer, S. R., Thase, M. E., Stenger, V. A., & Carter, C. S. 
(2002). Can’t shake that feeling: event-related fMRI assessment of sustained 
amygdala activity in response to emotional information in depressed 
individuals. Biological Psychiatry, 51(9), 693–707. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/s0006-3223(02)01314-8 
Silton, N. R., & Fogel, J. (2010). Religiosity, empathy, and psychopathology 
among young adult children of rabbis. Archive for the Psychology of 
Religion, 32(3), 277–291. https://doi.org/10.1163/157361210X532040 
Simmonds, D. J., Pekar, J. J., & Mostofsky, S. H. (2008). Meta-analysis of 
Go/No-go tasks demonstrating that fMRI activation associated with response 
inhibition is task-dependent. Neuropsychologia, 46(1), 224–232. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2007.07.015 
Sims, T. B., Neufeld, J., Johnstone, T., & Chakrabarti, B. (2014). Autistic traits 
modulate frontostriatal connectivity during processing of rewarding faces. 
Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 9(12), 2010–2016. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/scan/nsu010 
Singer, T., Critchley, H. D., & Preuschoff, K. (2009). A common role of insula in 
feelings, empathy and uncertainty. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 13(8), 
334–340. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2009.05.001 
Singer, T., Seymour, B., O’Doherty, J., Kaube, H., Dolan, R. J., & Frith, C. D. 
(2004). Empathy for Pain Involves the Affective but not Sensory 
Components of Pain. Science, 303(5661), 1157–1162. 
https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1093535 
Sled, J. G., Zijdenbos, A. P., & Evans, A. C. (1998). A nonparametric method for 
automatic correction of intensity nonuniformity in MRI data. IEEE 
Transactions on Medical Imaging, 17(1), 87–97. 
https://doi.org/10.1109/42.668698 
Smith, S. M., & Nichols, T. E. (2009). Threshold-free cluster enhancement: 
Addressing problems of smoothing, threshold dependence and localisation 
in cluster inference. NeuroImage, 44(1), 83–98. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2008.03.061 
Smolker, H. R., Depue, B. E., Reineberg, A. E., Orr, J. M., & Banich, M. T. 
(2015). Individual differences in regional prefrontal gray matter morphometry 
and fractional anisotropy are associated with different constructs of 
executive function. Brain Structure & Function, 220(3), 1291–1306. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00429-014-0723-y 
Solso, S., Xu, R., Proudfoot, J., Hagler  Jr, D. J., Campbell, K., Venkatraman, V., 
Carter Barnes, C., Ahrens-Barbeau, C., Pierce, K., Dale, A., Eyler, L., & 
Courchesne, E. (2016). Diffusion Tensor Imaging Provides Evidence of 
Possible Axonal Overconnectivity in Frontal Lobes in Autism Spectrum 
Disorder Toddlers. Biological Psychiatry, 79(8), 676–684. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biopsych.2015.06.029 







J. (2018). Effects of the experimental administration of oral estrogen on 
prefrontal functions in healthy young women. Psychopharmacology, 235(12), 
3465–3477. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00213-018-5061-y 
Sonnby-Borgström, M. (2002). Automatic mimicry reactions as related to 
differences in emotional empathy. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 
43(5), 433–443. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9450.00312 
Sowell, E R, Thompson, P. M., Tessner, K. D., & Toga, A. W. (2001). Mapping 
continued brain growth and gray matter density reduction in dorsal frontal 
cortex: Inverse relationships during postadolescent brain maturation. The 
Journal of Neuroscience : The Official Journal of the Society for 
Neuroscience, 21(22), 8819–8829. https://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.21-
22-08819.2001 
Sowell, Elizabeth R, Thompson, P. M., Holmes, C. J., Jernigan, T. L., & Toga, A. 
W. (1999). In vivo evidence for post-adolescent brain maturation in frontal 
and striatal regions. Nature Neuroscience, 2(10), 859–861. 
https://doi.org/10.1038/13154 
Spielberger, C. D., Edwards, C. D., Montouri, J., & Lushene, R. (1973). State-
Trait Anxiety Inventory for Children. In PsycTESTS Dataset. American 
Psychological Association (APA). https://doi.org/10.1037/t06497-000 
Spreng, R. N., Mar, R. A., & Kim, A. S. N. (2009). The common neural basis of 
autobiographical memory, prospection, navigation, theory of mind, and the 
default mode: A quantitative meta-analysis. Journal of Cognitive 
Neuroscience, 21(3), 489–510. https://doi.org/10.1162/jocn.2008.21029 
Spreng, R. N., McKinnon, M. C., Mar, R. A., & Levine, B. (2009). The Toronto 
Empathy Questionnaire: Scale Development and Initial Validation of a 
Factor-Analytic Solution to Multiple Empathy Measures. Journal of 
Personality Assessment, 91(1), 62–71. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/00223890802484381 
Stein, M. B., Simmons, A. N., Feinstein, J. S., & Paulus, M. P. (2007). Increased 
amygdala and insula activation during emotion processing in anxiety-prone 
subjects. American Journal of Psychiatry, 164(2), 318–327. 
Stein, R. B., Gossen, E. R., & Jones, K. E. (2005). Neuronal variability: Noise or 
part of the signal? Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 6(5), 389–397. 
https://doi.org/10.1038/nrn1668 
Steinbeis, N. (2016). The role of self-other distinction in understanding others’ 
mental and emotional states: Neurocognitive mechanisms in children and 
adults. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological 
Sciences, 371(1686), 20150074. https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2015.0074 
Steinberg, L. (2005). Cognitive and affective development in adolescence. 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 9(2), 69–74. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2004.12.005 
Sternberg. (2000). Emotional Intelligence Checklist Emotional Intelligence. 
Business, 78(2), 1–4. 







Unique role in cognition and emotion. Journal of Neuropsychiatry and 
Clinical Neurosciences, 23(2), 121–125. 
https://doi.org/10.1176/jnp.23.2.jnp121 
Stoet, G. (2010). Sex differences in the processing of flankers. Quarterly Journal 
of Experimental Psychology, 63(4), 633–638. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/17470210903464253 
Strack, F., Martin, L. L., & Stepper, S. (1988). Inhibiting and Facilitating 
Conditions of the Human Smile: A Nonobtrusive Test of the Facial Feedback 
Hypothesis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 54(5), 768–777. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.54.5.768 
Strayer, J. (1993). Children’s Concordant Emotions and Cognitions in Response 
to Observed Emotions. Child Development, 64(1), 188–201. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.1993.tb02903.x 
Stroop, J. R. (1935). Studies of interference in serial verbal reactions. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology, 18(6), 643–662. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0054651 
Stuss, D. T., & Levine, B. (2002). Adult clinical neuropsychology: Lessons from 
studies of the frontal lobes. Annual Review of Psychology, 53(1), 401–433. 
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.53.100901.135220 
Tajadura-Jiménez, A., & Tsakiris, M. (2014). Balancing the “inner” and the “outer” 
self: Interoceptive sensitivity modulates self-other boundaries. In Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: General (Vol. 143, Issue 2, pp. 736–744). 
American Psychological Association. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0033171 
Takeuchi, H., Taki, Y., Nouchi, R., Hashizume, H., Sekiguchi, A., Kotozaki, Y., 
Nakagawa, S., Miyauchi, C. M., Sassa, Y., & Kawashima, R. (2014). Effects 
of multitasking-training on gray matter structure and resting state neural 
mechanisms. Human Brain Mapping, 35(8), 3646–3660. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/hbm.22427 
Tamm, L., Barnea-Goraly, N., & Reiss, A. L. (2012). Diffusion tensor imaging 
reveals white matter abnormalities in Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder. 
Psychiatry Research, 202(2), 150–154. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pscychresns.2012.04.001 
Tamres, L. K., Janicki, D., & Helgeson, V. S. (2002). Sex Differences in Coping 
Behavior: A Meta-Analytic Review and an Examination of Relative Coping. 
Personality and Social Psychology Review, 6(1), 2–30. 
https://doi.org/10.1207/S15327957PSPR0601_1 
Tamura, I., Kitagawa, M., Otsuki, M., Kikuchi, S., Tashiro, K., & Dubois, B. 
(2007). Pure Topographical Disorientation Following a Right Forceps Major 
of the Splenium Lesion: A Case Study. Neurocase, 13(3), 178–184. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13554790701448812 
Tarasuik, J. C., Ciorciari, J., & Stough, C. (2009). Understanding the 
Neurobiology of Emotional Intelligence: A Review (pp. 307–320). 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-88370-0_16 
Tavor, I., Parker Jones, O., Mars, R. B., Smith, S. M., Behrens, T. E., & Jbabdi, 







during task performance. Science, 352(6282), 216–220. 
https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aad8127 
Taylor, G. J. (2001). Low emotional intelligence and mental illness. In Emotional 
intelligence in everyday life:  A scientific inquiry. (pp. 67–81). Psychology 
Press. 
Taylor, K. S., Seminowicz, D. A., & Davis, K. D. (2009). Two systems of resting 
state connectivity between the insula and cingulate cortex. Human Brain 
Mapping, 30(9), 2731–2745. https://doi.org/10.1002/hbm.20705 
Taylor, R., Théberge, J., Williamson, P. C., Densmore, M., & Neufeld, R. W. J. 
(2016). ACC Neuro-over-Connectivity Is Associated with Mathematically 
Modeled Additional Encoding Operations of Schizophrenia Stroop-Task 
Performance. Frontiers in Psychology, 7, 1295. 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01295 
Team. (2020). RStudio. PBC. http://www.rstudio.com 
Terasawa, Y., Fukushima, H., & Umeda, S. (2013). How does interoceptive 
awareness interact with the subjective experience of emotion? An fMRI 
Study. Human Brain Mapping, 34(3), 598–612. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/hbm.21458 
Thayer, R. E., Newman, J. R., & McClain, T. M. (1994). Self-Regulation of Mood: 
Strategies for Changing a Bad Mood, Raising Energy, and Reducing 
Tension. In Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (Vol. 67, Issue 5). 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.67.5.910 
Thoma, P., Zalewski, I., von Reventlow, H. G., Norra, C., Juckel, G., & Daum, I. 
(2011). Cognitive and affective empathy in depression linked to executive 
control. Psychiatry Research, 189(3), 373–378. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psychres.2011.07.030 
Thompson, W. F., Schellenberg, E. G., & Husain, G. (2004). Decoding Speech 
Prosody: Do Music Lessons Help? Emotion, 4(1), 46–64. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/1528-3542.4.1.46 
Thomsen, D. K., Mehlsen, M. Y., Viidik, A., Sommerlund, B., & Zachariae, R. 
(2005). Age and gender differences in negative affect - Is there a role for 
emotion regulation? Personality and Individual Differences, 38(8), 1935–
1946. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2004.12.001 
Timmers, M., Fischer, A. H., & Manstead, A. S. R. (2003). Ability versus 
vulnerability: Beliefs about men’s and women’s emotional behaviour. In 
Cognition and Emotion (Vol. 17, Issue 1, pp. 41–63). 
https://doi.org/10.1080/02699930302277 
Todorov, A., & Engell, A. D. (2008). The role of the amygdala in implicit 
evaluation of emotionally neutral faces. Social Cognitive and Affective 
Neuroscience, 3(4), 303–312. https://doi.org/10.1093/scan/nsn033 
Tognoli, E., & Kelso, J. A. S. (2014). The Metastable Brain. Neuron, 81(1), 35–
48. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2013.12.022 
Tollefson, J. (2019). Humans are driving one million species to extinction. In 








Tone, E. B., & Tully, E. C. (2014). Empathy as a risky strength: A multilevel 
examination of empathy and risk for internalizing disorders. Development 
and Psychopathology, 26(4 0 2), 1547–1565. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0954579414001199 
Tops, M., Boksem, M. A. S., Luu, P., & Tucker, D. M. (2011). Brain substrates of 
behavioral programs associated with self-regulation. Frontiers in 
Psychology, 2(AUG), 152. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2010.00152 
Tops, M., & De Jong, R. (2006). Posing for success: Clenching a fist facilitates 
approach. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 13(2), 229–234. 
https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03193835 
Tremblay, L., & Schultz, W. (1999). Relative reward preference in primate 
orbitofrontal cortex. Nature, 398(6729), 704–708. 
https://doi.org/10.1038/19525 
Treynor, W. (2003). No Title. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 27(3), 247–259. 
https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1023910315561 
Trilla, Panasiti, M. S., & Chakrabarti, B. (2015). The plasticity of the mirror 
system: How reward learning modulates cortical motor simulation of others. 
Neuropsychologia, 70, 255–262. 
https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2015.02.033 
Tsakiris, M., Tajadura-Jiménez, A., & Costantini, M. (2011). Just a heartbeat 
away from one’s body:Interoceptive sensitivity predicts malleability of body-
representations. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 
278(1717), 2470–2476. https://doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2010.2547 
Urry, H. L., van Reekum, C. M., Johnstone, T., & Davidson, R. J. (2009). 
Individual differences in some (but not all) medial prefrontal regions reflect 
cognitive demand while regulating unpleasant emotion. NeuroImage, 47(3), 
852–863. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2009.05.069 
Vakorin, V. A., Lippe, S., & McIntosh, A. R. (2011). Variability of brain signals 
processed locally transforms into higher connectivity with brain development. 
Journal of Neuroscience, 31(17), 6405–6413. 
https://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.3153-10.2011 
Vakorin, V. A., Mišić, B., Krakovska, O., & Mcintosh, A. R. (2011). Empirical and 
theoretical aspects of generation and transfer of information in a 
neuromagnetic source network. Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience, 
5(NOVEMBER 2011), 96. https://doi.org/10.3389/fnsys.2011.00096 
van den Heuvel, M. P., & Hulshoff Pol, H. E. (2010). Exploring the brain network: 
A review on resting-state fMRI functional connectivity. In European 
Neuropsychopharmacology (Vol. 20, Issue 8, pp. 519–534). 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroneuro.2010.03.008 
van der Heiden, L., Scherpiet, S., Konicar, L., Birbaumer, N., & Veit, R. (2013). 
Inter-individual differences in successful perspective taking during pain 
perception mediates emotional responsiveness in self and others: An fMRI 








Vanderhasselt, M.-A., Kühn, S., & De Raedt, R. (2011). Healthy brooders employ 
more attentional resources when disengaging from the negative: an event-
related fMRI study. Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience, 11(2), 
207–216. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13415-011-0022-5 
Vanderwal, T., Kelly, C., Eilbott, J., Mayes, L. C., & Castellanos, F. X. (2015). 
Inscapes: A movie paradigm to improve compliance in functional magnetic 
resonance imaging. NeuroImage, 122, 222–232. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2015.07.069 
Viviani, R. (2013). Emotion regulation, attention to emotion, and the ventral 
attentional network. In Frontiers in Human Neuroscience (Vol. 7, Issue NOV, 
p. 746). https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2013.00746 
Vladimir, K., Elena, V., Ekaterina, K., & Pavel, E. (2019). A review of 
neurophysiological and genetic correlates of emotional intelligence. 
International Journal of Cognitive Research in Science, Engineering and 
Education, 7(1), 137–142. https://doi.org/10.5937/ijcrsee1901137K 
Vogeley, K., Bussfeld, P., Newen, A., Herrmann, S., Happé, F., Falkai, P., Maier, 
W., Shah, N. J., Fink, G. R., & Zilles, K. (2001). Mind reading: Neural 
mechanisms of theory of mind and self-perspective. NeuroImage, 14(1 I), 
170–181. https://doi.org/10.1006/nimg.2001.0789 
von dem Hagen, E. A. H., Stoyanova, R. S., Baron-Cohen, S., & Calder, A. J. 
(2012). Reduced functional connectivity within and between ‘social’ resting 
state networks in autism spectrum conditions. Social Cognitive and Affective 
Neuroscience, 8(6), 694–701. https://doi.org/10.1093/scan/nss053 
Votinov, M., Wagels, L., Hoffstaedter, F., Kellermann, T., Goerlich, K. S., 
Eickhoff, S. B., & Habel, U. (2020). Effects of exogenous testosterone 
application on network connectivity within emotion regulation systems. 
Scientific Reports, 10(1), 2352. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-020-59329-0 
WABER, D. P., DE MOOR, C., FORBES, P. W., ALMLI, C. R., BOTTERON, K. 
N., LEONARD, G., MILOVAN, D., PAUS, T., & RUMSEY, J. (2007). The NIH 
MRI study of normal brain development: Performance of a population based 
sample of healthy children aged 6 to 18 years on a neuropsychological 
battery. Journal of the International Neuropsychological Society, 13(05). 
https://doi.org/10.1017/s1355617707070841 
Waber, D. P., Forbes, P. W., Almli, C. R., Blood, E. A., & Group, B. D. C. (2012). 
Four-year longitudinal performance of a population-based sample of healthy 
children on a neuropsychological battery: the NIH MRI study of normal brain 
development. Journal of the International Neuropsychological Society : JINS, 
18(2), 179–190. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1355617711001536 
Watkins, E. R., & Moulds, M. L. (2009). Thought Control Strategies, Thought 
Suppression, and Rumination in Depression. International Journal of 
Cognitive Therapy, 2(3), 235–251. https://doi.org/10.1521/ijct.2009.2.3.235 
Webb, T. L., Miles, E., & Sheeran, P. (2012). Dealing with feeling: A meta-







emotion regulation. In Psychological Bulletin (Vol. 138, Issue 4, pp. 775–
808). American Psychological Association. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0027600 
Weilbächer, R. A., & Gluth, S. (2017). The interplay of hippocampus and 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex in memory-based decision making. In Brain 
Sciences (Vol. 7, Issue 1). MDPI AG. 
https://doi.org/10.3390/brainsci7010004 
Weissman, D. H., Gopalakrishnan, A., Hazlett, C. J., & Woldorff, M. G. (2005). 
Dorsal anterior cingulate cortex resolves conflict from distracting stimuli by 
boosting attention toward relevant events. Cerebral Cortex, 15(2), 229–237. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/cercor/bhh125 
Werner, N. S., Duschek, S., Mattern, M., & Schandry, R. (2009). Interoceptive 
sensitivity modulates anxiety during public speaking. Journal of 
Psychophysiology, 23(2), 85–94. https://doi.org/10.1027/0269-8803.23.2.85 
Whitfield-Gabrieli, S., & Nieto-Castanon, A. (2012). Conn: A Functional 
Connectivity Toolbox for Correlated and Anticorrelated Brain Networks. 
Brain Connectivity, 2(3), 125–141. https://doi.org/10.1089/brain.2012.0073 
Whittle, S., Yücel, M., Yap, M. B. H., & Allen, N. B. (2011). Sex differences in the 
neural correlates of emotion: Evidence from neuroimaging. In Biological 
Psychology (Vol. 87, Issue 3, pp. 319–333). 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biopsycho.2011.05.003 
Wicker, B., Keysers, C., Plailly, J., Royet, J. P., Gallese, V., & Rizzolatti, G. 
(2003). Both of us disgusted in My insula: The common neural basis of 
seeing and feeling disgust. Neuron, 40(3), 655–664. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0896-6273(03)00679-2 
Wide, J. K., Hanratty, K., Ting, J., & Galea, L. A. M. (2004). High level estradiol 
impairs and low level estradiol facilitates non-spatial working memory. 
Behavioural Brain Research, 155(1), 45–53. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bbr.2004.04.001 
Wiens, S. (2005). Interoception in emotional experience. In Current Opinion in 
Neurology (Vol. 18, Issue 4, pp. 442–447). Lippincott Williams and Wilkins. 
https://doi.org/10.1097/01.wco.0000168079.92106.99 
Wild, B., Erb, M., & Bartels, M. (2001). Are emotions contagious? Evoked 
emotions while viewing emotionally expressive faces: Quality, quantity, time 
course and gender differences. Psychiatry Research, 102(2), 109–124. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-1781(01)00225-6 
Witte, A. V., Savli, M., Holik, A., Kasper, S., & Lanzenberger, R. (2010). Regional 
sex differences in grey matter volume are associated with sex hormones in 
the young adult human brain. NeuroImage, 49(2), 1205–1212. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2009.09.046 
Wozniak, J. R., Krach, L., Ward, E., Mueller, B. A., Muetzel, R., Schnoebelen, S., 
Kiragu, A., & Lim, K. O. (2007). Neurocognitive and neuroimaging correlates 
of pediatric traumatic brain injury: a diffusion tensor imaging (DTI) study. 
Archives of Clinical Neuropsychology : The Official Journal of the National 








Wu, Yan, Li, H., Zhou, Y., Yu, J., Zhang, Y., Song, M., Qin, W., Yu, C., & Jiang, 
T. (2016). Sex-specific neural circuits of emotion regulation in the 
centromedial amygdala. Scientific Reports, 6. 
https://doi.org/10.1038/srep23112 
Wu, Yan, Wang, J., Zhang, Y., Zheng, D., Zhang, J., Rong, M., Wu, H., Wang, 
Y., Zhou, K., & Jiang, T. (2016). The neuroanatomical basis for posterior 
superior parietal lobule control lateralization of visuospatial attention. 
Frontiers in Neuroanatomy, 10(MAR), 32. 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fnana.2016.00032 
Wu, Yupeng, Sun, D., Wang, Y., & Wang, Y. (2016). Subcomponents and 
Connectivity of the Inferior Fronto-Occipital Fasciculus Revealed by Diffusion 
Spectrum Imaging Fiber Tracking. Frontiers in Neuroanatomy, 10, 88. 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fnana.2016.00088 
Xiang, Y., Zhao, S., Wang, H., Wu, Q., Kong, F., & Mo, L. (2017). Examining 
brain structures associated with dispositional envy and the mediation role of 
emotional intelligence. Scientific Reports, 7(1), 39947. 
https://doi.org/10.1038/srep39947 
Yamagata, T., Nakayama, Y., Tanji, J., & Hoshi, E. (2012). Distinct information 
representation and processing for goal-directed behavior in the dorsolateral 
and ventrolateral prefrontal cortex and the dorsal premotor cortex. The 
Journal of Neuroscience : The Official Journal of the Society for 
Neuroscience, 32(37), 12934–12949. 
https://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.2398-12.2012 
Yamasaki, H., LaBar, K. S., & McCarthy, G. (2002). Dissociable prefrontal brain 
systems for attention and emotion. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences of the United States of America, 99(17), 11447–11451. 
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.182176499 
Yan, Z., Hong, S., Liu, F., & Su, Y. (2020). A meta-analysis of the relationship 
between empathy and executive function. PsyCh Journal, 9(1), 34–43. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/pchj.311 
Yeo, Krienen, F. M., Sepulcre, J., Sabuncu, M. R., Lashkari, D., Hollinshead, M., 
Roffman, J. L., Smoller, J. W., Zöllei, L., Polimeni, J. R., Fisch, B., Liu, H., & 
Buckner, R. L. (2011). The organization of the human cerebral cortex 
estimated by intrinsic functional connectivity. Journal of Neurophysiology, 
106(3), 1125–1165. https://doi.org/10.1152/jn.00338.2011 
Young, L., Dodell-Feder, D., & Saxe, R. (2010). What gets the attention of the 
temporo-parietal junction? An fMRI investigation of attention and theory of 
mind. Neuropsychologia, 48(9), 2658–2664. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2010.05.012 
Yuan, P., & Raz, N. (2014). Prefrontal cortex and executive functions in healthy 
adults: a meta-analysis of structural neuroimaging studies. Neuroscience 








Yurgelun-Todd, D. (2007). Emotional and cognitive changes during adolescence. 
Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 17(2), 251–257. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.conb.2007.03.009 
Zahn-Waxler, C., Cole, P. M., & Barrett, K. C. (2010). Guilt and empathy: Sex 
differences and implications for the development of depression. The 
Development of Emotion Regulation and Dysregulation, 243–272. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511663963.012 
Zaki. (2014). Empathy: A motivated account. Psychological Bulletin, 140(6), 
1608–1647. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0037679 
Zaki, J., Davis, J. I., & Ochsner, K. N. (2012). Overlapping activity in anterior 
insula during interoception and emotional experience. NeuroImage, 62(1), 
493–499. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2012.05.012 
Zaki, J., & Ochsner, K. (2012). The neuroscience of empathy: Progress, pitfalls 
and promise. In Nature Neuroscience (Vol. 15, Issue 5, pp. 675–680). 
Nature Publishing Group. https://doi.org/10.1038/nn.3085 
Zhang, L., Zuo, X. N., Ng, K. K., Chong, J. S. X., Shim, H. Y., Ong, M. Q. W., 
Loke, Y. M., Choo, B. L., Chong, E. J. Y., Wong, Z. X., Hilal, S., 
Venketasubramanian, N., Tan, B. Y., Chen, C. L. H., & Zhou, J. H. (2020). 
Distinct BOLD variability changes in the default mode and salience networks 
in Alzheimer’s disease spectrum and associations with cognitive decline. 
Scientific Reports, 10(1), 6457. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-020-63540-4 
Zhao, X., Lynch, J. G., & Chen, Q. (2010). Reconsidering Baron and Kenny: 
Myths and Truths about Mediation Analysis. Journal of Consumer Research, 


































NAME:       Teodora Stoica 
 
ADDRESS: Interdisciplinary Department 
         Houchens Building, Suite 105 
        University of Louisville 
                    Louisville, Kentucky 40292 
 
DOB:          Pitesti, Romania – February 7, 1986 
 
EDUCATION 
& TRAINING: B.A. Psychology 
   East Carolina University 
   2004-2007 
 
   M.S. Neuroscience 
   University of Hartford 
   2009-2010 
 
   Ph.D. Translational Neuroscience 
   University of Louisville 
   2015-2021 
 
 
AWARDS:  Dissertation Completion Award  
  2020 
  Graduate Intramural Research and Creative Activities Grant 
  2020 
  Dissertation Award  
  2019 
  Excellence in Service Award 
  2019 
  Next Generation Award 
  2018 
  Cloud Computing Scholarship 
  2017 
  Graduate Research Grant 







  Travel Scholarship for Brainhack Course 
  2017 
  Outstanding Trainee Award  
  2017 
  Travel Award 
  2013 
  Carol Ripley Scholarship for Outstanding Thesis 
  2007 
 
PROFESSIONAL SOCIETES:  Cognitive Neuroscience Society 
Organization for Human Brain Mapping 
Society for Neuroscience 
American Psychological Association 
Social and Affective Neuroscience Society 
 
PUBLICATIONS:  
1. Stoica, T., Depue, B.E. Resting State Relationship between Alexithymia and 
Emotion Regulation Strategy Mediated by Personality Traits in Large Sample: A 
Dynamic Connectivity Study (In Preparation) 
2. Stoica, T., Depue, B.E.(2021) Interoceptive Awareness and Empathy Share 
Intrinsic Spatial and Temporal Connectivity. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 
3. Stoica, T., Knight L.K, Naaz, F., Patton, S.C., Depue, B.E. (2021) Functional 
Connectivity Gender Differences during Emotion Regulation. Neuropsychologia 
4. Stoica T., Depue, B.E. Neuroimaging Insights into Common Behavioral 
Phenotypes of Autism Spectrum Disorders. Textbook of Clinical and Basic 
Neuroscience in Autism Spectrum Disorders (Book Chapter, In Press) 
5. Stoica, T., Knight, L.K, Naaz, F., Ramic, M., Depue, B.E (2019) Structural 
Morphometry and Connectivity of the Lateral Prefrontal Cortex Relates to Executive 
Function and Estradiol level in healthy adolescents.B rain and Behavior 
6. Knight, L.K, Stoica, T., Fogleman, N., Depue, B.E. (2019) Convergent Neural 
Correlates of Empathy and Anxiety during Socioemotional Processing.F rontiers in 
Human Neuroscience 
7. Fogleman, N., Naaz, F., Knight, L., Stoica, T., Patton, S., & Olson-Madden, J. et 
al. (2017). Reduced lateral prefrontal cortical volume is associated with 
performance on the modified Iowa Gambling Task: A surface based 
morphometric analysis of previously deployed veterans. Psychiatry Research: 
Neuroimaging 
8. Knight, L., Naaz, F., Stoica, T., & Depue, B. (2017). Lifetime PTSD and geriatric 
depression symptomatology relate to altered dorsomedial frontal and amygdala 
morphometry. Psychiatry Research: Neuroimaging 
9. Evon, D., Golin, C., Stoica, T., Jones, R., Willis, S., Galanko, J., & Fried, M. 
(2016). What's Important to the Patient? Informational Needs of Patients Making 








10. Radua, J., Stoica, T., Scheinost, D., Pittenger, C., & Hampson, M. (2016). 
Neural Correlates of Success and Failure Signals During Neurofeedback 
Learning. Neuroscience 
11. Scheinost, D., Stoica, T., Wasylink, S., Gruner, P., Saksa, J., Pittenger, C., & 
Hampson, M.(2014). Resting state functional connectivity predicts 
neurofeedback response. Frontiers In Behavioral Neuroscience 
12. Hampson, M., Stoica, T., Saksa, J., Scheinost, D., Qiu, M., & Bhawnani, J. et 
al.(2012). Real-time fMRI Biofeedback Targeting the Orbitofrontal Cortex for 
Contamination Anxiety. Journal Of Visualized Experiments 
13. Hampson M., Stoica T., Saksa J.R., Scheinost D., Qiu M., Bhawnani J., 
Pittenger, C., Papademetris X., Constable R.T. (2013). Biofeedback of real-time 
fMRI data from OFC to reduce contamination anxiety Translational Psychiatry 
 
NATIONAL MEETING PRESENTATIONS: 
 
(Poster) Society for Affective Neuroscience (SANS), Virtual, April 
(Participant) NeuroHackacademy, Virtual, July-August 
(Participant) Organization for Computational Neurosciences, Virtual, July 
(Participant) Organization for Human Brain Mapping, Virtual, July 
(Participant) Reading Emotions Symposium, University of Reading, Virtual, June 
*(Workshop) Brain Connectivity Workshop, Toronto, Canada, June 
*(Workshop) Summer School in Social Neuroscience, Durham, NC June 
(Participant) Society for Affective Science, Virtual, May 
(Poster) Cognitive Neuroscience Society, Virtual, May 
*(Poster) Society and Affective Neuroscience Society, Santa Barbara, CA May 
*Event canceled due to COVID-19 Pandemic 
(Invited Outreach Keynote) Society for Neuroscience (SfN), Chicago, IL October 
(Poster) Organization for Human Brain Mapping, Rome, Italy July 
(Poster) Graduate Student Research Conference, U of Louisville, February 
(Talk) Society for Neuroscience (SfN), San Diego, CA November 
(Poster) Neuroscience Day, U of Louisville April 
(Poster) Graduate Student Research Conference, U of Louisville March 
(Poster) Cognitive Neuroscience Society, Boston MA March 
(Poster) Organization for Human Brain Mapping, Vancouver, BC June 2017 
(Poster) Cognitive Neuroscience Society, San Francisco, CA April 2017 
(Talk/Poster) Neuroscience Day, University of Louisville March 2017 
(Poster) Neuroscience Day, University of Louisville April 2016 
(Talk/Poster) Cognitive Neuroscience Society, New York, NY April 2016 
(Poster) Research!Louisville October 2015 
(Poster) SBMT Baltimore MD May 2013 
(Talk/Poster) National TBI Research Symposium, Bethesda MD April 2013 
(Poster) ISMRM, Salt Lake City, UT April 2013 
